Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

We consider the problem of combining ranking results from various sources. In the context of the Web, the main applications include building meta-search engines, combining ranking functions, selecting documents based on multiple criteria, and improving search precision through word associations. We develop a set of techniques for the rank aggregation problem and compare their performance to that of well-known methods. A primary goal of our work is to design rank aggregation techniques that can e ectively combat \spam," a serious problem in Web searches. Experiments show that our methods are simple, e cient, and e ective.

/pdf/rank-aggregation-methods-for-the-web-4nf6fdvu3i.pdf

Rank aggregation methods for the Web

Design and control of warehouse order picking: A literature review

This research examined cooperation between 136 industrial buyers and suppliers. We identified four domains of potential cooperation: flexibility, information exchange, shared problem solving, and r...

/pdf/the-shadow-of-the-future-effects-of-anticipated-interaction-1lyboq4szg.pdf

The Shadow Of The Future: Effects Of Anticipated Interaction And Frequency Of Contact On Buyer-Seller Cooperation

"Bucket brigades" are a way of sharing work on a flow line that results in the spontaneous emergence of balance and consequent high throughput. All this happens without a work-content model or traditional assembly line balancing technology. Here we show that bucket brigades can be effective even in the presence of variability in the work content. In addition, we report confirmation at the national distribution center of a major chain retailer, which experienced a 34% increase in productivity after the workers began picking orders by bucket brigade.

https://www2.isye.gatech.edu/~jjb/bucket-brigades/papers/OR2001_V49_5:710-719.pdf

Performance of Bucket Brigades When Work Is Stochastic

A highly decentralized greedy heuristic will enable a fleet of automated guided vehicles to deliver unit loads quickly on a simple loop track.

Decentralized Control of Automated Guided Vehicles on a Simple Loop

Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model

The problem of cyclic staff scheduling is solved by a linear programming round-off heuristic for which a bound on the absolute error is established. The quality of the bound is independent of the resource requirements. Moreover, the quality of the bound improves as the matrix of resource availability approximates the property of consecutive ones. The appropriateness of the heuristic is further established by showing that cyclic staff scheduling is NP-complete.

A Guaranteed-Accuracy Round-off Algorithm for Cyclic Scheduling and Set Covering

A novel routing system based on a new travelling salesman heuristic was successfully implemented to handle the efficient daily routing of a varying number of vehicles to more than 200 delivery points whose locations change daily. The system had to be easily mantained by one person and require no resources for example, no computer. Our system achieved these objectives, cost less than $50, and, moreover, shortened average travel times by 13% compared to previous performance.

John J. Bartholdi

Papers

Performance of Bucket Brigades When Work Is Stochastic

Decentralized Control of Automated Guided Vehicles on a Simple Loop

Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model

A Guaranteed-Accuracy Round-off Algorithm for Cyclic Scheduling and Set Covering

A Minimal Technology Routing System for Meals on Wheels