We investigate the impact of Revenue-Sharing and Cost-Sharing offered by a retailer on a manufacturer's carbon emission abatement efforts and the two firms’ profitability in a linear demand setting when consumer environmental awareness and carbon tax arise. We consider a supply chain system with a manufacturer (she) and a retailer (he). To spur the manufacturer's incentive for abatement, the retailer can move first to offer some incentive schemes to her, e.g., sharing the revenue solely, sharing the investment cost solely or sharing both or neither of them with her, which are referred to as “ Revenue-Sharing scheme ” ( RS ), “ Cost-Sharing scheme ” ( CS ), “ Both scheme ” ( B ), and “ Neither scheme ” ( N ), respectively. Under mild assumptions, our analytical results show that, under all these four schemes, the manufacturer would invest in emission abatement as long as consumer environmental awareness or carbon tax exists, and both firms’ incentives for abatement are perfectly aligned. Surprisingly, B results in the same equilibrium outcomes as RS ; thus, CS becomes dispensable when both RS and CS are available simultaneously. Moreover, both RS and CS can improve system efficiency and manufacturer's incentive for abatement, and RS improves them over CS , but fails to coordinate them. Further, the two firms’ preferences over the four schemes are perfectly consistent: Both firms prefer RS to CS , prefer CS to N , and are indifferent between RS and B . Finally, to increase the manufacturer's incentive for abatement, the carbon tax level charged by the government should be the highest under RS , moderate under CS , the lowest under N , and identical under RS, B and the integrated system.

Retailer-driven carbon emission abatement with consumer environmental awareness and carbon tax: Revenue-sharing versus Cost-sharing ☆

Overview of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

The Supply Chain (SC) members are dependent on each other for resources and information, and this dependency has been increasing in recent times due to outsourcing, globalization and rapid innovations in information technologies. This increase in dependency brings some extent of risk and uncertainty too along with benefits. To meet these challenges, SC members must work towards a unified system and coordinate with each other. There is a need to identify the coordination mechanisms which helps in addressing the uncertainty in supply chain and achieving supply chain coordination.

A Review on Supply Chain Coordination: Coordination Mechanisms, Managing Uncertainty and Research Directions

Product variety and channel structure strategy for a retailer-Stackelberg supply chain

We consider a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a single manufacturer and a single retailer who invest in green advertising to build up the goodwill dynamic The latter has a dual purpose On one hand, it leads to higher sales and plays the traditional role of marketing tool On the other hand, it increases the return rate, playing the role of an operational tool The players evaluate the convenience of collaborating in a CLSC (collaborative remanufacturing) by pursuing both marketing and operational targets implementing a Reverse Revenue Sharing Contract (RRSC) Our findings suggest that green advertising should aim to increase customers’ knowledge and awareness about the return policy because collaboration is successful only when the returns’ residual value is large while the sharing parameter is not too high Moreover, the inefficiencies that RRSC carries out limit substantially its adoption A RRSC is payoff-Pareto-improving only in few cases Finally, we highlight the limitations of previous research in supply chain contracting, which has disregarded the administrative costs of using a two-parameter contract; this lack of consideration leads to imprecise findings and managerial prescriptions

Environmental collaboration in a closed-loop supply chain with a reverse revenue sharing contract

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

Retailing channels are increasingly being dominated by ‘power’ retailers who are in a position to dictate prices and ordering schedules to manufacturers and suppliers. A dominant retailer, such as Wal-Mart, has the ‘power’ to decide retail prices of products because there are so many manufacturers who are keen to sell their products through or to such a large and powerful retailer. Several products, such as electronic products, can be sold in the market for some periods during their lifecycles before they retreat, except when they are not popular with consumers after been introduced. Therefore, in case of such products, the retailer should not just consider a single-period pricing and ordering policy. It should make dynamic pricing and ordering decisions based on market demand forecast, in order to obtain maximum cumulative profit from the product during its lifecycle. In this study, we consider this scenario and construct a two-period model to discuss pricing and ordering problems for a dominant retailer with demand uncertainty in a declining price environment. We show that the maximum expected profit function is continuous concave, so the optimal solution to pricing and ordering policy exists and it is the one and only. We also analyze sensitivity of retailer's expected profit to the effects of parameters of price-discount sharing scheme and market demand.

Two-period pricing and ordering policy for the dominant retailer in a two-echelon supply chain with demand uncertainty

For developing a math word problem (MWP) solver, the problem text is usually modeled as a word sequence to put into a recursive neural network to capture the quantity relationships presented by the text. Recently, more and more researchers leverage graph-based models for problem representation learning and significant improvements are claimed to have achieved. To explore the potential effectiveness of presentation learning methods on diverse characteristics of benchmark datasets, a comparative analysis of problem representation learning is conducted in this paper. The framework of typical representation learning methods are studied and comparative experiments are implemented to reveal the performance variations in solving different types of math word problems. Experimental results show that, compared to sequence-based problem learning, there is no significant performance improvement after applying graphbased learning methods.

Comparative Analysis of Problem Representation Learning in Math Word Problem Solving

This study discusses the ordering problem in a supply chain with duopolistic suppliers and duopolistic retailers based on revenue sharing (RS) scheme and advance booking discount program. We obtain the optimal ordering quantities and advance booking discount (ABD) coefficients for the retailers. Keywords-ordering policy; revenue sharing; advance booking discount

Ordering Policy with Joint Adoption of Revenue Sharing and Advance Booking Discount Program

We present an integrated model for a single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain scenario where the product fits Poisson distribution. The manufacturer orders the required quantity of raw materials, converts them into finished products to deliver to the retailers. An integrated inventory model determines the lot size, taking into the pattern of ordering quantities required by the retailers. The purpose is to maximize the profit from the whole chain. Finally we try to determine the optimal ordering price for each retailer under profit sharing scheme.

Kewen Pan

Papers

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

Two-period pricing and ordering policy for the dominant retailer in a two-echelon supply chain with demand uncertainty

Comparative Analysis of Problem Representation Learning in Math Word Problem Solving

Ordering Policy with Joint Adoption of Revenue Sharing and Advance Booking Discount Program

An Integrated Model for a Single-Manufacturer Multi-retailer Supply Chain with Poisson Demand