Jiandong Ju

TL;DR: In this article, a two-stage game is used to model firms' strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization, franchising, or divestiture.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a simple model to study the relationship between domestic institutions -financial system, corporate governance, and property rights protection - and patterns of international capital flows and found that financial globalization always improves the welfare of a developed country with a good financial system, its effect is ambiguous for a developing country with an inefficient financial sector/poor corporate governance.

TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic general equilibrium model was developed to explore industrial evolution and economic growth in a closed developing economy, where industries will endogenously upgrade toward the more capital-intensive ones as the capital endowment becomes more abundant.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors unify the two competing schools of thought in a general equilibrium framework and show that there are threshold effects defined by a set of deep institutional parameters (cost of financial intermediation, quality of corporate governance, and level of property rights protection) which can be used to separate economies of high quality institutions from those of low quality institutions.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a simple model to study how domestic institutions affect patterns of international capital flows, where domestic savings leave the country in the form of financial capital outflows but domestic investment takes place via inward FDI.