Showing papers in "Noûs in 1985"

What do women want in a moral theory

Abstract: When I finished reading Carol Gilligan's "In Another Voice", I asked myself the obvious question for a philosopher reader, namely what differences one should expect in the moral philosophy done by women, supposing Gilligan's sample of women representative, and supposing her analysis of their moral attitudes and moral development to be correct. Should one expect them to want to produce moral theories, and if so, what sort of moral theories? How will any moral theories they produce differ from those produced by men? Obviously one does not have to make this an entirely a priori and hypothetical question. One can look and see what sort of contributions women have made to moral philosophy. Such a look confirms, I think, Gilligan's findings. What one finds is a bit different in tone and approach from the standard sort of moral philosophy as done by men following in the footsteps of the great moral philosophers (all men). Generalizations are extremely rash, but when I think of Philippa Foot's work on the moral virtues, of Elizabeth Anscombe's work on intention and on modern moral philosophy, of Iris Murdoch's philosophical writings, of Ruth Barcan Marcus' work on moral dilemmas, of the work of the radical feminist moral philosophers who are not content with orthodox Marxist lines of thought, of Jenny Teichman's book on Illegitimacy, of Susan Wolf's recent articles, of Claudia Card's essay on mercy, Sabina Lovilbond's recent book, Gabriele Taylor's work on pride, love and on integrity, Cora Diamond's and Mary Midgeley's work on our attitude to animals, Sissela Bok's work on lying and on secrecy, Virginia Held's work, the work of Alison Jaggar, Marilyn Frye, and many others, I seem to hear a different voice from the standard moral philosophers' voice. I hear the voice Gilligan heard, made reflective and philosophical. What women want in moral

Frege, the tractatus, and the logocentric predicament

Abstract: The principles of logic are, let us remember, the principles of valid reasoning that set the standards of consistency. Inquiry into any subject matter whatsoever draws implicitly on these principles and must conform to these standards on pain of incoherence. Logic then has a privileged position among the sciences, and this position raises two questions. First, what is the subject matter of logic; what content for logical principles does justice to their role in setting standards of consistency? Second, from what vantage point are we able to isolate and elucidate the basic notions that enter into the formulation of logic? These questions become all the more pressing, once the study of logic is separated sharply from empirical psychological investigations of human cognition. The magnitude of Frege's innovation in logic makes him acutely aware of the logocentric predicament. Frege puts forward his begriffsschrift as a formulation of the principles of valid reasoning. In developing a conception of logic that supports this identification, Frege addresses the issues raised by the logocentric predicament. Indeed, an examination of Frege's conception of logic can serve to clarify those issues. However, in the end, this conception of logic is unsatisfactory. For there are deep tensions between Frege's official construal of the content of the axioms of the begriffsschrift, and his view of judgment that underlies the identification of the begriffsschrift as logic. Wittgenstein's Tractatus is, in large measure, a response to these tensions in Frege's thought. Wittgenstein largely

Against Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals

Abstract: Or so the argument goes.' Since an omniscient being would be a being that knows all that is known, since only I know what I know in knowing (1), and since I am not omniscient, there is no omniscient being. In what follows I want to present and ponder this and similar arguments against omniscience, each of which turns on the issue of knowledge expressed by means of indexicals: 'I,' 'here,' 'now,' and the like. Consider also the following argument, for example: No one knows at any time other than now-no one has known at any time in the past and no one will know at any time in the future-what I know in knowing that:

Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory

Abstract: Sur les difficultes que rencontre toute transition entre les theories morales considerees comme ideales (au sens de J. Rawls) et leurs applications historiques. L'A. precise d'abord la definition des theories ideales, et notamment le role central qu'y joue le concept de principe moral| puis il montre, a la fois sur des bases theoriques et sur des exemples concrets, que l'application reelle des principes exige toujours une ou plusieurs modifications. Il insiste plus particulierement sur les implications de son analyse pour les ethiques professionnelles

On the Logic of Belief

Abstract: Any general theory of denotation must ultimately confront the problems surrounding the denotation of expressions inside intensional contexts. Since Kripke's persuasive arguments against a Russell-Frege theory of names (Kripke, 1972), many philosophers have abandoned such views in favor of what I shall call 'the direct reference theory' of names (following Kaplan, 1977). The direct reference theory of names maintains that names denote objects directly, and not via a sense or definite description. Unfortunately, although Kripke points out the shortcomings of both Russell's and Frege's views concerning proper names, he does not offer a solution to the problems which motivated their theories. I shall argue that the problems do not, strictly speaking, lie with the direct reference theory of names, but rather in the traditional view of belief. I shall offer an alternative theory of belief that is motivated in part by recent work on indexicals and belief, and that solves the difficulties of denotation in belief contexts. The problem I wish to consider can be illustrated by means of the following sentences:

Absolute Versions of Incompleteness Theorems

Abstract: sort I propose to help alleviate the problem. Adherents of such views will have to find some other program for epistemological studies. Leaving this possibility aside, what ideas are there in the classical positions which might help us carry out the program I propose? The chief virtue of formalism (aside from being precise enough to refute!) seems to be that it uncovered an interesting dass of self verifying propositions, that is propositions which if true can be known to be true (namely the r.e. formulas of arithmetic). Unfortunately, this does not seem to carry us much further. It would not be surprising, however, if this perspective could lead to a proof of the consistency of 2) with U an r.e. formula. Nevertheless, although there are various schemas of recursive ordinals, it is not clear that these can be turned to the purposes at hand with insights "from below". Platonistic and even conceptualistic perspectives do suggest other possibilities. At the very least, they suggest working in a richer framework for carrying out the program. For example, it may be that there is a more general theory of humanly intelligible concepts: perhaps at least one for each ordinal. (Compare to G6del's suggestion in Davis (1946, p. 85)) that the ordinal definable sets correspond to the humanly definable concepts. It is by no means obvious that this would be incompatible with the Post-Turing thesis!) From the Platonistic perspective, there is the possibility of tying concepts and proofs to truth and more generally to the real world. While it is not clear exactly how this would go, we do know that what is definable depends on the structure of the real world; it is plausible to think that the concepts which are available depend on what can be defined, and that the proofs that are available depend in turn on the available concepts. It is in any case very plausible that the notion of provability should be dependent on the notion of truth (compare the traditional "justified true belief" and the more recent Gettier inspired "hereditarily justified true belief"). A suggestion from the Platonistic tradition (specifically, from G6del in Davis (1946, p. 85) which has never been followed up is that axioms might be the instances of certain r.e. schemas which in addition happen to be true. Again, it is by no means obvious that this would be incompatible with the Post-Turing thesis. Another possibility is suggested by George Bealer's approach to the correspondence between thought and reality (1982). Briefly, there are ways of combining concepts (thoughts), perhaps analogous to syntactic operations, but one starts with concepts which are part of the actual structure of reality (qualities and connections). The latter satisfy (at least according to one theory) a weak extensionality This content downloaded from 157.55.39.35 on Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:57:00 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS 339 condition: they are the same if they necessarily have the same extension. Again, it is not apparent that anything in this would violate the Post-Turing thesis. (It is true that if the logical necessities satisfy S5, i.e. possible implies necessarily possible, then concepts having necessarily the same extension turn out not r.e. However, the qualities and connections are a restricted class of concepts.) I have emphasized that the results pose problems for epistemology generally and not merely for formalist or nominalist epistemology. I do not wish to leave the impression that the nominalist has no special difficulties. The nominalist can of course reject the framework into which I have cast the epistemological issues (for example by denying the meaningfulness of 'it is provable that'). This seems rather unnatural and unintuitive, however, as would rejection of its meaningful applicability to arithmetic sentences, or its iterability in this context. Moreover, it does not seem to be necessary in order to preserve the mechanist thesis. (Some such move would be required if one wishes to present any particular formal system as an analysis of B -namely, then one must at least reject natural axioms for B. But such an analysis is surely very implausible.) If we do cast the epistemological issues into the framework I advocate, then the nominalist does have special problems. The reason for this is that for the nominalist the natural theoretical framework is arithmetic (or something close) and not some esoteric theory involving truth, predication, or other metaphysical notions. The basic problem is not specifically epistemological. It is this. Since the nominalist theory of concepts is the syntactic theory (I take it this excludes the concept of truth), the nominalist is stuck with the fixed point theorems in a special way. This is best explained by contrast with a theory which allows propositions. In such a theory [p] will denote the proposition expressed by p (if there is one) instead of the sentence expressing it. But now one can distinguish between the case where p expresses a proposition, and the case where it does not. There is the possibility of natural restrictions blocking or disarming the fixed point theorems. To be more specific, let us consider an almost-nominalistic theory of propositions. The theory is framed in terms of Kripke's theory of partial truth (Kripke, 1975). An elegant version of this theory which will do for our purposes is due to Feferman. Consider a classical first order language L extending ordinary arithmetic, with predicates T for true and F for false; T is supposed to include the true atomic sentence of arithmetic, F to include the false ones. The special axioms for T and F are the Kripke-Kleene rules. For example a This content downloaded from 157.55.39.35 on Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:57:00 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Early medieval philosophy (480-1150) : an introduction

