世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

Ethnic Groups in Conflict

1. Contracting In. 2. Patriarchal Confusions. 3. Contract, the Individual and Slavery. 4. Genesis, Fathers and the Political Liberty of Sons. 5. Wives, Slaves and Wage-Slaves. 6. Feminism and the Marriage Contract. 7. What's Wrong with Prostitution?

The Sexual Contract

Social scientists have sketched four distinct theories to explain a phenomenon that appears to have ramped up in recent years, the diffusion of policies across countries. Constructivists trace policy norms to expert epistemic communities and international organizations, who define economic progress and human rights. Coercion theorists point to powerful nation-states, and international financial institutions, that threaten sanctions or promise aid in return for fiscal conservatism, free trade, etc. Competition theorists argue that countries compete to attract investment and to sell exports by lowering the cost of doing business, reducing constraints on investment, or reducing tariff barriers in the hope of reciprocity. Learning theorists suggest that countries learn from their own experiences and, as well, from the policy experiments of their peers. We review the large body of research from sociologists and political scientists, as well as the growing body of work from economists and psychologists, pointing to the diverse mechanisms that are theorized and to promising avenues for distinguishing among causal mechanisms.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2281983_code2071501.pdf?abstractid=2281983&type=2

The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning?

Political scientists, sociologists, and economists have all sought to ana- lyze the spread of economic and political liberalism across countries in recent decades+ This article documents this diffusion of liberal policies and politics and proposes four distinct theories to explain how the prior choices of some countries and inter- national actors affect the subsequent behavior of others: coercion, competition, learn- ing, and emulation+ These theories are explored empirically in the symposium articles that follow+ The goal of the symposium is to bring quite different and often isolated schools of thought into contact and communication with one another, and to define common metrics by which we can judge the utility of the contending approaches to diffusion across different policy domains+

/pdf/introduction-the-international-diffusion-of-liberalism-j0407lw02p.pdf

Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism

Although spatial econometrics is being used more frequently in political science, most applications are still based on geographic notions of distance. Here we argue that it is often more fruitful to consider political economy notions of distance, such as relative trade or common dyad membership. We also argue that the spatially autoregressive model usually (but not always) should be preferred to the spatially lagged error model. Finally, we consider the role of spatial econometrics in analyzing time-series–cross-section data, and show that a plausible (and testable) assumption allows for the simple introduction of space (however defined) into such analyses. We present examples of spatial analyses involving trade and democracy.

Space Is More than Geography: Using Spatial Econometrics in the Study of Political Economy

This study focuses on the varying effectiveness of three mediation styles—facilitation, formulation, and manipulation—on international crises. Effectiveness is assessed in terms of three outcome variables: formal agreement, post-crisis tension reduction, and contribution to crisis abatement. The authors analyze new data on the mediation process from the International Crisis Behavior project (1918-2001). Manipulation has the strongest effect on the likelihood of both reaching a formal agreement and contributing to crisis abatement. Facilitation has the greatest influence on increasing the prospects for lasting tension reduction. The authors explore how the different styles affect the strategic bargaining environment to explain these differences in impact. The findings suggest that mediators should use a balance of styles if they are to maximize their overall effectiveness.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002705282862

Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes

Mediation has competing short- and long-term effects. In the short run, the actors are better able to identify and settle on a mutually satisfying outcome. In the long run, mediation can create artificial incentives that, as the mediator's influence wanes and the combatants' demands change, leave the actors with an agreement less durable than one that would have been achieved without mediation. This article tests the observable implications from this logic using a set of international crises from 1918 to 2001. The results reconcile findings in the previous literature that inconsistently portray the effectiveness of mediation.

Kyle Beardsley

Papers

Space Is More than Geography: Using Spatial Econometrics in the Study of Political Economy

Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes

Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems

The Mediation Dilemma

Distance traveled to outpatient drug treatment and client retention.