Michael J. Tierney

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a principal-agent theory of delegation to international organizations based on the principle of common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks, and discuss the role of agents in the problem of distribution, information, and delegation in international organizations.

TL;DR: In this article, an agency theory of international organizations is proposed to explain slippage between member states' interests and IO behavior, but also suggests institutional mechanisms through which states can rein in errant IOs.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce a new dataset of foreign assistance, AidData, that covers more bilateral and multilateral donors and more types of aid than existing datasets while also improving project-level information about the purposes and activities funded by aid.

TL;DR: A central theme of this and similar anti-globalization protests is that the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and other global institutions are runaway international bureaucracies implementing a "Washington consensus" formulated by professional economists and other neo-liberals who have made their careers within these agencies as discussed by the authors.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate whether foreign aid from China is prone to political capture in aid-receiving countries and examine whether more Chinese aid is allocated to the birth regions of political leaders, controlling for indicators of need and various fixed effects.