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Showing papers by "Neil Wallace published in 2007"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A new theory of coexistence of money and higher-return assets is set out, showing that there exists a function mapping the portfolios of the buyer and the seller to the trade that occurs such that (i) the trade is in the buyer–seller core and some people are induced to enter the buyer-seller meeting with money.

74 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple matching model of money with the potential for counterfeiting is constructed, and lotteries are included to provide scope for the operation of the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps.

67 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Green and Lin this paper study a version of the diamond-dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service.

60 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the system failed to satisfy a purported arbitrage condition: the yield on collateral exceeded the tax rate plus the product of the clearing fee and the average clearing rate of notes, due to a model in which note issuers choose to issue notes only in trades that produce a low clearing rate, but in which there are diminishing returns to additional note issue.

23 citations


Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the Lagos-Wright model is replaced by two alternative notions of implementability: one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings, and it is shown that the first best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion with-out taxation if people are sufficiently patient.
Abstract: The Lagos-Wright model -- a monetary model in which pairwise meetings alternate in time with a centralized meeting -- has been extensively analyzed, but always using particular trading protocols Here, trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of implementability: one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings It is shown that the first-best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion with- out taxation if people are sufficiently patient And, if people are free to skip the centralized meeting, then lump-sum taxation used to pay interest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations

4 citations