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Input Output Analysis Foundations And Extensions

ROSE-ACKERMAN Susan, PALIFKA Bonnie J. Corruption and government : causes, consequences, and reform Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2016, XXIII-618 p. ISBN 978-1-107-44109-5 MOND 723 Resume editeur : The second edition of Corruption and Government updates Susan Rose-Ackerman's 1999 book to address emerging issues and to rethink old questions in light of new data. The book analyzes the research explosion that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall, the founding of Transparency Intern...

Corruption and government : causes, consequences, and reform

ธรรมาภบาลของภาครฐเปนหนงในปจจยสำคญทสงอทธพลตอการพฒนาเศรษฐกจและสงคมของประเทศ บทความเรองนไดทำการพจารณาธรรมาภบาลของภาครฐใน 213 ประเทศทวโลก ซงแบงออกเปน 6 มต ไดแก การควบคมการคอรปชนความมประสทธผลของภาครฐ การปราศจากความรนแรงและการกอการรายคณภาพในการควบคม การบงคบใชกฎหมาย และเสรภาพของประชาชนในการแสดงความคดเหน ซงทำการศกษาโดยธนาคารโลกภายใตโครงการ Worldwide Governance Indicators จากการพจารณาพบวาประเทศทพฒนาแลวมธรรมาภบาลของ ภาครฐสงกวาประเทศกำลงพฒนาเปนอยางมาก สะทอนใหเหนวา ธรรมาภบาลของภาครฐคอหนงในปจจยทชวยขบเคลอนการพฒนาเศรษฐกจและสงคมของประเทศนอกจากนยงพบวาประเทศไทยยงไมสามารถพงพอใจกบระดบของธรรมาภบาลของประเทศในปจจบนได เนองจากยงอยในระดบคอนขางตา Government Governance: An Implication from Worldwide Governance Indicators Government governance is one of the major determinants of the economic and social development of the nations. This article reviewed government governance of 213 countries worldwide which was categorized into six dimensions, including control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability, based on the study of the World Bank under Worldwide Governance Indicators project. After the revision, it was found that developed countries had far higher government governance than developing countries, implying that government governance is one of the factors which drive the economic and social development of the nations. Moreover, Thailand could not yet be satisfied with its current government governance since its rank was quite low.

