Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

We consider the problem of combining ranking results from various sources. In the context of the Web, the main applications include building meta-search engines, combining ranking functions, selecting documents based on multiple criteria, and improving search precision through word associations. We develop a set of techniques for the rank aggregation problem and compare their performance to that of well-known methods. A primary goal of our work is to design rank aggregation techniques that can e ectively combat \spam," a serious problem in Web searches. Experiments show that our methods are simple, e cient, and e ective.

/pdf/rank-aggregation-methods-for-the-web-4nf6fdvu3i.pdf

Rank aggregation methods for the Web

Design and control of warehouse order picking: A literature review

This research examined cooperation between 136 industrial buyers and suppliers. We identified four domains of potential cooperation: flexibility, information exchange, shared problem solving, and r...

/pdf/the-shadow-of-the-future-effects-of-anticipated-interaction-1lyboq4szg.pdf

The Shadow Of The Future: Effects Of Anticipated Interaction And Frequency Of Contact On Buyer-Seller Cooperation

An O(N log N) planar travelling salesman heuristic based on spacefilling curves

We describe all possible asymptotic behavior of "bucket brigade" production lines with two or three workers, each characterized by a constant work velocity. The results suggest wariness in interpreting simulation results. They also suggest a strategy for partitioning a workforce into effective teams to staff the lines.

Dynamics of Two- and Three-Worker Bucket Brigade Production Lines

We analyze algorithms that sequence the retrieval of items from a carousel conveyor, and show how the appropriate algorithm depends on the load to which the carousel is subjected. In general, as the load increases, so does the quality of solutions produced by simple heuristics. We conclude by recommending certain greedy heuristics for the problems of sequencing the retrieval of orders and for sequencing the retrieval of the items within each order.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA149994&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Retrieval Strategies for a Carousel Conveyor

There are many ways in which social insect foragers may organise the collection of resources and their transportation back to the nest. One way is to partition the task into a number of sequential stages in which material is passed from one worker to another in a relay fashion. This relatively new concept is known as task partitioning. In this study, we focus on a particular form of task partitioning, bucket brigades, which we define as a multistage (i.e., three or more stages) partitioned transport scheme that uses only direct transfer between individual workers and without any predetermined transfer locations, other than the first or last stages. We first consider the potential costs and benefits of bucket brigades compared to other transportation schemes. We then use theory and computer simulation to analyse some of these aspects in detail. In one empirical study of a bucket brigade, foragers were generally found to be sequenced from smallest (near the food source) to fastest (nearest the nest). This exactly matches what dynamical systems theory would predict as an ergonomically efficient solution. However, we also demonstrate that a single and simple local rule - larger ants win fights over material - will generate this sequencing as an epiphenomenon that is not necessarily optimal. We use the behaviour of bucket brigades to reveal some general points about the optimality of task partitioning in more detail.

https://www2.isye.gatech.edu/~jjb/bucket-brigades/papers/2002_Anderson_Boomsma_Bartholdi.pdf

Task partitioning in insect societies: bucket brigades

The forward pick area of a distribution center is a cache of conveniently located products from which order pickers can quickly draw, but which must be replenished from bulk or reserve storage. The quantities stored forward determine the amount of work required to sustain the forward pick area. Two stocking strategies that are commonly used in industry are analyzed and compared with the optimal stocking strategy for small parts.

https://www2.isye.gatech.edu/%7Ejjb/papers/2008_IIE_Bartholdi_Hackman.pdf

John J. Bartholdi

Papers

An O(N log N) planar travelling salesman heuristic based on spacefilling curves

Dynamics of Two- and Three-Worker Bucket Brigade Production Lines

Retrieval Strategies for a Carousel Conveyor

Task partitioning in insect societies: bucket brigades

Allocating space in a forward pick area of a distribution center for small parts