Open AccessPosted Content
Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?
TLDR
In this paper, the authors argue that the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions, and the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions.Abstract:
Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, I argue that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) the institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops.read more
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The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)
Paul DiMaggio,Walter W. Powell +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them, and describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative.
Posted Content
Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union
TL;DR: In this article, the twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a "management-enforcement ladder" makes the EU highly successful in combating violations, thus reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon.
Journal ArticleDOI
Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the eu regulatory state
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the allocation of regulatory authority in the EU and propose a transnational regulatory network as a back-road to the informal Europeanization of government regulation, arguing that the informalization of governance is vulnerable to strong distributive conflict and raises unresolved problems of democratic legitimacy.
Book
Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union
TL;DR: Tallberg as discussed by the authors develops a rationalist theory of formal leadership and demonstrates its explanatory power through carefully selected case studies of EU negotiations, showing that the rotating Presidency of the EU constitutes a power platform that grants governments unique opportunities to shape the outcomes of negotiations.
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Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe
TL;DR: In this paper, three aspects of the life of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) after delegation are examined: their independence from elected officials, their relationship with regulatees; their decision-making processes.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields
Paul DiMaggio,Walter W. Powell +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them, and describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative.
Posted Content
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
TL;DR: The canonical agency problem can be posed as follows as discussed by the authors : the agent may choose an act, aCA, a feasible action space, and the random payoff from this act, w(a, 0), will depend on the random state of nature O(EQ the state space set), unknown to the agent when a is chosen.
Book
The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht
TL;DR: The choice for Europe as mentioned in this paper is the choice of Europe and the choice for the future of the European Union, the Treaties of Rome, 1955-1958 and the Maastricht Treaty, 1988-1991.
Journal ArticleDOI
The joint‐decision trap: lessons from german federalism and european integration
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the similarities between joint decision making in German federalism and decision-making in the European Community and argued that the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de facto requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a "problem-solving" (as opposed to a "bargaining") style of decision making can be maintained.
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Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
TL;DR: Do supranational institutions matter, do they deserve the status of an independent causal variable in the politics of the European Community (EC)? Does the Commission of European Communities matter? Does the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the European Parliament? Is the EC characterized by continued member state dominance or by a runaway Commission and an activist Court progressively chipping away at this dominance? as mentioned in this paper.