世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Thinking fast and slow.

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein Penguin Books, 2009, 312 pp, ISBN 978-0-14-311526-7This book is best described formally as a general explanation of and advocacy for libertarian paternalism, a term coined by the authors in earlier publications. Informally, it is about how leaders, systems, organizations, and governments can nudge people to do the things the nudgers want and need done for the betterment of the nudgees, or of society. It is paternalism in the sense that "it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people's behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better", (p. 5) It is libertarian in that "people should be free to do what they like - and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so", (p. 5) The built-in possibility of opting out or making a different choice preserves freedom of choice even though people's behavior has been influenced by the nature of the presentation of the information or by the structure of the decisionmaking system. I had never heard of libertarian paternalism before reading this book, and I now find it fascinating.Written for a general audience, this book contains mostly social and behavioral science theory and models, but there is considerable discussion of structure and process that has roots in mathematical and quantitative modeling. One of the main applications of this social system is economic choice in investing, selecting and purchasing products and services, systems of taxes, banking (mortgages, borrowing, savings), and retirement systems. Other quantitative social choice systems discussed include environmental effects, health care plans, gambling, and organ donations. Softer issues that are also subject to a nudge-based approach are marriage, education, eating, drinking, smoking, influence, spread of information, and politics. There is something in this book for everyone.The basis for this libertarian paternalism concept is in the social theory called "science of choice", the study of the design and implementation of influence systems on various kinds of people. The terms Econs and Humans, are used to refer to people with either considerable or little rational decision-making talent, respectively. The various libertarian paternalism concepts and systems presented are tested and compared in light of these two types of people. Two foundational issues that this book has in common with another book, Network of Echoes: Imitation, Innovation and Invisible Leaders, that was also reviewed for this issue of the Journal are that 1 ) there are two modes of thinking (or components of the brain) - an automatic (intuitive) process and a reflective (rational) process and 2) the need for conformity and the desire for imitation are powerful forces in human behavior. …

Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers

Conventional studies of bilateral trade patterns specify a log-normal gravity equation for empirical estimation. However, the log-normal gravity equation suffers from three problems: the bias created by the logarithmic transformation, the failure of the homoscedasticity assumption, and the way zero values are treated. These problems normally result in biased and inefficient estimates. Recently, the Poisson specification of the trade gravity model has received attention as an alternative to the log-normality assumption (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). However, the standard Poisson model is vulnerable for problems of overdispersion and excess zero flows. To overcome these problems, this paper considers modified Poisson fixed-effects estimations (negative binomial, zero-inflated). Extending the empirical model put forward by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we show how these techniques may provide viable alternatives to both the log-normal and standard Poisson specification of the gravity model of trade.

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On the Specification of the Gravity Model of Trade: Zeros, Excess Zeros and Zero-inflated Estimation

Empirical research establishing the costs and benefits that can be associated with polycentric urban systems is often called for but rather thin on the ground. In part, this is due to the persistence of what appear to be two analytically distinct approaches in understanding and measuring polycentricity: a morphological approach centring on nodal features and a functional approach focused on the relations between centres. Informed by the oft-overlooked but rich heritage of urban systems research, this paper presents a general theoretical framework that links both approaches and discusses the way both can be measured and compared in a coherent manner. Using the Netherlands as a test case, it is demonstrated that most regions tend to be more morphologically polycentric than functionally polycentric. The difference is largely explained by the size, external connectivity and degree of self-sufficiency of a region’s principal centre.

Form Follows Function? Linking Morphological and Functional Polycentricity:

Recent concepts such as ‘megaregions' and ‘polycentric urban regions' emphasize that external economies are not confined to a single urban core, but are shared among a collection of nearby and link...

/pdf/spatial-structure-and-productivity-in-us-metropolitan-areas-2xetyl409f.pdf

Spatial Structure and Productivity in US Metropolitan Areas

The current dynamics in the Western European urban system are in marked contrast with the bourgeoning literature stressing the importance of agglomeration for economic growth. This paper explores whether this is due to the rise of ‘city network economies’, leading to processes of borrowed size as well as the rise of agglomeration shadows in networks of cities. The spread of metropolitan functions over Western European cities is analysed. It is found that network connectivity positively enhances the presence of metropolitan functions, but local size remains the most significant determinant for most types of functions. The importance of size and network connectivity differs across metropolitan functions and across cities.

Borrowing size in networks of cities: City size, network connectivity and metropolitan functions in Europe

In contemporary literature on changing urban systems, it is often argued that the traditional central place conceptualisation is outdated and should be replaced by a network view that emphasises the increasing criss-crossing pattern of interdependencies between spatial units. This paper tests for urban network development by looking at commuting patterns in the Greater South East UK. The analysis is based on census commuting interaction data for three points in time during the past three decades (1981, 1991, and 2001). Although the empirical results indicate that the Greater South East UK can still not be characterized as a polycentric urban region or integrated urban network, there is some evidence for urban network development at the local, intra-urban, level as well as a decentralization of the system at the regional, inter-urban, level.

/pdf/functional-polycentrism-and-urban-network-development-in-the-488qexfr1p.pdf

Martijn Burger

Papers

On the Specification of the Gravity Model of Trade: Zeros, Excess Zeros and Zero-inflated Estimation

Form Follows Function? Linking Morphological and Functional Polycentricity:

Spatial Structure and Productivity in US Metropolitan Areas

Borrowing size in networks of cities: City size, network connectivity and metropolitan functions in Europe

Functional Polycentrism and Urban Network Development in the Greater South East, United Kingdom: Evidence from Commuting Patterns, 1981–2001