Showing papers by "Jeremy Greenwood published in 2014"
TL;DR: In this article, the United States Census Bureau suggests that there has been a rise in assortative mating, which contributes to household income inequality, and the high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this.
Abstract: Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating aects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coe¢ cient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this
345 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that as contraception improves there is less need for parents, churches, and states to inculcate sexual mores, and that the marginal gains from socializing their children against its costs can be balanced.
Abstract: Societies socialize children about sex. This is done in the presence of peer-group effects, which may encourage undesirable behavior. Parents want the best for their children. Still, they weigh the marginal gains from socializing their children against its costs. Churches and states may stigmatize sex, both because of a concern about the welfare of their flocks and the need to control the cost of charity associated with out-of-wedlock births. Modern contraceptives have profoundly affected the calculus for instilling sexual mores. As contraception improves there is less need for parents, churches, and states to inculcate sexual mores. Technology affects culture. (JEL: D58, J13, O15, N30)
46 citations
Posted Content•
01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of union learning and organizing is developed to provide an answer to the question "What type of businesses attract unions?" A union monitors establishments in an industry to learn about their productivity and decides which ones to organize.
Abstract: What type of businesses attract unions? A theory of union learning and organizing is developed to provide an answer to this question. A union monitors establishments in an industry to learn about their productivity and decides which ones to organize. An establishment becomes unionized if the union wins a certification election, the outcome of which can be influenced by costly actions taken by the two parties. The model offers predictions on the nature of union selection, which are examined empirically. Data on union certification elections, matched with data on establishment characteristics, is used to explore where union activity is concentrated. In Industrial and Labor Relations Review (May 2017), v. 70, n. 3: 733i?½766.
16 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the United States Census Bureau suggests that there has been a rise in assortative mating and that this is important for household income inequality, and the high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 was important for this result.
Abstract: Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this result.
13 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the United States Census Bureau suggests that there has been a rise in assortative mating and that this is important for household income inequality, and the high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 was important for this result.
Abstract: Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this result.
8 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic model of the union organizing process is constructed to answer this question, which predicts two main selection effects: unions secure elections in larger and more productive establishments early in their life-cycles, and among the establishments that experience an election, unions are more likely to win in smaller and less productive ones.
Abstract: What type of businesses do unions target for organizing? A dynamic model of the union organizing process is constructed to answer this question. A union monitors establishments in an industry to learn about their productivity and decides which ones to organize and when. An establishment becomes unionized if the union targets it for organizing and wins the union certification election. The model predicts two main selection effects: unions secure elections in larger and more productive establishments early in their life-cycles, and among the establishments that experience an election, unions are more likely to win in smaller and less productive ones. These predictions find support in union certification election data for 1977-2007 matched with data on establishment characteristics. Other empirical regularities pertaining to union organizing are also documented.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a dynamic model of the union organizing process is constructed to answer this question, which predicts two main selection effects: unions secure elections in larger and more productive establishments early in their life-cycles, and among the establishments that experience an election, unions are more likely to win in smaller and less productive ones.
Abstract: What type of businesses do unions target for organizing? A dynamic model of the union organizing process is constructed to answer this question. A union monitors establishments in an industry to learn about their productivity and decides which ones to organize and when. An establishment becomes unionized if the union targets it for organizing and wins the union certification election. The model predicts two main selection effects: unions secure elections in larger and more productive establishments early in their life-cycles, and among the establishments that experience an election, unions are more likely to win in smaller and less productive ones. These predictions find support in union certification election data for 1977-2007 matched with data on establishment characteristics. Other empirical regularities pertaining to union organizing are also documented.
1 citations