Co-Planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human Brain—3-Dimensional Proportional System: An Approach to Cerebral Imaging, J. Talairach, P. Tournoux. Georg Thieme Verlag, New York (1988), 122 pp., 130 figs. DM 268

This Review presents basic facts regarding the long-run evolution of income and wealth inequality in Europe and the United States. Income and wealth inequality was very high a century ago, particularly in Europe, but dropped dramatically in the first half of the 20th century. Income inequality has surged back in the United States since the 1970s so that the United States is much more unequal than Europe today. We discuss possible interpretations and lessons for the future.

Inequality in the long run

In the past three decades, our understanding of brain–behavior relationships has been significantly shaped by research using non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) techniques. These methods allow non-invasive and safe modulation of neural processes in the healthy brain, enabling researchers to directly study how experimentally altered neural activity causally affects behavior. This unique property of NIBS methods has, on the one hand, led to groundbreaking findings on the brain basis of various aspects of behavior and has raised interest in possible clinical and practical applications of these methods. On the other hand, it has also triggered increasingly critical debates about the properties and possible limitations of these methods. In this review, we discuss these issues, clarify the challenges associated with the use of currently available NIBS techniques for basic research and practical applications, and provide recommendations for studies using NIBS techniques to establish brain–behavior relationships.

Studying and modifying brain function with non-invasive brain stimulation.

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The Secret of Our Success.

Emotions appear to be a key determinant of behavior in cooperative relationships. Emotions affect behavior both directly, by motivating action, and indirectly, as actors anticipate others’ emotional responses. The influence of emotions is understandable once it is recognized that (a) the ability to benefit from cooperative relationships has been a key determinant of biological fitness throughout our species’ history, and (b) panhuman emotions are adaptations crafted by natural selection. Different emotions affect cooperative behavior in different ways: some emotions lead actors to forego the temptation to defect, some lead them to reciprocate harm suffered or benefits provided, and some lead them to repair damaged relationships. An important class of emotions influences cooperative behavior in part by motivating conformity to norms and/or punishment of norm violators. This chapter discusses thirteen emotions that seem to have the greatest impact on cooperation. In addition to reviewing empirical evidence of the role of emotions in cooperation, the chapter presents a variety of explanatory hypotheses and provides a number of discrete testable predictions.

Genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation

Intergroup conflict persists when and because individuals make costly contributions to their group's fighting capacity, but how groups organize contributions into effective collective action remains poorly understood. Here we distinguish between contributions aimed at subordinating out-groups (out-group aggression) from those aimed at defending the in-group against possible out-group aggression (in-group defense). We conducted two experiments in which three-person aggressor groups confronted three-person defender groups in a multiround contest game (n = 276; 92 aggressor-defender contests). Individuals received an endowment from which they could contribute to their group's fighting capacity. Contributions were always wasted, but when the aggressor group's fighting capacity exceeded that of the defender group, the aggressor group acquired the defender group's remaining resources (otherwise, individuals on both sides were left with the remainders of their endowment). In-group defense appeared stronger and better coordinated than out-group aggression, and defender groups survived roughly 70% of the attacks. This low success rate for aggressor groups mirrored that of group-hunting predators such as wolves and chimpanzees (n = 1,382 cases), hostile takeovers in industry (n = 1,637 cases), and interstate conflicts (n = 2,586). Furthermore, whereas peer punishment increased out-group aggression more than in-group defense without affecting success rates (Exp. 1), sequential (vs. simultaneous) decision-making increased coordination of collective action for out-group aggression, doubling the aggressor's success rate (Exp. 2). The relatively high success rate of in-group defense suggests evolutionary and cultural pressures may have favored capacities for cooperation and coordination when the group goal is to defend, rather than to expand, dominate, and exploit.

/pdf/in-group-defense-out-group-aggression-and-coordination-42utu753c4.pdf

In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict.

Humans exhibit a remarkable capacity for cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals. Yet, human cooperation is neither universal, nor stable. Instead, cooperation is often bounded to members of particular groups, and such groups endogenously form or break apart. Cooperation networks are parochial and under constant reconfiguration. Here, we demonstrate how parochial cooperation networks endogenously emerge as a consequence of simple reputation heuristics people may use when deciding to cooperate or defect. These reputation heuristics, such as “a friend of a friend is a friend” and “the enemy of a friend is an enemy” further lead to the dynamic formation and fission of cooperative groups, accompanied by a dynamic rise and fall of cooperation among agents. The ability of humans to safeguard kin-independent cooperation through gossip and reputation may be, accordingly, closely interlinked with the formation of group-bounded cooperation networks that are under constant reconfiguration, ultimately preventing global and stable cooperation.

https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2977046/view

The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization

Social norms, such as treating others fairly regardless of kin relations, are essential for the functioning of human societies. Their existence may explain why humans, among all species, show unique patterns of prosocial behaviour. The maintenance of social norms often depends on external enforcement, as in the absence of credible sanctioning mechanisms prosocial behaviour deteriorates quickly. This sanction-dependent prosocial behaviour suggests that humans strategically adapt their behaviour and act selfishly if possible but control selfish impulses if necessary. Recent studies point at the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in controlling selfish impulses. We test whether the DLPFC is indeed involved in the control of selfish impulses as well as the strategic acquisition of this control mechanism. Using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation, we provide evidence for the causal role of the right DLPFC in strategic fairness. Because the DLPFC is phylogenetically one of the latest developed neocortical regions, this could explain why complex norm systems exist in humans but not in other social animals.

/pdf/be-nice-if-you-have-to-the-neurobiological-roots-of-4llna8var1.pdf

Be nice if you have to — the neurobiological roots of strategic fairness

Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (1) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy and reveal that (2) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness. This suggests that (3) attack recruits neuroendocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning, and hostile attributions; and that (4) people invest less in attack than defense, and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (5) in intergroup conflict, out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for prosociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts and reduce their waste.

https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2982187/view

Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups.

The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment. Existing research, however, has ignored that the distribution of punishment power can be the result of social interactions. We introduce a novel experiment in which individuals can transfer punishment power to others. We find that while decentralised peer punishment fails to overcome free riding, the voluntary transfer of punishment power enables groups to sustain cooperation. This is achieved by non-punishing cooperators empowering those who are willing to punish in the interest of the group. Our results show how voluntary power centralisation can efficiently sustain cooperation, which could explain why hierarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.

/pdf/building-the-leviathan-voluntary-centralisation-of-1z19e89v6t.pdf

Jörg Gross

Papers

In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict.

The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization

Be nice if you have to — the neurobiological roots of strategic fairness

Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups.

Building the Leviathan – Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans