K
Kali P. Rath
Researcher at University of Notre Dame
Publications - 31
Citations - 665
Kali P. Rath is an academic researcher from University of Notre Dame. The author has contributed to research in topics: Best response & Nash equilibrium. The author has an hindex of 12, co-authored 31 publications receiving 621 citations. Previous affiliations of Kali P. Rath include Johns Hopkins University.
Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite action games was proved. But the payoff depends on the player's action and the average response of others.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players
TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games was shown by means of counterexamples and the stringent conditions on the cardinality of action sets cannot be relaxed, and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games
TL;DR: A consequence of their theorem is applied to a finite-action setting of finite games with incomplete and private information, as well as to that of large games, which re-emphasizes the close connection between statistical decision theory and the theory of games.
Journal ArticleDOI
The nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in anonymous games with compact action spaces
TL;DR: In an anonymous game, the payoff of a player depends upon the player's own action and the action distribution of all the players as discussed by the authors, and it is shown that if the set of actions is finite, or countably infinite and compact then there is a symmetric equilibrium distribution.
Journal ArticleDOI
Two stage equilibrium and product choice with elastic demand
Kali P. Rath,Gongyun Zhao +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a two-stage model of product choice with elastic demand is examined, where the first stage equilibrium locations are unique, symmetric and depend upon the ratio of the reservation price and the transportation cost parameter.