The Transmission Control Protocol.

Im Jahre 1977 wurde der „Data Encryption Algorithm“ (DEA) vom „National Bureau of Standards“ (NBS, später „National Institute of Standards and Technology“ – NIST) zum amerikanischen Verschlüsselungsstandard für Bundesbehörden erklärt [NBS_77]. 1981 folgte die Verabschiedung der DEA-Spezifikation als ANSI-Standard „DES“ [ANSI_81]. Die Empfehlung des DES als StandardVerschlüsselungsverfahren wurde auf fünf Jahre befristet und 1983, 1988 und 1993 um jeweils weitere fünf Jahre verlängert. Derzeit liegt eine Neufassung des NISTStandards vor [NIST_99], in dem der DES für weitere fünf Jahre übergangsweise zugelassen sein soll, aber die Verwendung von Triple-DES empfohlen wird: eine dreifache Anwendung des DES mit drei verschiedenen Schlüsseln (effektive Schlüssellänge: 168 bit) [NIST_99]. Der DES basiert auf einer von Horst Feistel bei IBM entwickelten Blockchiffre („Lucipher“) mit einer Schlüssellänge von 128 bit. Da die amerikanische „National Security Agency“ (NSA) dafür gesorgt hatte, daß der DES eine Schlüssellänge von lediglich 64 bit besitzt, von denen nur 56 bit relevant sind, und spezielle Substitutionsboxen (den „kryptographischen Kern“ des Verfahrens) erhielt, deren Konstruktionskriterien von der NSA nicht veröffentlicht wurden, war das Verfahren von Beginn an umstritten. Kritiker nahmen an, daß es eine geheime „Trapdoor“ in dem Verfahren gäbe, die der NSA eine OnlineEntschlüsselung auch ohne Kenntnis des Schlüssels erlauben würde. Zwar ließ sich dieser Verdacht nicht erhärten, aber sowohl die Zunahme von Rechenleistung als auch die Parallelisierung von Suchalgorithmen machen heute eine Schlüssellänge von 56 bit zum Sicherheitsrisiko. Zuletzt konnte 1998 mit einer von der „Electronic Frontier Foundation“ (EFF) entwickelten Spezialmaschine mit 1.800 parallel arbeitenden, eigens entwickelten Krypto-Prozessoren ein DES-Schlüssel in einer Rekordzeit von 2,5 Tagen gefunden werden. Um einen Nachfolger für den DES zu finden, kündigte das NIST am 2. Januar 1997 die Suche nach einem „Advanced Encryption Standard“ (AES) an. Ziel dieser Initiative ist, in enger Kooperation mit Forschung und Industrie ein symmetrisches Verschlüsselungsverfahren zu finden, das geeignet ist, bis weit ins 21. Jahrhundert hinein amerikanische Behördendaten wirkungsvoll zu verschlüsseln. Dazu wurde am 12. September 1997 ein offizieller „Call for Algorithm“ ausgeschrieben. An die vorzuschlagenden symmetrischen Verschlüsselungsalgorithmen wurden die folgenden Anforderungen gestellt: nicht-klassifiziert und veröffentlicht, weltweit lizenzfrei verfügbar, effizient implementierbar in Hardund Software, Blockchiffren mit einer Blocklänge von 128 bit sowie Schlüssellängen von 128, 192 und 256 bit unterstützt. Auf der ersten „AES Candidate Conference“ (AES1) veröffentlichte das NIST am 20. August 1998 eine Liste von 15 vorgeschlagenen Algorithmen und forderte die Fachöffentlichkeit zu deren Analyse auf. Die Ergebnisse wurden auf der zweiten „AES Candidate Conference“ (22.-23. März 1999 in Rom, AES2) vorgestellt und unter internationalen Kryptologen diskutiert. Die Kommentierungsphase endete am 15. April 1999. Auf der Basis der eingegangenen Kommentare und Analysen wählte das NIST fünf Kandidaten aus, die es am 9. August 1999 öffentlich bekanntmachte: MARS (IBM) RC6 (RSA Lab.) Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen) Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen) Twofish (Schneier, Kelsey, Whiting, Wagner, Hall, Ferguson).

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

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私の computer 環境

Thank you for reading rfid handbook fundamentals and applications in contactless smart cards and identification. As you may know, people have search numerous times for their chosen novels like this rfid handbook fundamentals and applications in contactless smart cards and identification, but end up in malicious downloads. Rather than reading a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they juggled with some malicious bugs inside their laptop.