ธรรมาภิบาลของภาครัฐ: นัยจาก Worldwide Governance Indicators

by GABRIELLA EICHINGER FERRO-LUZZI via Mario Fascetti, 67, 00136 Rome, Italy. 24 ix 81 Cohen (CA 22:201-18) and all his commentators take it for granted that we know the mechanism of biological evolution. For him \"the basic mechanism, change resulting from reproductive success, is clear\" (p. 204), and commentator Swartz does not even want to speak of the theory of evolution because the \"facts are empirically established\" (p. 214). I think we have to distinguish between biological evolution and the explanation thereof. Biological evolution is a fact; general directional change towards greater complexity of organisms and, above all, towards greater complexity of the brain cannot be denied. Theory as to the mechanism of evolution, however, leaves much to be desired. Breeding success might at most be adduced to explain the survival of the species; it can never explain directional change unless we simultaneously assume that species become progressively fitter and hence survive longer, which is not borne out by paleontology. We have as a species little hope of matching the longevity of the scorpion, and the tortoise beats us in the longevity of the individual and the species. If reproductive success and the survival of the species were selected for, we would do well to return at least to the level of the rat, but unfortunately the general direction of evolution seems to be set once and for all, even if it means producing less and less viable species. Within the general direction of evolution, transient \"fashions\" are discernible, and these too cannot be explained in terms of fitness. After a long period in which the \"nude look\" was \"in,\" fur coats became fashionable, eventually to give way to another wave of nudism. At present ancient nudists, fur-clad beauties, and modern nudists may be found inhabiting the same environment, and therefore the appearance of the outermost layer of the body obviously cannot be said to possess survival or reproductive value. Also, Homo sapiens is evolving. We are getting taller, and our eyes and teeth are getting weaker. None of these changes has any influence on reproduction, and the latter two, at least, do not make us fitter. What could be better proof of the theory of selection through reproductive success than evolution towards a longer period of fertility? This is happening now, but the extra years the Western woman has gained at the beginning and end of her fertile period are not used for reproduction. I have recently pointed out (1980:247-56) the utter implausibility of all attempts to explain continued lactase activity throughout life by reference to survival and reproductive advantages. If, for instance, the Danes, who are among the best lactose absorbers in the world, had acquired this trait through selection for fitness, they would have to have lived for thousands of years in such precarious nutritional conditions that drinking or not drinking fresh milk made a difference to their survival and reproduction, which is obviously absurd; In my view, the Darwinian paradigm has lulled us into the false security of having found the answer to the evolutionary problem and thus prevented us from searching for internal mechanisms setting the evolutionary switches. One such switch seems to indicate the overall direction, others lead to temporary fashions, and still others, possibly, determine the life-spans of species. Change toward a drier climate may have been fatal for the Brontosaurus but was hardly so for the Ichthyosaurus, which probably died of old age after an enviably long lifetime as a species. If, as I hold, biological evolution is a fact but its mechanism totally unknown, the application of the evolutionary model to culture naturally becomes problematic. On this point, however, several reservations have been voiced by the commentators, and Cohen himself rightly insists that \"prediction of the future is impossible for human events\"; therefore I can limit myself to a few points. I suggest that we speak not of the evolution of culture as an omnibus category but of that of particular aspects of culture. Evolution in the direction of greater complexity and efficiency is clearly at work in technology. Number also imposes some constraints, and the state could develop only after the tribal band. This is about all, however, that can be said with certainty of cultural evolution; speculations about the evolution of family types, systems of reckoning descent, ways of thinking, and so forth I hold to be vain. Small autonomous villages in Africa may well have developed into a kingdom according to the sequence Cohen describes, but the postulate of \"selective factors\" implies that there was some kind of necessity at work, which, being concluded post hoc, can never be proven. Cohen cites a few options, it is true, but the very concept of \"pressure on the leaders to specialize\" so that they eventually transformed themselves into monarchs is questionable. If disputes had really been crucial, these could just as well have been settled by councils of elders or the like. In India, for instance, disputes have been very effectively settled by village and caste councils with or without the existence of monarchy, and Westerners have long been accustomed to consult lawyers. It is true that there have been \"attempts to create a basis for world order,\" but I would not conclude from these that there is an evolutionary trend in that direction. Attempts at world order (in the form of world domination) have repeatedly been made in the past; it is only that the known world, or the world that counted, was smaller then. Even if the existing states could be brought to abdicate voluntarily, a world government replacing them would be 'rather impracticable. Our minds have an innate tendency (only a tendency, not a necessity) to prefer unity to plurality, and attempts to create bigger states and international organizations participate in this tendency, which has little to do with the rational evaluation of advantages and disadvantages. Since smaller entities, however, are easier to administer, it is quite conceivable that some of the bigger existing states will shrink, judging from the diffusion of separatist movements all over the world. A parallel to this situation may be drawn in the economic field. There has been a tendency to create bigger and bigger industrial complexes, but it is unlikely that this tendency will continue. In Italy the big firms are in trouble, while family enterprises flourish. Similarly, the supermarket, which according to some prophets should long since have ousted the small shops, has not been able to do so, at least in Europe. I am glad that Cohen does not simplistically extend \"biological theory into sociocultural realms\" as some of his commentators are prone to, but the postulate that similar abstract principles govern \"the evolution of all things-inorganic, organic, and sociocultural\"-seems to be inspired more by the above-mentioned monistic tendency of our minds than by the observation of facts.

On Evolutionary Epistemology

Public Management Reform

The impact of decentralization on efficiency in the production of public goods and services has been described by the current scientific discourse in some detail. In this article, we focus on an analysis of the impact of the factor of decentralization as well as other selected factors on efficiency in public procurement. We view the term efficiency to be the ratio between the tendered and the estimated price, but also as procedural correctness and legality, as it is reflected in the administration of complaints, investigations, and findings regarding violations of the law by the supervising authority. We then describe the phases of bidding and post-bidding. For empirical research, we used linear regression and logistic regression. These methods are applied to data regarding public procurement for the years 2010-2014. The results show that, among the contracting authorities at the different levels of decentralization, there were statistically significant differences which we can explain through the different levels of accountability, economies of scale, as well as the qualifications of the workers of the contracting authority.

The Effects of Decentralization on Efficiency in Public Procurement: Empirical Evidence for the Czech Republic

This chapter is dedicated to the introduction into theory of decentralization. We reviewed past and current theories of decentralization from the classical theories of Oates and Tiebout to the current approaches of the second generation of fiscal federalism and provide a summary of the main results. We linked decentralization with the issue of local government efficiency, which describes how well an organization uses resources in producing services, and effectiveness, the degree to which a system achieves its program and policy objectives. We introduced the main determinants of local government efficiency namely information asymmetry, rational ignorance and rational abstention, bureaucratic behavior, competition among municipalities, fiscal illusion, intergovernmental grants and transfers, municipality size, and the environmental and institutional environment.

