Originally published in Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 1994, Vol 39(2), 225. Reviews the book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion by John Zaller (1992). The author's commendable effort to specify a model of mass opinion formation offers readers an introduction to the prevailing vi

The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

The morality of freedom

The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …

The Law of Peoples

This article examines Michael Oakeshott's peculiar understanding of religion and its connection to politics and public affairs in democratic societies. It considers Oakeshott's views on both the prominence of religion as an expression of practical life, and the conciliatory role of the religious imagination in human existence. Upon inspection, Oakeshott's notion of a reconciled form of religiosity appears to be devised to speak to problems of religious enthusiasm in liberal democracies. Oakeshott's response to challenges of religious enthusiasm is insufficient and problematic, however, as is the conservative disposition he advocates for individual persons in democratic polities.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fpalgrave.cpt.9300123.pdf

Political Theory and the Conduct of Faith: Oakeshott on Religion in Public Life

A liberalism of conscience incorporates both persuasion and reasoning to achieve its ends, but it does not entail guilt or bad conscience about the need to rule. Neither does the approach involve efforts to convert dissenters to some specific conception of the good. My view differs significantly from the views of John Rawls and John Locke: a liberalism of conscience is based in principles that people should accept, and which provide a firmer ground for rightful toleration. The theory is critical for rethinking the nature of value-pluralism, and it is capable of uniting religious and secular parties in an affirmation of fundamental political principles.

The ascendant liberal conscience: a response to three critics

This essay considers what the possession of strong moral character might imply for political action, and whether democratic leaders should possess character of that sort. Democratic citizens ought to put forth people of strong moral character for high office, I argue, instead of engendering leaders who lack such character or who are less constrained in thought, feeling, or action.I provide an account of the nature of character, clarifying its meaning and noting its importance for moral and political analysis. I subsequently describe the idea of strong moral character, and consider what it entails for deliberation and action on the part of those who possess it. Strong moral character can prompt high officials to avoid committing acts that are deeply morally troubling, and leaders who enjoy character of that kind need not be politically ineffective. I distinguish reasons why strong moral character for leaders is preferable to alternatives, and forestall a short series of objections to the case, prior to closing.

What Should a Democratic Leader Be Willing to Do

This book examines the importance of personal autonomy for democratic citizenship and for good lives. It charts the evolution of autonomy and analyzes the proliferation of autonomy in free societies. The book pinpoints serious deficiencies in received ideals of autonomy for individual persons. It delivers an extended critique of personal autonomy, noting the excessive openness and lack of moral structure that personal autonomy provides. It elaborates an argument in favor of ethical autonomy, an alternative kind of autonomy that integrates individual self-rule with moral character. Ethical autonomy includes important restraints on an autonomous individual’s imagination, deliberation, and will. It supports central liberal commitments, it fits with reasonable pluralism, it enhances active and astute forms of democratic citizenship, and it is grounded in fundamental principles of liberty of conscience. This novel understanding enriches the values of freedom, toleration, respect, individual rights, limited government, and the rightful rule of law.

Ethical Autonomy: The Rise of Self-Rule

This article assesses theoretical frameworks used to address tensions between liberalism and Islam. It analyzes three general approaches to negotiating those tensions, and it outlines a fou...

Lucas Swaine

Papers

Political Theory and the Conduct of Faith: Oakeshott on Religion in Public Life

The ascendant liberal conscience: a response to three critics

What Should a Democratic Leader Be Willing to Do

Ethical Autonomy: The Rise of Self-Rule

Can Islam Transform Liberalism