Michael Firth

TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper examined whether ownership structure and boardroom characteristics have an effect on corporate financial fraud in China and found that the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure of the chairman are associated with the incidence of fraud.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether large institutional shareholdings in a firm deter earnings management by its managers when those executives otherwise have incentives to increase or decrease reported profits, and they found that the presence of large institutional shareholders inhibit managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits towards the managers' desired level or range of profits.

TL;DR: This article examined the compensation of CEOs in China's listed firms and found that firms that have a State agency as the major shareholder do not appear to use performance related pay, while firms with private blockholders or SOEs as their major shareholders relate the CEO's pay to increases in stockholders' wealth or increases in profitability.

TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper investigated the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership in Chinese listed companies and found that SOECG controlled firms perform best and SAMB and private controlled firms performed worst.