J
Jonas Tallberg
Researcher at Stockholm University
Publications - 126
Citations - 6334
Jonas Tallberg is an academic researcher from Stockholm University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Global governance & European union. The author has an hindex of 37, co-authored 118 publications receiving 5630 citations. Previous affiliations of Jonas Tallberg include Lund University.
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Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union
TL;DR: In this article, the twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a "management-enforcement ladder" makes the EU highly successful in combating violations, thus reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon.
Journal ArticleDOI
Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union
TL;DR: In recent years, the question of what determines compliance with international regulatory agreements has gained an increasingly prominent position on the research agenda through a burgeoning literature on international regime effectiveness and international legal systems as mentioned in this paper.
Posted Content
Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions, and the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions.
Book
Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union
TL;DR: Tallberg as discussed by the authors develops a rationalist theory of formal leadership and demonstrates its explanatory power through carefully selected case studies of EU negotiations, showing that the rotating Presidency of the EU constitutes a power platform that grants governments unique opportunities to shape the outcomes of negotiations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions, and the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions.