世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

Economics Of Discrimination

The information in this chapter is based on interviews conducted in collaboration with the MIDA coordinator Sefu Kawaya during a two-week visit to Kinshasa (3-17 November 2005).

The Democratic Republic of Congo

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 72 experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so. None of the most popular explanations suggested in the literature can explain the data. We show that only combining a preference for being honest with a preference for being seen as honest can organize the empirical evidence.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/dp10188.pdf?abstractid=2840132&mirid=1

Preferences for Truth-Telling

We report insights into the behavior of prisoners in dilemma situations that so famously carry their name. We compare female inmates and students in a simultaneous and a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma. In the simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma, the cooperation rate among inmates exceeds the rate of cooperating students. Relative to the simultaneous dilemma, cooperation among first-movers in the sequential Prisoner's Dilemma increases for students, but not for inmates. Students and inmates behave identically as second movers. Hence, we find a similar and significant fraction of inmates and students to hold social preferences.

Prisoners and their dilemma

We replicate Andreoni (Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 1–21, 1995)’s finding that agents behave more selfishly when taking from a public account than when giving to a public good. Based on a neutral language setting we add new insights into motivations to give or take in a linear public good setting: we find that Andreoni’s result is partly driven by the complete elimination of giving options in the taking frame. However, a pure extension of the action space into the taking domain also leads to a significant increase in selfish behavior.

Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games

This study analyzes deterrence schemes and their impact on stealing. The results confirm Becker’s deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, crowding out of pro-social behavior occurs due to deterrence incentives: when deterrence incentives first exist and are removed later on, subsequent behavior is more selfish than without this deterrence history. This study offers evidence that (part of this) crowding out takes place via change of emotions. Without deterrence incentives in place, in a variant of the dictator game, players with pro-social emotions steal less. When players face expected punishment, pro-social emotions are deactivated and do not decrease stealing; in this case, self-centered emotions get activated and motivate greater stealing. This study provides support for theories on emotions in behavioral criminal law and economics and offers new insights for deterrence policy. (JEL C91, D63, K42)

On the Interaction of Deterrence and Emotions

We study ethnic discrimination in Europe's largest carpooling marketplace. Using a unique dataset with more than 17,000 rides, we estimate the effects of drivers' perceived name origins on the demand for rides. Carpooling is a novel application for studying ethnic discrimination where consumer choice entails social interaction with the service provider (i.e. driver). We find large discrimination effects for drivers with Arab, Turkish or Persian sounding names. Further analyses support assumptions consistent with statistical discrimination. Our findings broaden the perspective of ethnic discrimination by shedding light on subtle, everyday forms of discrimination in social markets and fuel ongoing discussions about anti-discrimination efforts in an era in which markets increasingly move online.

/pdf/ride-with-me-ethnic-discrimination-social-markets-and-the-3gnin9h2v5.pdf

Ride with me - Ethnic discrimination, social markets, and the sharing economy

https://research.vu.nl/ws/files/104469242/Adaptation_to_climate_change_in_Afghanistan.pdf

Menusch Khadjavi

Papers

Prisoners and their dilemma

Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games

On the Interaction of Deterrence and Emotions

Ride with me - Ethnic discrimination, social markets, and the sharing economy

Adaptation to climate change in Afghanistan: Evidence on the impact of external interventions