Differences in transactions within and outside of cohesive subgroups are hypothesized to be a function of actors' pursuit of different forms of social capital. In an example of the French financial elite, subgroups are identified based on the pattern of friendships, and graphical representations establish the descriptive link between social structure and action. Estimates from multilevel models quantify the extent to which actors abstain from hostile action against subgroup members but tend to support others not in their subgroup. These complementary findings establish the subgroup as a critical mesolevel entity, defined by the social structure while affecting action.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/210083

Linking Action to Social Structure within a System: Social Capital within and between Subgroups

Identifying cohesive subgroups

Mapping interactions within and between cohesive subgroups

We define the complex system underlying organizational culture by incorporating the social-psychological principles of balance and information (B-I) into models of influence (changes in attitudes as a function of interaction) and selection (changes in interaction). We identify information based influence as a potential anchor for actors' sentiments so that they are not overwhelmed by normative influence. In the model of selection, we identify the pursuit of information as an important counterbalance to the effect of homophily (interacting with others like oneself). Using the tools of dynamic systems we show how our models generate the full range of equilibria of complex systems. Through simulations we also explore how our system responds to exogenous effects.

Organizational Culture As a Complex System: Balance and Information in Models of Influence and Selection

In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players’ voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division represents players’ expected payoffs in a Stationary Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations. T he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment. We consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good. Agents cannot use physical force to divide this good. Our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights, proposal rights, agents’ patience, etc. in determining political power. Following Shapley and Shubik (1954), we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes, rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives. 1 In that spirit, political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion. 2 We model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game. In each period, a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good. Committee members then vote on the proposal. If the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule, the proposed division is implemented and the

https://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/kalandrakis/download/AJPS06.pdf

Proposal Rights and Political Power

The existence of human social groups is taken as problematic. What is it that constitutes a group “identity”? What is it that stays the same despite changes in membership? The everyday notion that a group is the same if it stays about the same size and continues to do the same sorts of things is taken seriously. “Size” and “activity” are key variables that must be kept within limits if the group is to maintain its identity. This, in turn, implies a stabilizing process amenable to cybernetic analysis.



From observation and experimentation with natural and laboratory groups, a model of this process is developed. It incorporates mechanisms for preserving values of key variables, and enables us to identify sources of instability. The assumptions of the model are tested by computer simulation, the group-1 program, and the results are found to compare well with historical data from natural groups.



Processes of special interest are a triple size-regulation mechanism, and the appearance of the “early leaver phenomenon” in informal groups. This means that new members have the highest probability of leaving, and this is well known in industrial situations. It is found to be an essential correlate of stability.

The identity of human social groups

Metagame theory does not solve the paradox of rationality, i.e., both players do better if both play irrationally, generated by prisoner's dilemma games under the assumption of individual rationality. There is a further metagame generated by each player's need to optimize. This is that if either player convinces the other to cooperate by metagames or other means, he can do better by defecting. This higher order metagame is isomorphic with the base game, and the original irrational equilibrium is regenerated.

Mike Robinson

Papers

The identity of human social groups

Critique and comment. Prisoner's Dilemma: Metagames and other solutions