Showing papers in "International Journal of Industrial Organization in 2001"

TL;DR: In this article, the effects of product market competition on R&D incentives are analyzed in a model capturing the strategic interactions between firms with different cost levels, and it is shown that the axioms imply the existence of a non-monotone relation between intensity of competition and the value of an innovation.

TL;DR: This paper studied the processes of growth of the worlds top 150 pharmaceutical firms, on the grounds of an original database which also allows disaggregate analysis at the level of single therapeutical classes and chemical entities, showing that the industry displays fat tails in the distribution of growth shocks, present at all levels of aggregation, with (relatively rare) big spurs of growth.

TL;DR: In this article, the effects of government policies on the evolution of an industry, the global mobile telecommunications market, are analyzed, and the authors find a relatively slow diffusion convergence between countries.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the effect of international airline alliances on traffic levels, fares, and welfare, and found that both consumer and total surplus typically rise following formation of an alliance despite the harm to inter-hub passengers.

TL;DR: In this paper, an approach to modeling endogenous merger formation, employing ideas on coalition formation from cooperative game theory, is proposed. But the model is limited to the case of a single firm and does not consider other possible, socially more desirable, mergers.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the effects of ownership changes on employment, wages and plant closing in the US manufacturing sector and found that ownership changes are not a primary vehicle for cuts in employment and wages, or closing plants.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a framework linking what is known in the industrial organization literature on the dynamics and evolution of markets to one of the major policy instruments, namely competition policy.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller's incentives to be honest and show that the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services; only in one scenario there is no trade.

TL;DR: In this article, an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship is developed that is susceptible to the moral hazard problem. And the optimal form of licensing derived in the model generates predictions that seem to be consistent with actual practice.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used survey data to investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms and found that the characteristics of the Italian capital market, corporate governance and the specific relationship between banks and firms imply a low fraction of incentive pay over total compensation and a low sensitivity of incentive compensation to firm performance.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse the subgame perfect equilibrium of a four-stage game in a model of vertical product differentiation, where the consumer's evaluation of a product depends on its inherent quality and on its network's size.

TL;DR: In this article, a comparison of the incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes is made to the European cigarette industry, and the results are used to derive a method of estimating market power and conduct.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used evidence on the activity of U.S. publicly traded firms from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s to investigate whether innovation declines during the mature phase of the industry life cycle.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore some problems that industrial policy faces in industries characterized by dynamic increasing returns on the basis of a "history friendly model" of the evolution of the computer industry.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors employ a two-step modified count data model to determine the county-level attributes that are conducive to attracting new foreign plants and find that previous counts of foreign direct investment, market size and accessibility, and land area are positively related to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) occurrences; while higher input costs deter new foreign firm entry.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the impact of competition policy on the level and the dynamics of firm price cost margins in two European countries, Belgium and the Netherlands, and found that the introduction of a new competition policy in Belgium did not have any effect on the price mark-ups in Belgium.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess the view that Bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than Cournot equilibrium and provide counter-examples showing that no clear-cut comparison of prices and quantities is possible without strategic complementarity in either of the two games.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a new explanation for industry shakeout, an event evident in the life-cycle of many industries in which the number of firms drops significantly in a short interval of time.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a simple model of competition between a thermal station and a hydrostation for the production of energy, and show that, despite the static characteristics of the thermal cost function, the thermal output is determined by intertemporal considerations.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the profitability of merger in oligopoly is significantly enhanced if firms delegate the output decision to an agent and then motivate the latter using strategic rent shifting contracts.

TL;DR: In this paper, a public/private partnership competition policy that mitigates the appropriability problems associated with innovation that occur in a dynamic market when competitive pressures are present is presented.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the interactions between the use of strategic delegation and mergers in the context of a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and cost functions and show that the incentive for merger, under delegation, is considerably increased with respect to the setting without delegation.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the incentives of firms to form vertical research joint ventures (RJVs) which enable an upstream supplier to internalize the positive externality of its innovation on a downstream market, while giving the downstream members a cost advantage over their non-member rivals.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the evolution of and competition in the internet search engine market and find that while early entrants still have an advantage, the pure "brand effect" advantage has been declining over time.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors review and evaluate some of the traditional techniques used to define markets and measure market power in antitrust analysis and reveal the limitations of these techniques when applied in high technology contexts, particularly when inherently static analytical frameworks are employed.

TL;DR: This paper performed an empirical study of banks' branching decisions as a strategic non-price variable in an oligopolistic setting and found clear evidence that banks act strategically in their branching decisions, taking into consideration the future response from rival banks.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the cyclical behavior of antitrust enforcement as measured by the number of cases initiated by the US Department of Justice and found that antitrust case activity is countercyclical.

TL;DR: In this article, the central point of this paper is that, with important exceptions, coordination on innovation and on the supply of proprietary technical information to competitors can be highly beneficial to the economy, enhancing both its static efficiency and its growth.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show how antitrust laws against price-fixing can be enforced efficiently in the presence of asymmetric information between the authorities and the industry, and under different regimes of pecuniary punishment.

TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic theory of joint venture life cycle that relies on synergy, organisational learning and moral hazard is provided, and the authors demonstrate that depending on parameter values the outcome may involve any one of the following: stable joint venture formation, joint venture forming followed by breakdown, or Cournot competition in all the periods.