M
Michal Szkup
Researcher at University of British Columbia
Publications - 19
Citations - 225
Michal Szkup is an academic researcher from University of British Columbia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Global game & Small open economy. The author has an hindex of 7, co-authored 19 publications receiving 186 citations. Previous affiliations of Michal Szkup include New York University.
Papers
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Financial Frictions and New Exporter Dynamics
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of financial frictions as a barrier to international trade is investigated, and new exporter dynamics are studied to identify how these frictions affect export decisions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Financial frictions and new exporter dynamics
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of financial frictions as a barrier to international trade is investigated, and new exporter dynamics are studied to identify how these frictions affect export decisions.
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Information acquisition in global games of regime change
Michal Szkup,Isabel Trevino +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown that information acquisition can be inefficient and that strategic complementarities in actions do not always translate into strategic complementarsities in information acquisition, and it is found that public and private information can be complements.
Costly information acquisition in a speculative attack: Theory and experiments
Michal Szkup,Isabel Trevino +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a discrete global games model of speculative attack where agents choose, at a cost, the precision of the private signal they observe is proposed. But, contrary to our predictions, the number of attacks increases as subjects acquire more precise information.
Journal ArticleDOI
Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
Michal Szkup,Isabel Trevino +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown how changes in the information structure can give rise to sentiments that drastically affect outcomes in coordination games, with empirical support for the hypothesis that subjects are over-optimistic about the actions of others when the signal precision is high and over-pessimistic when it is low.