Handbook of the Economics of Finance

Regression Analysis of Count Data: Preface

This thesis investigates the relationship between economic growth and financial development in developing countries over 1988-2001. Previous studies have generally used averaged data, for both developing and developed countries, and inappropriate estimation methods. In an attempt to reach some definitive conclusions, Generalised Method of Moments dynamic estimation is used with a newly collected panel of annual data to assess the relationship. The results show that while banks performance has a negative impact on growth, stock markets positively promote growth. To reach an overall conclusion about the impact of finance on growth and to solve the problems associated with the existence of multicollinearity among the different measures of financial development, principal components analysis is used to generate new, comprehensive measures of financial development. In assessing the link between the new measures and financial development and growth, the results support the existence of an overall positive relationship. The thesis also examines the behaviour of interest rates in developing and industrialised countries using individual and panel unit root tests. The results are sensitive to the choice of the test, country and time unit.

Stock markets, banks and economic growth

This review article tries to answer four questions: (i) what are the stylized facts about uncertainty over time; (ii) why does uncertainty vary; (iii) do fluctuations in uncertainty matter; and (iv) did higher uncertainty worsen the Great Recession of 2007-2009? On the first question both macro and micro uncertainty appears to rise sharply in recessions. On the second question the types of exogenous shocks like wars, financial panics and oil price jumps that cause recessions appear to directly increase uncertainty, and uncertainty also appears to endogenously rise further during recessions. On the third question, the evidence suggests uncertainty is damaging for short-run investment and hiring, but there is some evidence it may stimulate longer-run innovation. Finally, in terms of the Great Recession, the large jump in uncertainty in 2008 potentially accounted for about one third of the drop in GDP.

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Fluctuations in Uncertainty

We examine how financial market development affects technological innovation. Using a large data set that includes 32 developed and emerging countries and a fixed effects identification strategy, we identify economic mechanisms through which the development of equity markets and credit markets affects technological innovation. We show that industries that are more dependent on external finance and that are more high-tech intensive exhibit a disproportionally higher innovation level in countries with better developed equity markets. However, the development of credit markets appears to discourage innovation in industries with these characteristics. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of financial market development on the economy.

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Financial Development and Innovation: Cross-Country Evidence

I examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value. I find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs 2 or more years after they are passed, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, leverage, and product market competition.

Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting

Our results highlight the importance of interaction among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate governance. We find that strong union laws protect not only workers but also underperforming managers. Weak investor protection combined with strong union laws are conducive to worker–management alliances, wherein poorly performing firms sell assets to prevent large-scale layoffs, garnering worker support to retain management. Asset sales in weak investor protection countries lead to further deteriorating performance, whereas in strong investor protection countries they improve performance and lead to more layoffs. Strong union laws are less effective in preventing layoffs when financial leverage is high.

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Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions

This study argues that developed capital markets, through their monitoring and disciplining role, can significantly influence innovation and economic growth. Specifically, it examines how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation. It uses a panel of 13,339 firms over the 1976-2000 period, patents and patent citations to measure the quantity and quality of innovation, and the enactment of state antitakeover laws as an exogenous decrease in the threat of hostile takeovers. It finds a decline in innovation for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs two or more years after they are enacted, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, financial leverage, and product market competition.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1476127_code94963.pdf?abstractid=967421&rulid=4802683&mirid=1

We hypothesize that public firms that create novel innovations rely more on arm's length financing (equity and public debt) than on relationship based bank financing. A primary reason is that banks, unable to evaluate novel technologies, will tend to discourage investing in innovative projects and be more prone to shut down ones that are ongoing. Using a large panel of US companies from 1974-2000, we find that consistent with our predictions, firms that rely more on arm's length financing have a larger number of patents and these patents are more significant in terms of influencing subsequent patents. We confirm our findings by showing a significant increase in innovative activity of firms following a large infusion of arm's length financing and no such pattern after a similar infusion of bank loans. Creating novel innovations leads to a significantly higher firm value and suggests that firms would rationally take into account the potential impact of innovative activity when making their financing choices. Finally, we use an IV approach to ameliorate endogeneity concerns and demonstrate that our findings are driven primarily by innovative firms choosing their financing arrangements.

Finance and Innovation: The Case of Publicly Traded Firms

Using a large panel of U.S. companies, I document that firms that rely more on arm’s length financing, such as public debt and equity, innovate more and have higher-quality innovations than firms that use other sources, such as relationship-based bank financing. I hypothesize that one possible reason for this finding is the greater flexibility and tolerance to experimentation associated with arm’s length financing. I find support for this hypothesis by showing that firms with more arm’s length financing have greater volatility of innovative output, and are more likely to innovate in new technological areas. Furthermore, focusing only on bank financing, I demonstrate that firms have more novel innovations if they borrow from multiple banks, use predominantly credit lines, and have less intense covenants. I address potential endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variable analysis, and by showing that innovation increases significantly after new public debt offerings and seasoned equity offerings, but d...

Julian Atanassov

Papers

Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting

Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions

Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting

Finance and Innovation: The Case of Publicly Traded Firms

Arm’s Length Financing and Innovation: Evidence from Publicly Traded Firms