Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

We consider the problem of combining ranking results from various sources. In the context of the Web, the main applications include building meta-search engines, combining ranking functions, selecting documents based on multiple criteria, and improving search precision through word associations. We develop a set of techniques for the rank aggregation problem and compare their performance to that of well-known methods. A primary goal of our work is to design rank aggregation techniques that can e ectively combat \spam," a serious problem in Web searches. Experiments show that our methods are simple, e cient, and e ective.

/pdf/rank-aggregation-methods-for-the-web-4nf6fdvu3i.pdf

Rank aggregation methods for the Web

Design and control of warehouse order picking: A literature review

This research examined cooperation between 136 industrial buyers and suppliers. We identified four domains of potential cooperation: flexibility, information exchange, shared problem solving, and r...

/pdf/the-shadow-of-the-future-effects-of-anticipated-interaction-1lyboq4szg.pdf

The Shadow Of The Future: Effects Of Anticipated Interaction And Frequency Of Contact On Buyer-Seller Cooperation

If a truck is equipped with GPS, one can programmatically track its movement within the container terminal. It is then possible to identify the yards that were visited, infer the types of containers dropped off or picked up, and measure the time spent stopped in each yard, as well as the time spent driving. This allows a much more granular measurement of terminal service times than the commonly reported aggregate statistic “truck turn-time.” Furthermore, the process requires no resources from the terminal. Our methodology is adapted from map-matching, which attempts to align a sequence of GPS readings with a road network. In this case, we attempt to align GPS readings with each of the typical sequences of terminal operations, so as to find the most likely sequence.

/pdf/using-gps-to-measure-truck-service-times-in-a-container-hydo2yk29c.pdf

Using GPS to measure truck service times in a container terminal

Introductory editorial to the issue about operations research in China. These papers describe experiences that took place at least two years ago; since then the changes within China have been enormous. What is a problem and what is an acceptable solution might look rather different by now! We look forward to hearing of the experiences of the new generation of Chinese who contribute their MS/OR skills to the modernization of their country.

Introduction to Operations Research in the People’s Republic of China

We built a control system to realize the idea of self-coordinating buses recently proposed by Bartholdi and Eisenstein. It has been extensively tested and by the end of 2012 will manage the most heavily-traveled bus route through the campus of the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, GA, USA. Here we review the idea, describe the architecture of a control system that implements it, and provide a snapshot of progress towards full implementation.

Building a Self-Organizing Urban Bus Route

: This report explains how to implement a simple but effective routing system that will quickly determine (1) which locations should be visited by which delivery vehicles, and (2) in what sequence each vehicle should visit its assigned locations. The system uses only a map and two card files. It is easy to maintain and requires no additional clerical effort. The system is being used successfully by a large delivery organization in Atlanta.

How To Implement a Simple Routing System

: This paper introduces a novel heuristic to compute a minimal-length tour of N given points in the plane: they are sequenced as they appear along a spacefilling curve. The algorithm consists essentially of sorting: it is easily coded, requires only O (N) memory, and may be implemented to execute in O (N log N) operations at most, or O (N) operations on the average.

John J. Bartholdi

Papers

Using GPS to measure truck service times in a container terminal

Introduction to Operations Research in the People’s Republic of China

Building a Self-Organizing Urban Bus Route

How To Implement a Simple Routing System

Spacefilling Curves and Routing Problems in the Plane