Abstract: Compact but singularly well thought out material of a theological, logical, poetic as well as philosophical nature.

Tetrahedra, Motion, and Virtue

Abstract: Could the fire we see be tetrahedra? Could your thinking be rotary motion, as Aristotle takes Plato to be saying? Could what courage really is, i.e. the Form Courage, be a mathematical proportion or geometrical configuration? This paper asks such questions and is an attempt to take seriously the idea that in speaking of the Forms and their images in the Timaeus Plato need not be assuming that the identity conditions for either of these are set by the meanings of their names. In commenting on Tim. 51b-e, F. M. Cornford remarks that the Form Fire, the "model", is "the meaning of the name 'Fire' more or less clearly present to our thought whenever we use the word" and cannot be identified with the pyramid (Cornford, 1937, p. 190, see also G. Vlastos, 1981.) He adds in support: When we look at a fire we do not see or think of pyramids, and

De se and Descartes: A new semantics for indexicals

Abstract: The propositional theory of belief has recently come under heavy fire from various quarters. In the present article I wish to examine one such line of attack: the arguments it uses, the evidence it brings against the propositional theory, and the alternative accounts offered by its standard bearers. Those who lack the time or inclination to follow me down this torturous path may wish to know that my conclusion is a vindication of the propositional theory, albeit in a reformed form, enriched by a new, unorthodox device. Robert Stalnaker' summarizes the propositional theory in two theses:

Review of W ittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

Abstract: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Documents about the work Wittgenstein on rules and private language (1982) / Saul Aaron Kripke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Pages in data.bnf.fr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Related authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This page in data.bnf.fr lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Sources and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Link to the main catalogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Variant of the title

Why a Set Contains its Members Essentially

Abstract: It is essential to every set that it contain just the members it does and no others. This means that no set could gain or lose any members (or exchange some members for others) and still be the set it was. It. also means that no set could have had members other than the ones it does. In short, the membership of a set can vary neither from time to time nor from one possible world to another. Dissent from this thesis on the part of anyone who accepts the idea of essential characteristics at all is likely to be based on misunderstanding of what the thesis says. Here is another statement of it that should forestall irrelevant objections:

Meaning Change for Natural Kind Terms

Abstract: Diachronic linguistics studies and explains the ways in which langRages change over time. It studies changes in phonetic, grammatical, and semantic items, and in whatever theoretical entities linguists postulate to do ordinary synchronic linguistics. In this paper I want to consider the effects of scientific investigation on the meanings of natural kind terms. I will present a diachronic model of the way such terms undergo meaning changes. Consider some of the ways in which science has an effect on language. Scientists may discover important distinctions that are not captured by current natural language or by the technical vocabulary the scientists inherit. They may suggest new words or a new usage of old words to reflect such distinctions. On the other hand the scientists may discover that natural language has terms for classifying things that do not exist or for making distinctions that are no longer thought to be worth making. Then they may suggest dropping some words or usages. They might suggest a substitution, dropping an old usage and starting a new one at the same time. Historical accident enters into how all this happens. The scientist (or someone else) may explicitly suggest a change in the language or he may simply start using words in a new way, expecting that the change will catch on. In either case his attempt might fail; he may have an effect on nothing beyond his own ideolect. When a scientist does change the language, he may add clarity or confusion. The diachronic model I suggest for natural kind terms should be helpful for finding and systematizing whatever regularities are available among these changes. The model I pro-

