John M. Bizjak

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how excessive concern over current stock price can motivate managers to use observable investment decisions to manipulate the market's inferences about the firm's stock price, and find that firms with high/persistent informational asymmetries between managers and shareholders will tend to favor contracts that focus on long-run stock returns (both current and future) over contracts focusing on near-term stock returns alone.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects CEO pay, and they find that firms use competitive benchmarks to gauge the reservation wage necessary for retention, which has a significant impact on levels and changes in CEO compensation.

TL;DR: The authors examined the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries and provided new insight into how boards function and the role that they play in providing managerial oversight and determining corporate strategy.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay and find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significant impact on CEO compensation.

TL;DR: The role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries was examined in this paper.