世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Thinking fast and slow.

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein Penguin Books, 2009, 312 pp, ISBN 978-0-14-311526-7This book is best described formally as a general explanation of and advocacy for libertarian paternalism, a term coined by the authors in earlier publications. Informally, it is about how leaders, systems, organizations, and governments can nudge people to do the things the nudgers want and need done for the betterment of the nudgees, or of society. It is paternalism in the sense that "it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people's behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better", (p. 5) It is libertarian in that "people should be free to do what they like - and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so", (p. 5) The built-in possibility of opting out or making a different choice preserves freedom of choice even though people's behavior has been influenced by the nature of the presentation of the information or by the structure of the decisionmaking system. I had never heard of libertarian paternalism before reading this book, and I now find it fascinating.Written for a general audience, this book contains mostly social and behavioral science theory and models, but there is considerable discussion of structure and process that has roots in mathematical and quantitative modeling. One of the main applications of this social system is economic choice in investing, selecting and purchasing products and services, systems of taxes, banking (mortgages, borrowing, savings), and retirement systems. Other quantitative social choice systems discussed include environmental effects, health care plans, gambling, and organ donations. Softer issues that are also subject to a nudge-based approach are marriage, education, eating, drinking, smoking, influence, spread of information, and politics. There is something in this book for everyone.The basis for this libertarian paternalism concept is in the social theory called "science of choice", the study of the design and implementation of influence systems on various kinds of people. The terms Econs and Humans, are used to refer to people with either considerable or little rational decision-making talent, respectively. The various libertarian paternalism concepts and systems presented are tested and compared in light of these two types of people. Two foundational issues that this book has in common with another book, Network of Echoes: Imitation, Innovation and Invisible Leaders, that was also reviewed for this issue of the Journal are that 1 ) there are two modes of thinking (or components of the brain) - an automatic (intuitive) process and a reflective (rational) process and 2) the need for conformity and the desire for imitation are powerful forces in human behavior. …

Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers

In this chapter, we discuss the use of gravity models in the study of spatial structure. Using the recent discussion on functional polycentricity as a background, we argue that the gravity model approach has one obvious advantage when examining spatial structure: it can simultaneously assess functional polycentricity and spatial interdependencies within one modelling framework. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methods that can be applied to estimate the gravity model.

Examining Spatial Structure Using Gravity Models

How happy we are, depends partly on how we live our life and part of our way of life is how we commute between home and work. In that context, we are faced with the question of how much time spent on commuting is optimal happiness wise and with what means of transportation we will feel best. Decisions about commuting are typically made as a side issue in job choice and there are indications that we are bad in predicting how such decisions will work out on our happiness in the long-run. For that reason, it is helpful to know how commuting has worked out on the happiness of other people and on people like you in particular. Several cross-sectional studies found lower happiness among long-distance commuters and among users of public transportation. Yet these differences could be due to selection effects, such as unhappy people opting more often for distant jobs without having a car. Still another limitation is that earlier research has focused on the average effect of commuting, rather than specifying what is optimal for whom. Data of the Dutch ‘Happiness Indicator’ study was analyzed, in the context of which 5000 participants recorded what they had done in the previous day and how happy they had felt during these activities. This data allows comparison between how the same person feels at home and during commute, which eliminates selection effects. The number of participants is large enough to allow a split-up between different kinds of people, in particular among the many well-educated women who participated in this study. People feel typically less happy when commuting than at home, and that the negative difference is largest when commuting with public transportation and smallest when commuting by bike. It is not per se the commuting time that causes happiness loss, but specific combinations of commuting time and commuting mode. Increasing commuting times can even lead to a gain in happiness for certain types of women, when the commute is by bike. Split-up by different kinds of people shows considerable differences, such as an optimal commute alone or even by public transport for some highly educated women. Optimal ways of commuting for different kinds of people are presented in a summary table, from which individuals can read what will fit them best. The differences illustrate that research focusing on average effects of happiness will not help individuals in making a more informed choice.

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Commuting and Happiness: What Ways Feel Best for What Kinds of People?

When investing in a foreign country, multinational enterprises face social, political and organizational information asymmetries. This liability of foreignness (LOF) introduces additional costs, threaten profitability and deter foreign direct investments. In this study we investigate if certain regions are better able to mitigate these liabilities, and therefore attract more greenfield investments. We identify regional trust, defined as the society average for interpersonal trust per region, as potential mediator of the LOF. Using European cross-sectional data from 2003-2011 on the number of cross-border greenfield investments and the regional level of trust, we confirm that the level of regional trust positively affects the number of investments that a region receives. The effect of regional trust is sizable (factor 1.65 and above per one unit increase in regional trust). Firms with a higher probability of facing a LOF (operationalized by geographic, institutional and genetic distance between the home and host country) more often locate in regions with a higher level of trust. We show that this result is robust against endogeneity.

Regional Trust, Liabilities of Foreignness and the Location Decision of Multinational Firms in Europe

In this manuscript, we relate regional structural composition—related and unrelated variety—to firm-level productivity in European regions, applying a Cobb–Douglas production function framework and using firm-, industry- and regional-level mixed hierarchical (multilevel) models. Our analyses indicate that regional-related variety has a positive impact on firm productivity in European regions, especially for firms in high-tech and medium-tech regions. These outcomes have implications for European policies on competitiveness as firms embedded in regions without these technological and institutional circumstances are systematically worse off in terms of productivity, and catching-up is not obvious for such regional economies.

/pdf/heterogeneous-relatedness-and-firm-productivity-52pxwptghw.pdf

Heterogeneous relatedness and firm productivity

Which foreign direct investments are most affected by political instability? Analysis of quarterly greenfield investment flows into countries in the Middle East and North Africa from 2003 to 2012 shows that adverse political shocks are associated with significantly reduced investment inflows in the non-resource tradable sectors. By contrast, investments in natural resource sectors and non-tradable activities appear insensitive to such shocks. Consistent with these patterns, the significant reduction in investment inflows in Arab Spring affected economies was starkest in the non-resource manufacturing sector. Political instability is thus associated with increased reliance on non-tradables and aggravated resource dependence. Conversely, how intensified political instability affects aggregate foreign direct investment is critically contingent on the initial sector composition of these flows.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/6716.pdf?abstractid=2365877&type=2

Martijn Burger

Papers

Examining Spatial Structure Using Gravity Models

Commuting and Happiness: What Ways Feel Best for What Kinds of People?

Regional Trust, Liabilities of Foreignness and the Location Decision of Multinational Firms in Europe

Heterogeneous relatedness and firm productivity

Risky Business: Political Instability and Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment in the Arab World