Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are among the major growing technologies that have many beneficial applications, yet they can also pose a significant threat. Recently, several incidents occurred with UAVs violating privacy of the public and security of sensitive facilities, including several nuclear power plants in France. The threat of UAVs to the security of nuclear facilities is of great importance and is the focus of this work. This paper presents an overview of UAV technology and classification, as well as its applications and potential threats. We show several examples of recent security incidents involving UAVs in France, USA, and United Arab Emirates. Further, the potential threats to nuclear facilities and measures to prevent them are evaluated. The importance of measures for detection, delay, and response (neutralization) of UAVs at nuclear facilities are discussed. An overview of existing technologies along with their strength and weaknesses are shown. Finally, the results of a gap analysis in existing approaches and technologies is presented in the form of potential technological and procedural areas for research and development. Based on this analysis, directions for future work in the field can be devised and prioritized.

Analyzing the threat of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to nuclear facilities

National cyber crisis management: Different European approaches

There is a recent surge in the use of state-sponsored cyber operations by states against foreign political institutions, including efforts to sway electoral outcomes by influencing voters. Yet cyber statecraft research has focused more on operations designed to yield a direct military advantage or reward, rather than as a subtle tool of influence. We seek to address this gap in the literature, first by conceptualising a typology of state-sponsored operations constituting ‘cyber voter interference’ (CVI), second by theorising a causal mechanism through which CVI can influence the cognition and behaviour of voters contingent on specific local conditions within a target state, and third by testing the plausibility of our theoretical model via two case studies of recent elections in the United States and France, both of which saw credible accusations of cyber interference by hostile foreign actors. We find that the evidence supports the plausibility of the theorised model, and our argument that the su...

Doxing democracy: influencing elections via cyber voter interference

Securing cyberspace: How states design governance arrangements

The attribution of cyber attacks is often neglected. The consensus still is that little can be done to prosecute the perpetrators – and unfortunately, this might be right in many cases. What is however only of limited interest for the private industry is in the center of interest for nation states. Investigating if an attack was carried out in the name of a nation state is a crucial task for secret services. Many methods, tools and processes exist for network- and computer forensics that allow the collection of traces and evidences. They are the basis to associate adversarial actions to threat actors. However, a serious problem which has not got the appropriate attention from research yet, are false flag campaigns, cyber attacks which apply covert tactics to deceive or misguide attribution attempts – either to hide traces or to blame others. In this paper we provide an overview of prominent attack techniques along the cyber kill chain. We investigate traces left by attack techniques and which questions in course of the attribution process are answered by investigating these traces. Eventually, we assess how easily traces can be spoofed and rate their relevancy with respect to identifying false flag campaigns.

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Under false flag: using technical artifacts for cyber attack attribution

Information Warfare and Influence Operations are, in principle, intended to get your own message across or to prevent your adversary from doing so. However, it is not just about developing a coherent and convincing storyline as it also involves confusing, distracting, dividing, and demoralising the adversary. From that perspective, cyberspace seems to be ideal for conducting such operations that will have disruptive, rather than destructive outcomes.

Influence Cyber Operations: The use of cyberattacks in support of Influence Operations

While many states are developing national cyber security strategies, the exact role and responsibilities of the armed forces in cyberspace often remain unclear. Although attention has been devoted to acquiring specific technical capacities and expertise to act in cyberspace, decision-making processes, doctrines for deployment, and procedures generally lack systematic analysis. The first part of this article therefore focuses on whether militaries in their own national context contribute to defensive cyber security tasks. Common national challenges are identified, as are approaches that potentially improve cyber security through better civil-military cooperation. The article then examines the organisational structures in place across Asia and Europe to enable better international military cooperation for cyber related incidents. It outlines how international cooperation might assist a better exchange of information to increase cyber defence effectiveness, specifically between Asia and Europe.

Matthijs A. Veenendaal

Papers

Influence Cyber Operations: The use of cyberattacks in support of Influence Operations

Civil-military relations and international military cooperation in cyber security: Common challenges & state practices across Asia and Europe