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The Theory of Industrial Organization

Publisher Summary This chapter reviews the supply chain coordination with contracts. Numerous supply chain models are discussed. In each model, the supply chain optimal actions are identified. The chapter extends the newsvendor model by allowing the retailer to choose the retail price in addition to the stocking quantity. Coordination is more complex in this setting because the incentives provided to align one action might cause distortions with the other action. The newsvendor model is also extended by allowing the retailer to exert costly effort to increase demand. Coordination is challenging because the retailer's effort is noncontractible—that is, the firms cannot write contracts based on the effort chosen. The chapter also discusses an infinite horizon stochastic demand model in which the retailer receives replenishments from a supplier after a constant lead time. Coordination requires that the retailer chooses a large basestock level.

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts

Under a revenue-sharing contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the revenue the retailer generates. Such contracts have become more prevalent in the videocassette rental industry relative to the more conventional wholesale price contract. This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in a general supply chain model with revenues determined by each retailer's purchase quantity and price. Demand can be deterministic or stochastic and revenue is generated either from rentals or outright sales. Our model includes the case of a supplier selling to a classical fixed-price newsvendor or a price-setting newsvendor. We demonstrate that revenue sharing coordinates a supply chain with a single retailer (i.e., the retailer chooses optimal price and quantity) and arbitrarily allocates the supply chain's profit. We compare revenue sharing to a number of other supply chain contracts (e.g., buy-back contracts, price-discount contracts, quantity-flexibility contracts, sales-rebate contracts, franchise contracts, and quantity discounts). We find that revenue sharing is equivalent to buybacks in the newsvendor case and equivalent to price discounts in the price-setting newsvendor case. Revenue sharing also coordinates a supply chain with retailers competing in quantities, e.g., Cournot competitors or competing newsvendors with fixed prices. Despite its numerous merits, we identify several limitations of revenue sharing to (at least partially) explain why it is not prevalent in all industries. In particular, we characterize cases in which revenue sharing provides only a small improvement over the administratively cheaper wholesale price contract. Additionally, revenue sharing does not coordinate a supply chain with demand that depends on costly retail effort. We develop a variation on revenue sharing for this setting.

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Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations

Perspectives in supply chain risk management

The authors examine the implications of electronic shopping for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers. They assume that near-term technological developments will offer consumers unparalleled opportunities to locate and compare product offerings. They examine these advantages as a function of typical consumer goals and the types of products and services being sought and offer conclusions regarding consumer incentives and disincentives to purchase through interactive home shopping vis-à-vis traditional retail formats. The authors discuss implications for industry structure as they pertain to competition among retailers, competition among manufacturers, and retailer-manufacturer relationships.

Interactive home shopping: Consumer, retailer, and manufacturer incentives to participate in

A number of factors, including developments in Internet-based commerce and third-party logistics, have led many companies to consider engaging in direct sales. Such a company may at once be both a supplier to and a direct competitor of any existing reseller partners (e.g., land-based retailers), which can result in “channel conflict.” This can have momentous implications for distribution strategy.

To generate managerial insights into this important issue, we develop a model that captures key attributes of such a setting, including various sources of inefficiency. We examine these in detail and identify a number of counterintuitive structural properties. For instance, the addition of a direct channel alongside a reseller channel is not necessarily detrimental to the reseller, given the associated adjustment in the manufacturer's pricing. In fact, both parties can benefit.

Finally, we examine ways to adjust the manufacturer-reseller relationship that have been observed in industry. These include changes in wholesale pricing, paying the reseller a commission for diverting customers toward the direct channel, or conceding the demand fulfillment function entirely to the reseller. The latter two schemes could be mutually beneficial in that they achieve a division of labor according to each channel's competitive advantage.

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Channel Conflict and Coordination in the E‐Commerce Age

This paper studies a distribution system in which a manufacturer supplies a common product to two independent retailers, who in turn use service as well as retail price to directly compete for end customers. We examine the drivers of each firm's strategy, and the consequences for total sales, market share, and profitability. We show that the relative intensity of competition with respect to each competitive dimension plays a key role, as does the degree of cooperation between the retailers. We discover a number of insights concerning the preferences of each party regarding competition. For instance, there will be circumstances under which both retailers would prefer an increase in competitive intensity. Our analysis generalizes existing knowledge about manufacturer wholesale pricing strategies, and rationalizes behaviors that would not be evident without both price and service competition. Finally, we characterize the structure of wholesale pricing mechanisms that can coordinate the system, and show that the most commonly used formats (those that are linear in the order quantity) can achieve coordination only under very limiting conditions.

Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition

In this review, we summarize model-based research on contracts in the supply chain setting and provide a taxonomy for work in this area. During our discussions it became clear that the field has developed in many directions at once. Furthermore, as we surveyed the Uterature, it was not obvious what constitutes a contract in this context. While the nomenclature “supply chain management” is relatively new, many of the problems that are addressed are not. In particular, mathematical models for optimizing inventory control have a long history as a significant part of the mainstream of operations research and operations management. Inventory modeling, per se, dates to the early part of the century and the ideas of a Westinghouse engineer named Ford Harris (1915). A natural issue to address first is what is meant by supply chain management (SCM) research and how it relates to the vast body of work constituting classical inventory theory.

Modeling Supply Chain Contracts: A Review

Companies realize the importance of providing spare parts and after-sales services, but most could make far more money in the aftermarket than they do. Here's how.

Winning in the aftermarket

Customers for retail merchandise can often be satisfied with one of several items. Accounting for demand substitution in defining customer service influences the choice of items to stock and the optimal inventory level for each item stocked. Further, when certain items are not stocked, the resulting substitutions increase the demand for other items, which also affects the optimal stock levels. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic demand model for items in an assortment that captures the effects of substitution and a methodology for selecting item inventory levels so as to maximize total expected profit, subject to given resource constraints. Illustrative examples are solved to provide insights concerning the behavior of the optimal inventory policies, using the negative binomial demand distribution, which has performed well in fitting retail sales data.

Narendra Agrawal

Papers

Channel Conflict and Coordination in the E‐Commerce Age

Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition

Modeling Supply Chain Contracts: A Review

Winning in the aftermarket

Management of Multi-Item Retail Inventory Systems with Demand Substitution