Measuring Health: A Guide to Rating Scales and Questionnaires

Cost Effectiveness in Health and Medicine.

One important goal of this study is to develop a methodology of inference for a widely used Cliff-Ord type spatial model containing spatial lags in the dependent variable, exogenous variables, and the disturbance terms, while allowing for unknown heteroskedasticity in the innovations. We first generalize the generalized moments (GM) estimator suggested in Kelejian and Prucha (1998,1999) for the spatial autoregressive parameter in the disturbance process. We prove the consistency of our estimator; unlike in our earlier paper we also determine its asymptotic distribution, and discuss issues of efficiency. We then define instrumental variable (IV) estimators for the regression parameters of the model and give results concerning the joint asymptotic distribution of those estimators and the GM estimator under reasonable conditions. Much of the theory is kept general to cover a wide range of settings. We note the estimation theory developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) for GM and IV estimators and by Lee (2004) for the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator under the assumption of homoskedastic innovations does not carry over to the case of heteroskedastic innovations. The paper also provides a critical discussion of the usual specification of the parameter space.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1296549_code459177.pdf?abstractid=1296549&mirid=3

Specification and Estimation of Spatial Autoregressive Models with Autoregressive and Heteroskedastic Disturbances

Professor Titmuss, an eminent English social theorist, believes that man is inherently altruistic and that the duty of government is to create that social and economic climate which best channels man's drive to work together for the common good. In support of this belief, he has written a book about the procurement, distribution, and transfusion of human blood, a medical topic which he employs as an illustrative social and economic microcosm. The conclusion he reaches is foregone: "The voluntary socialized system in Britain is economically, professionally, administratively and qualitatively more efficient than the mixed, commercialized, and individualistic American system" (Titmuss, R.M: "Why Give to Strangers?" Lancet 1 :123-125, 1971). As the book was written with a bias, so will it be read with bias. My own bias is that of an American and a blood-banker. I am only too conscious of many deficiencies in the American complex of arrangements—it isn't

The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are "clinched," and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

/pdf/an-efficient-ascending-bid-auction-for-multiple-objects-56f99xfxuc.pdf

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity contraints The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game It uses a two stage approach In the first stage the distribution of bids conditional on state variables is estimated using data on bids, bidder characteristics and contract characteristics In the second stage, an expression of the expected sum of future profits based on the distribution of bids is obtained, and costs are inferred based on the first order condition of optimal bids We apply the estimation method to repeated highway construction procurement auctions in the state of California between May 1996 and May 1999 In this market, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability of winning further contracts We quantify the effect of intertemporal constraints on bidders' costs and on bids Due to the intertemporal effect and also to bidder asymmetry, the auction can be inefficient Based on the estimates of costs, we quantify efficiency losses

Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game

This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity constraints. The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game. It uses a two stage approach. In the first stage the distribution of bids conditional on state variables is estimated using data on bids, bidder characteristics, and contract characteristics. In the second stage, an expression of the expected sum of future profits based on the distribution of bids is obtained, and costs are inferred based on the first order condition of optimal bids. We apply the estimation method to repeated highway construction procurement auctions in the state of California between May 1996 and May 1999. In this market, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability of winning further contracts. We quantify the effect of intertemporal constraints on bidders’ costs and on bids. Due to the intertemporal effect and also to bidder asymmetry, the auction can be inefficient. Based on the estimates of costs, we quantify efficiency losses.

/pdf/estimation-of-a-dynamic-auction-game-p7zfb45sbo.pdf

Estimation of a dynamic auction game

http://albertbanalestanol.com/wp-content/uploads/Industry-Collaboration-with-figures-and-tables.pdf

The double-edged sword of industry collaboration: Evidence from engineering academics in the UK

Cost-effectiveness analysis of addiction treatment: paradoxes of multiple outcomes

https://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/mpesend/papers/BiddingBehavior.pdf

Mireia Jofre-Bonet

Papers

Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game

Estimation of a dynamic auction game

The double-edged sword of industry collaboration: Evidence from engineering academics in the UK

Cost-effectiveness analysis of addiction treatment: paradoxes of multiple outcomes

Bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction: A summary