Rfid Handbook Fundamentals And Applications In Contactless Smart Cards And Identification

We describe a largely automated and systematic analysis of TLS implementations by what we call 'protocol state fuzzing': we use state machine learning to infer state machines from protocol implementations, using only blackbox testing, and then inspect the inferred state machines to look for spurious behaviour which might be an indication of flaws in the program logic. For detecting the presence of spurious behaviour the approach is almost fully automatic: we automatically obtain state machines and any spurious behaviour is then trivial to see. Detecting whether the spurious behaviour introduces exploitable security weaknesses does require manual investigation. Still, we take the point of view that any spurious functionality in a security protocol implementation is dangerous and should be removed.

We analysed both server- and client-side implementations with a test harness that supports several key exchange algorithms and the option of client certificate authentication. We show that this approach can catch an interesting class of implementation flaws that is apparently common in security protocol implementations: in three of the TLS implementations analysed new security flaws were found (in GnuTLS, the Java Secure Socket Extension, and OpenSSL). This shows that protocol state fuzzing is a useful technique to systematically analyse security protocol implementations. As our analysis of different TLS implementations resulted in different and unique state machines for each one, the technique can also be used for fingerprinting TLS implementations.

/pdf/protocol-state-fuzzing-of-tls-implementations-t022m1tfya.pdf

Protocol state fuzzing of TLS implementations

IMSI catching is a problem on all generations of mobile telecommunication networks, i.e., 2G (GSM, GPRS), 3G (HDSPA, EDGE, UMTS) and 4G (LTE, LTE+). Currently, the SIM card of a mobile phone has to reveal its identity over an insecure plaintext transmission, before encryption is enabled. This identifier (the IMSI) can be intercepted by adversaries that mount a passive or active attack. Such identity exposure attacks are commonly referred to as 'IMSI catching'. Since the IMSI is uniquely identifying, unauthorized exposure can lead to various location privacy attacks. We propose a solution, which essentially replaces the IMSIs with changing pseudonyms that are only identifiable by the home network of the SIM's own network provider. Consequently, these pseudonyms are unlinkable by intermediate network providers and malicious adversaries, and therefore mitigate both passive and active attacks, which we also formally verified using ProVerif. Our solution is compatible with the current specifications of the mobile standards and therefore requires no change in the infrastructure or any of the already massively deployed network equipment. The proposed method only requires limited changes to the SIM and the authentication server, both of which are under control of the user's network provider. Therefore, any individual (virtual) provider that distributes SIM cards and controls its own authentication server can deploy a more privacy friendly mobile network that is resilient against IMSI catching attacks.

/pdf/defeating-imsi-catchers-4kcpi6woh4.pdf

Defeating IMSI Catchers

We apply model learning on three SSH implementations to infer state machine models, and then use model checking to verify that these models satisfy basic security properties and conform to the RFCs. Our analysis showed that all tested SSH server models satisfy the stated security properties, but uncovered several violations of the standard.

/pdf/model-learning-and-model-checking-of-ssh-implementations-4wzkc29ypj.pdf

Model learning and model checking of SSH implementations

Learning techniques allow the automatic inference of the behaviour of a system as a finite state machine. We demonstrate that learning techniques can be used to extract such formal models from software on banking smartcards which - as most bank cards do - implement variants of the EMV protocol suite. Such automated reverse-engineering, which only observes the smartcard as a black box, takes little effort and is fast. The finite state machine models obtained provide a useful insight into decisions (or indeed mistakes) made in the design and implementation, and would be useful as part of security evaluations - not just for bank cards but for smartcard applications in general - as they can show unexpected additional functionality that is easily missed in conformance tests.

/pdf/formal-models-of-bank-cards-for-free-53717ciidc.pdf

Formal Models of Bank Cards for Free

This paper looks at relay attacks against contactless payment cards, which could be used to wirelessly pickpocket money from victims. We discuss the two leading contactless EMV payment protocols (Visa’s payWave and MasterCard’s PayPass). Stopping a relay attack against cards using these protocols is hard: either the overhead of the communication is low compared to the (cryptographic) computation by the card or the messages can be cached before they are requested by the terminal. We propose a solution that fits within the EMV Contactless specification to make a payment protocol that is resistant to relay attacks from commercial off-the-shelf devices, such as mobile phones. This solution does not require significant changes to the cards and can easily be added to existing terminals. To prove that our protocol really does stop relay attacks, we develop a new method of automatically checking defences against relay attacks using the applied pi-calculus and the tool ProVerif.

/pdf/relay-cost-bounding-for-contactless-emv-payments-3tb5epb167.pdf

Joeri de Ruiter

Papers

Protocol state fuzzing of TLS implementations

Defeating IMSI Catchers

Model learning and model checking of SSH implementations

Formal Models of Bank Cards for Free

Relay cost bounding for contactless EMV payments