Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Introduction PART ONE: COGNITION Ideas and Beliefs Social Beliefs Structures and Strategies Structures of Ideologies Values Mental Models Consistency Consciousness Common Sense Knowledge and Truth Identity Social Cognition PART TWO: SOCIETY Ideology and Society Groups Group Relations Elites Dominant Ideologies? Institutions PART THREE: DISCOURSE The Relevance of Discourse Discourse Structures Context Reproduction From Cognition to Discourse Persuasion Legitimation Ideological Discourse Structures The Ideology and Discourse of Modern Racism Conclusions

Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach

LIST OF FIGURES PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1 Philosophy of Education Before the Twentieth Century Socrates and Plato Aristotle Rousseau Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 2 The Philosophical and Educational Thought of John Dewey Dewey's Philosophical Orientation The Meaning and Aims of Education Dewey's Psychology Dewey's Theory of Knowledge Democracy and Education The Place of Subject Matter Dewey Today: An Assessment Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 3 Analytic Philosophy Philosophical Analysis in Education The Analysis of Teaching Current Analyses of Teaching Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 4 Continental Philosophy Existentialism Phenomenology Critical Theory Hermeneutics Postmodernism Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 5 Logic and Critical Thinking Formal Logic Informal Logic McPeck's View of Critical Thinking An Alternative Approach Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 6 Epistemology and Education Justified True Belief Foundationalism Truth Nonfoundational Theories of Knowledge Epistemology and Education Constructivism Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 7 Philosophy of Social Science and Educational Research How Does Science Grow? A Debate in Educational Research Some Examples Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 8 Ethics and Moral Education Pre-Enlightenment Ethics Enlightenment Ethics Utilitarianism Deweyan Ethics Moral Education Cognitive Developmentalism Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 9 Social and Political Philosophy The Current Debate Justice and Equality in Education Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 10 Problems of School Reform Equality Accountability Standards Testing Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 11 Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism Multiculturalism Cosmopolitanism The Educator's Dilemma Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 12 Feminism, Philosophy, and Education Feminist Critiques of Philosophy Epistemology Philosophy of Social Science Ethics Care and Education Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

Philosophy of Education

The use of interpretive approaches within management and organizational sciences has increased substantially. However appropriate criteria for justifying research results from interpretive approaches have not developed so rapidly alongside their adaptation. This article examines the potential of common criteria for justifying knowledge produced within interpretive approaches. Based on this investigation, appropriate criteria are identified and a strategy for achieving them is proposed. Finally, an interpretive study of competence in organizations is used to demonstrate how the proposed criteria and strategy can be applied to justify knowledge produced within interpretive approaches.

How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced Within Interpretive Approaches

The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. The first task can be accomplished once we realize that the accuracy of systems of partial beliefs can be measured on a gradational scale that satisfies a small set of formal constraints, each of which has a sound epistemic motivation. When accuracy is measured in this way it can be shown that any system of degrees of belief that violates the axioms of probability can be replaced by an alternative system that obeys the axioms and yet is more accurate in every possible world. Since epistemically rational agents must strive to hold accurate beliefs, this establishes conformity with the axioms of probability as a norm of epistemic rationality whatever its prudential merits or defects might be.

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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism

THE distinguished author of “Why the Mind has a Body” is one of the most original and fearless philosophers of the school which labels itself “Critical Realism.” The present short volume, though it is written with all the freshness and vigour we associate with his work, is frankly disappointing. This is because, instead of stating his theory and advancing his argument from his own point of view, he develops it by means of a rather tedious criticism of Mr. Bradley, Mr. Russell, M. Bergson, and other philosophers. His own theory rests, he tells us, on two assumptions: first, that there is a world; second, that there is a self. Nature, he is convinced, is really what it appears to be, and the self is an outgrowth of nature, though in some of its manifestations rising above it. It seems to us that the primary difficulty of such assumptions is that they conflict with physical science and are irreconcilable with the scientific concepts of nature and self. In philosophy, assumptions in the premises have a curious knack of turning up in the conclusion so that no real progress can be made, but they are otherwise harmless enough. Scientific reality is a question of real metaphysical interest at the present time, but it finds no place in this theory, which is mainly concerned with the question of sense-data.A Theory of Knowledge.Charles AugustusStrongBy. Pp. xii+103. (London, Bombay and Sydney: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1923.) 6s. net.

Theory of Knowledge

Catherine Trotter est traditionnellement associee a la defense de Locke et Clarke. L'A. explore d'autres aspects de son oeuvre philosophique et pricipalement sa theorie morale

https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_philosophy/v031/31.4bolton.pdf

Some Aspects of the Philosophical Work of Catharine Trotter

This paper argues that Locke has a representative theory of sensitive knowledge. Perceivers are immediately aware of nothing but sensory ideas in the mind; yet perceivers think of real external substances that correspond to and cause those ideas, and they are warranted in believing that those substances exist (at that time). The theory poses two questions: what warrants the truth of such beliefs? What is it in virtue of which sensory ideas represent external objects and how do they make perceivers think of those objects? Both the epistemic and semantic issues need to be addressed. This paper urges that Locke's basic account of warrant is roughly reliabilist. The causal origin of sensory ideas assures that, in general, sense based beliefs are true. Locke defines the limit of this warrant by the theoretical point that we cannot discuss skeptical doubt without assuming the truthfulness of our perceptual faculty. Turning to the semantic question, the paper argues that ideas are mental modifications or entities. They are not intrinsically representative (satisfiable), but rather represent only by virtue of their causal origin. They merely "track" the presence of substances and their qualities. Ideas nevertheless prompt perceivers to think of their causes. This is roughly because sensory ideas have a specific mental role, namely, to serve as marks for distinguishing substances and their respective qualities for purposes of action. The paper suggests that, for Locke, the challenge posed by the semantic veil of ideas is to explain this externally directed marking function within bounds of his anti-innatism. But it concludes that his answers to the twin questions fit together reasonably well.

Martha Brandt Bolton

Papers

Theory of Knowledge

Some Aspects of the Philosophical Work of Catharine Trotter

Locke on the semantic and epistemic role of simple ideas of sensation

Spinoza on cartesian doubt

Change in the Monad