Newcomb's perfect predictor

Abstract: Since Robert Nozick (1970) first published Newcomb's problem, much has been written of it. Most of the literature has dealt primarily with the case in which the predictor is assumed to be highly reliable but not infallible. As the problem is typically formulated, traditional evidential decision theories, such as Jeffrey's (1965) recommend taking one box. Causal decision theories, such as those developed by Gibbard and Harper (1981), Skyrms (1980, 1982), Lewis (1981), and Sobel (1977) favor taking both boxes. Recently, refined evidential decision theories have been offered by Eells (1981) and Jeffrey (1981) which are intended to prescribe a two-box solution. We think it clear that one should take two boxes and prefer the causal decision theorists' justification of this choice. Our concern here is with the case in which the predictor is not merely reliable, but perfect. In this case, causal decision theories are less satisfactory, for they continue to recommend choosing both boxes, and this recommendation is not so intuitive.' The infallibility of the predictor changes intuitions, because it seems that taking one box guarantees that you become a millionaire, while taking both guarantees that you do not. Gibbard and Harper claim that this appearance is based on mistaking truth-functional conditionals for counterfactuals. We shall argue, though, that the counterfactuals leading to the one-box solution have independent support. As a result, the argument for taking one box is cogent in the infallible case. In some formulations of the puzzle, so is the argument for taking two. In these cases, the problem lies not in either of these competing arguments but in the puzzle itself. Perfect predictor versions of Newcomb's problem can be interpreted in various ways, but on plausible interpretations the prob-

Critical hegemony and aesthetic acculturation

Abstract: I want to make some observations about contemporary art and the workings of the art world, in the attempt to demythologize certain aspects of both. I shall be speaking from the experience of an artist, but with the tools and perspective of a philosopher. Hence counterexamples to my claims must be fairly numerous, in order to demonstrate the need for revision of my many, admittedly empirical generalizations. Let's begin by supposing that, at some relatively early stage of development, one exhibits some talent or interest in art-making, and that this is expressed in some spontaneous, untutored, creative product: drawing, say, or needlework, or mechanical inventions. We can expect that if this creative impulse is encouraged at all, its products will reflect the aesthetic values and conventions of one's immediate community, and be informed and determined by one's ethnic, economic, and political environment: Artists almost always treat issues in their work that are, in a broad sense, of personal concern to them. Now let's speculate on who is most likely to make a career commitment to art, either as an artist, a critic, dealer, or collector. Art institutions in their present incarnations seem to offer the opportunity to achieve the highest standards of one's freely chosen craft, and the valued peer recognition and approval that accompanies it. On the other hand, posthumous or belated "discoveries" of unrecognized artists, as well as successful publicity campaigns for pre-packaged enfants terrible de la minute, demonstrate the lack of correlation of merit and professional success. Similarly, aspiring dealers and critics may learn all too quickly the economic dangers of staking their professional credibility on a single "movement" or individual. Hence one must be economically prepared to ensure one's material well-being in some other way, in case one's gamble on

Induction and Deduction Revisited

Abstract: What is the distinction between an inductive argument and a deductive one? This seems a straightforward question, but there has been very little discussion of it lately in the literature. Perhaps then it is a question with a straightforward, settled answer, not worth further talk. If that is so, it ought to be possible to state the answer. Suppose we try. We can begin by looking briefly at the jobs which the distinction is supposed to do. Gilbert Harman has claimed whenever one characterizes a set of statements as premisses and conclusion one is thereby thinking of the statements as constituting a deductive argument. This leaves no room for a separate class of inductive arguments, and according to Harman it follows that there is no 'subject of inductive logic'.' Wilfrid Sellars, having concluded that all 'probability' arguments are best construed as camouflaged deductive arguments for conclusions which explicitly state that it is reasonable for the arguer to accept certain statements, leaves us with a negative prospect for a distinct set of inductive arguments, and hence for a distinct inductive logic.2 Sellars and Harman thus accept the well-entrenched view that if there were a legitimate distinction between inductive and deductive logic, that distinction would be drawn by appeal to a more fundamental distinction between arguments-a distinction between inductive and deductive arguments. Neither Harman nor Sellars admit the existence of any members in the class of inductive arguments. Other philosophers, such as Arthur Burks,3 viewing the distinction between deductive and inductive logic in much the same way, insist there are inductive arguments to serve as subject matter for inductive logic. In fact it has become commonplace to hold that inductive logic, whatever it may be, is the logic of inductive arguments, whatever they may be, and similarly deductive logic is the logic of deductive arguments.