Fiscal Decentralization Reforms and Local Government Efficiency: An Introduction

DO THE DATA ON MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC IMPLY INCORRECTNESS IN THEIR MANAGEMENT? Milan Půček, Michal Plaček, František Ochrana Limited public resources confront public administration bodies with the question of how to handle them in an economically rational manner. Audit of public expenditures necessitates an ongoing creation and modifi cation of an effective control system. Such a system is made up by subsystems of a formal (accounting and documentation) and economic control, responsible for monitoring the effi ciency, effectiveness and economy of managing public expenditures. Signifi cance of such interconnection rests in the fact that the formal control may signal possible improper management of public expenditures. This may become a stimulus for the economic control subsystem to verify the effectiveness, effi ciency and economy of outlaid expenditures. For identifi cation purposes related to potential accounting and record-keeping incorrectnesses in the management of public expenditures is proposed adoption of Benford’s Law (Benford’s test). Benford’s test is applied on municipal expenditure data for the year 2012. Data represent sums of public expenditures in the structure of the statement of budgetary execution and control specifi ed by the Regulation of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic No. 323/2002 Coll. For the data analysis there were used statistical methods, hypothesis testing, linear regressions and comparisons. Although the empirical analysis points at a limited use of Benford’s test in the conditions of municipal expenditures in the Czech Republic (mainly due to the instability of results and unavailability of suitable data), the analysis showed that Benford’s test can be adopted as a supporting tool, suitable for building into the control system of public expenditures. It is one of the ways to increase the effectiveness of a complex control of public expenditures.

https://dspace.tul.cz/bitstream/handle/15240/19271/EM_4_2016_7.pdf?sequence=1

Do the data on municipal expenditures in the Czech Republic imply incorrectness in their management

The uptake of green public procurement in the Czech Republic is known to lag behind the European standards. We trace this condition back to the adverse effects of a specific type of decision-making trade-off faced by the Czech public procurement officials, namely the trade-off between stewardship and administrative compliance. The trade-off means that public procurers are aware of administrative risks and complications attendant on the conscientious non-perfunctory implementation of green public procurement. The overall result is that public procurers ultimately come to prioritize the contract criterion of the lowest price over ecological criteria. The existence of this trade-off has been generally confirmed by the results of a unique large-N survey of more than 1100 respondents from a group of local public officials and mayors in the Czech Republic. We have found that the decision-making of Czech public procurers is affected by the trade-off between stewardship and administrative compliance, which turn out to be mutually conflicting goals. On the one hand, many public procurers do possess a stewardship motivation that shapes their positive attitude to GPP. On the other hand, they are painfully aware of, and seek to forestall, administrative risks and complications attendant on the conscientious, i.e., non-perfunctory, implementation of GPP.

/pdf/stewardship-and-administrative-capacity-in-green-public-4bfjekriht.pdf

Stewardship and administrative capacity in green public procurement in the Czech Republic: evidence from a large-N survey

The article examines the section of officials in the central administration who belong to the ministerial staff of the Czech Republic. It examines those persons engaged in the creation of analyses, strategies, and management activities. The study is based on original research conducted by the ministries of the Czech Republic in 2013 (N = 1351). The article seeks to discover what the make-up of this group is in terms of gender, age, and education levels at the chosen ministries, as well as to report on the types of experiences the group has had. The analysis shows that ministerial officials are in fact a gender-balanced group of employees, predominately university-educated. The overall median age of employees in all ministries is 42 years. On the other hand, there are certain inter-ministerial differences, as explained in detail in this paper. Based on results of the empirical research, conclusions have been drawn that may also serve as an inspiration for similar investigations in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe that address similar issues as found in the Czech Republic.

/pdf/who-are-the-officials-in-the-central-administration-of-the-4aqhcyn5mz.pdf

Michal Plaček

Papers

The Effects of Decentralization on Efficiency in Public Procurement: Empirical Evidence for the Czech Republic

Fiscal Decentralization Reforms and Local Government Efficiency: An Introduction

Do the data on municipal expenditures in the Czech Republic imply incorrectness in their management

Stewardship and administrative capacity in green public procurement in the Czech Republic: evidence from a large-N survey

Who are the officials in the central administration of the Czech Republic and what activities do they perform