The recent surge of interest in “ecosystems” in strategy research and practice has mainly focused on what ecosystems are and how they operate. We complement this literature by considering when and why ecosystems emerge, and what makes them distinct from other governance forms. We argue that modularity enables ecosystem emergence, as it allows a set of distinct yet interdependent organizations to coordinate without full hierarchical fiat. We show how ecosystems address multilateral dependences based on various types of complementarities - supermodular or unique, unidirectional or bidirectional, which determine the ecosystem’s value-add. We argue that at the core of ecosystems lie non-generic complementarities, and the creation of sets of roles that face similar rules. We conclude with implications for mainstream strategy and suggestions for future research.

Towards a Theory of Ecosystems

机构投资者作为证券市场中的重要力量,越来越受到理论界和实务界的关注。论文对宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院会计学教授布赖恩-布希（Brian Bushee）的论文＂The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior＂（机构投资者对企业短视研发投资行为的影响,以下简称Bushee（1998））进行评价并提出相关的建议和研究方向。

《The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior》述评

IDENTIFICATION AND INFERENCE FOR ECONOMETRIC MODELS ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THOMAS ROTHENBERG PDF Are you looking for Ebook identification and inference for econometric models essays in honor of thomas rothenberg PDF? You will be glad to know that right now identification and inference for econometric models essays in honor of thomas rothenberg PDF is available on our online library. With our online resources, you can find identification and inference for econometric models essays in honor of thomas rothenberg or just about any type of ebooks, for any type of product.

Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg

Research summary: A substantial and burgeoning body of research has described the influence of platform-mediated networks in a wide variety of settings, whereby users and complementors desire compatibility on a common platform. In this review, we outline extant views of these dynamics from the industrial organization (IO) economics, technology management, and strategic management perspectives. Using this review as a foundation, we propose a future research agenda in this domain that focuses the on the relative influence of network effects and platform quality in competitive outcomes, drivers of indirect network effects, the nature and attributes of complementors, and leveraging complementor dynamics for competitive advantage.

Managerial summary: In many industries, such as social networks and video games, consumers place greater value on products with a large network of other users and a large variety of complementary products. Such “network effects” offer lucrative opportunities for firms that can leverage these dynamics to create dominant technology platforms. This article reviews current perspectives on network effects and the emergence of platforms, and offers several areas of future consideration for optimal strategies in these settings. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Networks, platforms, and strategy: Emerging views and next steps

Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market

We consider firms in the context of their business ecosystems and explore how governance choices with respect to complementors and distributors shape their competitive behavior—i.e., investments in new technologies. We argue that, in addition to creating differences in incentives, governance choices play an important role in the firm’s ability to coordinate accompanying changes in interdependent activities so as to create value from the new technology. We test our predictions in the U.S. healthcare industry from 1995-2006. We examine how hospitals’ decisions to invest in new imaging technologies are shaped by their governance modes with physicians—key complementors to hospitals, and with managed care organizations (MCOs)— primary distributors of hospital and physician services. We find that hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing arm’slength or integrated modes, and the likelihood of investment is increasing in the scope of alliance. Finally, hospitals pursuing tapered integration with downstream MCOs are more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing arm’s-length relationships. Overall, the study argues for extending research on organizational forms to explore the link between coordination mechanisms and competitive behavior, and to consider such choices in the context of business ecosystems.

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Coordinating and competing in ecosystems: How organizational forms shape new technology investments

Research summary: We provide evidence that founder chief executive officers (CEOs) of large SP they are also more likely to perceive their firms to be undervalued, as implied by their option-exercise behavior. We provide evidence that, to date, investors appear unaware of this “overconfidence bias” among founders.

Managerial summary: This article helps to explain why firms managed by founder chief executive officers (CEOs) behave differently from those managed by professional CEOs. We study a sample of S&P 1500 firms and find strong evidence that founder CEOs are more overconfident than professional CEOs. To date, investors appear unaware of this overconfidence bias among founders. Our study should help firm stakeholders, including investors, employees, suppliers, and customers, put the statements and actions of founder CEOs in perspective. Our study should also help members of corporate boards make more informed decisions about whether to retain (or bring back) founder CEOs or hire professional CEOs. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Are founder CEOs more overconfident than professional CEOs? Evidence from S&P 1500 companies

Disclosed is a character service method and system having a game item function. In one embodiment, a method is provided for generating a character by a character generating system including a gamvatar provider, a gamvatar controller, and a game server. The method includes providing an avatar to a user accessing the character generating system online, checking whether the user desires to combine a game item function with the avatar before progressing a game when the user acquires the game item function, combining the game item function with a corresponding layer of the avatar when the user desires to combine the game item function with the avatar, and d) generating the combined gamvatar.

Method and system for providing character having game item functions

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.

CEO career horizon, corporate governance, and real options: The role of economic short-termism

We provide evidence that founder CEOs of large SP they are also more likely to perceive their firm to be undervalued as implied by their option-exercise behavior. To date, investors appear unaware of the “overconfidence bias” among founders.

Joon Mahn Lee

Papers

Coordinating and competing in ecosystems: How organizational forms shape new technology investments

Are founder CEOs more overconfident than professional CEOs? Evidence from S&P 1500 companies

Method and system for providing character having game item functions

CEO career horizon, corporate governance, and real options: The role of economic short-termism

Are Founder CEOs more Overconfident than Professional CEOs? Evidence from S&P 1500 Companies