世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

This handbook looks to provide academics and students with a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the phenomenon of innovation. Innovation spans a number of fields within the social sciences and humanities: Management, Economics, Geography, Sociology, Politics, Psychology, and History. Consequently, the rapidly increasing body of literature on innovation is characterized by a multitude of perspectives based on, or cutting across, existing disciplines and specializations. Scholars of innovation can come from such diverse starting points that much of this literature can be missed, and so constructive dialogues missed. The editors of The Oxford Handbook of Innovation have carefully selected and designed twenty-one contributions from leading academic experts within their particular field, each focusing on a specific aspect of innovation. These have been organized into four main sections, the first of which looks at the creation of innovations, with particular focus on firms and networks. Section Two provides an account of the wider systematic setting influencing innovation and the role of institutions and organizations in this context. Section Three explores some of the diversity in the working of innovation over time and across different sectors of the economy, and Section Four focuses on the consequences of innovation with respect to economic growth, international competitiveness, and employment. An introductory overview, concluding remarks, and guide to further reading for each chapter, make this handbook a key introduction and vital reference work for researchers, academics, and advanced students of innovation. Contributors to this volume - Jan Fagerberg, University of Oslo William Lazonick, INSEAD Walter W. Powell, Stanford University Keith Pavitt, SPRU Alice Lam, Brunel University Keith Smith, INTECH Charles Edquist, Linkoping David Mowery, University of California, Berkeley Mary O'Sullivan, INSEAD Ove Granstrand, Chalmers Bjorn Asheim, University of Lund Rajneesh Narula, Copenhagen Business School Antonello Zanfei, Urbino Kristine Bruland, University of Oslo Franco Malerba, University of Bocconi Nick Von Tunzelmann, SPRU Ian Miles, University of Manchester Bronwyn Hall, University of California, Berkeley Bart Verspagen , ECIS Francisco Louca, ISEG Manuel M. Godinho, ISEG Richard R. Nelson, Mario Pianta, Urbino Bengt-Ake Lundvall, Aalborg

The Oxford Handbook of Innovation

Building on an idea in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), this article investigates the application of synthetic control methods to comparative case studies. We discuss the advantages of these methods and apply them to study the effects of Proposition 99, a large-scale tobacco control program that California implemented in 1988. We demonstrate that, following Proposition 99, tobacco consumption fell markedly in California relative to a comparable synthetic control region. We estimate that by the year 2000 annual per-capita cigarette sales in California were about 26 packs lower than what they would have been in the absence of Proposition 99. Using new inferential methods proposed in this article, we demonstrate the significance of our estimates. Given that many policy interventions and events of interest in social sciences take place at an aggregate level (countries, regions, cities, etc.) and affect a small number of aggregate units, the potential applicability of synthetic control methods to comparative cas...

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Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program

Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual Report

Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the leading perspectives in management and organizational studies, yet debate continues regarding its empirical support. In this paper, we take stock of the large body of extant research and provide a systematic assessment of empirical evidence. In all, 308 statistical tests from 63 articles, selected according to a set of clear criteria, were examined across various dimensions. We assess not only the level of empirical support for the theory, but also the degree of paradigm consensus present in the empirical literature. Our analysis shows that results are mixed: while we found support in some areas (e.g., with regard to asset specificity), we also found considerable disagreement on how to operationalize some of TCE's central constructs and propositions, and relatively low levels of empirical support in other core areas (e.g., surrounding uncertainty and performance). We conclude that a more thorough empirical grounding of the theory's foundation is crucial to its future development, and offer several strategies for doing this. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics

Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.

https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/gov2126/files/goelnelson_1998.pdf

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Corruption, which remains a serious problem in many countries, has prompted considerable research in recent years. This paper adds to the extant literature with insights on factors influencing corrupt activity. Using cross-country data for about 100 nations, the roles of national history, geography, and government are examined to see how they affect conditions for corruption, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The innovative aspects of this research include use of a wide set of historical, geographical, and governmental determinants of corruption, as well as detailed assessment of several previously considered determinants. The main issues addressed are the effects of the size and scope of government on the incidence of corruption across countries, and the significance of historical and geographic factors in corruption. Regarding the first question, the authors find the size and scope of government can significantly affect corruption. On the second, it is shown that historical institutional inertia in older countries and new rent-seeking opportunities in younger nations can encourage corruption, while certain geographic factors can mitigate corruption. The paper ends with discussion aimed at the policymaker.

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Causes of Corruption: History, Geography, and Government

In a recent article, Wallace Oates (1985) investigated whether fiscal decentralization tended to act as a constraining influence on the overall size of the public sector. This hypothesis has been advanced by several alternative theories of government behavior including Richard Musgrave's (1959) model of how the "distribution" function of government would be carried out by subnational governments, Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan's (1980) "Leviathan" model, and the more traditional public choice model (for example, Walter Hettich and Stanley Winer, 1984). All contend that the decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources, and thereby constrains taxing power. Oates analyzed two data sets, one pertaining to the state and local sector in the United States and the other consisting of a sample of 43 countries, and found little empirical support for the decentralization hypothesis. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider his analysis in the case of state and local governments. Specifically, it will be argued that Oates's measures of decentralization may be inappropriate to test the hypothesis. Furthermore, by taking into account the structure or composition of local governmental jurisdictions within a state, empirical support of the decentralization hypothesis can be marshaled for general-purpose local governments such as counties and municipalities. I. Measuring Fiscal Decentralization Among the States

Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension

Using a well-known index of corruption, this paper examines the determinants of corruption for a large sample of countries. Specifically, the present study brings empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether economic freedom or political freedom serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity. In particular, does greater economic freedom or greater political freedom yield a more 'clean' society? Our results show that greater economic freedom seems to matter more in this regard. Examining different components of economic freedom, we find that not all these components are equally effective in reducing corruption. For instance, monetary policy seems to have a stronger influence on the level of corrupt activity in a country than fiscal policy. Robustness of these findings is checked and policy implications are discussed.

Economic Freedom versus Political Freedom: Cross-Country Influences on Corruption

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/452369

Michael A. Nelson

Papers

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Causes of Corruption: History, Geography, and Government

Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension

Economic Freedom versus Political Freedom: Cross-Country Influences on Corruption

Democracy, Economic Freedom, Fiscal Policy, and Growth in LDCs: A Fresh Look*