Two experiments examined the impact of attention on sensorimotor skills. In Experiment 1, experienced golfers putted under dual-task conditions designed to distract attention from putting and under skill-focused conditions that prompted attention to step-by-step putting performance. Dual-task condition putting was more accurate. In Experiment 2, right-footed novice and experienced soccer players dribbled through a slalom course under dual-task or skill-focused conditions. When using their dominant right foot, experts again performed better in the dual-task condition. However, when using their less proficient left foot, experts performed better in the skill-focused condition. Novices performed better under skill-focus regardless of foot. Whereas novices and the less-proficient performances of experts benefit from online attentional monitoring of step-by-step performance, high-level skill execution is harmed.

When paying attention becomes counterproductive: impact of divided versus skill-focused attention on novice and experienced performance of sensorimotor skills

This review provides an overview of a diverse, temporally distributed, body of literature regarding the effects of conscious attention to movement. An attempt is made to unite the many different views within the literature through Reinvestment Theory (Masters, 1992; Masters, Polman, & Hammond, 1993), which suggests that relatively automated motor processes can be disrupted if they are run using consciously accessed, task-relevant declarative knowledge to control the mechanics of the movements on-line. Reinvestment Theory argues that the propensity for consciousness to control movements on-line is a function of individual personality differences, specific contexts and a broad range of contingent events that can be psychological, physiological, environmental or even mechanical.

The theory of reinvestment

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System geared to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This "swamps" working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model.

http://pascalboyer.net/articles/BoyerLienardBBS.pdf

Why ritualized behavior? Precaution systems and action parsing in developmental, pathological and cultural rituals.

The attention-intention-effort pathway in the development of psychophysiologic insomnia: a theoretical review.

In 3 experiments, the authors examined mathematical problem solving performance under pressure. In Experiment 1, pressure harmed performance on only unpracticed problems with heavy working memory demands. In Experiment 2, such high-demand problems were practiced until their answers were directly retrieved from memory. This eliminated choking under pressure. Experiment 3 dissociated practice on particular problems from practice on the solution algorithm by imposing a high-pressure test on problems practiced 1, 2, or 50 times each. Infrequently practiced high-demand problems were still performed poorly under pressure, whereas problems practiced 50 times each were not. These findings support distraction theories of choking in math, which contrasts with considerable evidence for explicit monitoring theories of choking in sensorimotor skills. This contrast suggests a skill taxonomy based on real-time control structures.

N.V. Hammond

Papers

‘Reinvestment’: A dimension of personality implicated in skill breakdown under pressure