Wireless Communications

计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

We explore the theoretical foundations of value creation in e-business by examining how 59 American and European e-businesses that have recently become publicly traded corporations create value. We observe that in e-business new value can be created by the ways in which transactions are enabled. Grounded in the rich data obtained from case study analyses and in the received theory in entrepreneurship and strategic management, we develop a model of the sources of value creation. The model suggests that the value creation potential of e-businesses hinges on four interdependent dimensions, namely: efficiency, complementarities, lock-in, and novelty. Our findings suggest that no single entrepreneurship or strategic management theory can fully explain the value creation potential of e-business. Rather, an integration of the received theoretical perspectives on value creation is needed. To enable such an integration, we offer the business model construct as a unit of analysis for future research on value creation in e-business. A business model depicts the design of transaction content, structure, and governance so as to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities. We propose that a firm's business model is an important locus of innovation and a crucial source of value creation for the firm and its suppliers, partners, and customers. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

https://uazuay.edu.ec/bibliotecas/e-business/Value_Creation_in_E-Business.pdf

Value creation in E-business

From the Publisher:
Information Goods -- from movies and music to software code and stock quotes - have supplanted industrial goods as the key drivers of world markets. Confronted by this New Economy, many instinctively react by searching for a corresponding New Economics to guide their business decisions. Executives charged with rolling out cutting-edge software products or on-line versions of their magazines are tempted to abandon the classic lessons of economics, and rely instead on an ever changing roster of trends, buzzwords, and analogies that promise to guide strategy in the information age. Not so fast, say authors Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian. In Information Rules they warn managers, "Ignore basic economic principles at your own risk. Technology changes. Economic laws do not." Understanding these laws and their relevance to information goods is critical when fashioning today's successful competitive strategies. Information Rules introduces and explains the economic concepts needed to navigate the evolving network economy. Information Rules will help business leaders and policy makers - from executives in the entertainment, publishing, hardware, and software industries to lawyers, finance professionals, and writers -- make intelligent decisions about their information assets.

/pdf/information-rules-a-strategic-guide-to-the-network-economy-e8wzthah9w.pdf

Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

The Economics of Networks

We analyze the salient features of networks and point out the similarities between the economic structure of networks and the structure of vertically related industries. The analysis focuses on positive consumption and production externalities, commonly called network externalities. We discuss their sources and their effects on pricing and market structure. We distinguish between results that do not depend on the underlying industry microstructure (the macro approach) and those that do (the micro approach). We analyze the issues of compatibility, coordination to technical standards, interconnection and interoperability, and their effects on pricing and quality of services and on the value of network links in various ownership structures. We also briefly discuss the issue of interconnection fees for bottleneck.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/9702121.pdf?abstractid=1719&mirid=1&type=2

Technology platforms, such as Microsoft Windows, are the hubs of technology industries. We develop a framework to characterize the optimal two-sided pricing strategy of a platform firm, that is, the pricing strategy towards the direct users of the platform as well as towards firms offering applications that are complementary to the platform. We compare industry structures based on a proprietary platform (such as Windows) with those based on an open-source platform (such as Linux) and analyze the structure of competition and industry implications in terms of pricing, sales, profitability, and social welfare. We find that, when the platform is proprietary, the equilibrium prices for the platform, the applications, and the platform access fee for applications may be below marginal cost, and we characterize demand conditions that lead to this. The proprietary applications sector of an industry based on an open source platform may be more profitable than the total profits of a proprietary platform industry. When users have a strong preference for application variety, the total profits of the proprietary industry are larger than the total profits of an industry based on an open source platform. The variety of applications is larger when the platform is open source. When a system based on an open source platform with an independent proprietary application competes with a proprietary system, the proprietary system is likely to dominate the open source platform industry both in terms of market share and profitability. This may explain the dominance of Microsoft in the market for PC operating systems.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID613601_code254274.pdf?abstractid=613601&rulid=43831&mirid=1

Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry

This article analyzes the competition and integration among complementary products that can be combined to create composite goods or systems. The model generalizes the Cournot duopoly complements model to the case in which there are multiple brands of compatible components. It analyzes equilibrium prices for a variety of organizational and market structures that differ in their degree of competition and integration. The model applies to a variety of product networks, including automatic teller machines, real estate multiple listing services, and airlines CRS, as well as to nonnetwork markets of compatible components such as computer CPUs and peripherals, hardware and software, and long distance and local telephone services. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Competition and integration among complements, and network market structure*

Technology platforms, such as Microsoft Windows, are the hubs of technology industries. We develop a framework to characterize the optimal two-sided pricing strategy of a platform firm; that is, the pricing strategy toward the direct users of the platform as well as toward firms offering applications that are complementary to the platform. We compare industry structures based on a proprietary platform (such as Windows) with those based on an open source platform (such as Linux), and analyze the structure of competition and industry implications in terms of pricing, sales, profitability, and social welfare. We find that, when the platform is proprietary, the equilibrium prices for the platform, the applications, and the platform access fee for applications may be below marginal cost, and we characterize demand conditions that lead to this. The proprietary applications sector of an industry based on an open source platform may be more profitable than the total profits of a proprietary platform industry. When users have a strong preference for application variety, the total profits of the proprietary industry are larger than the total profits of an industry based on an open source platform. The variety of applications is larger when the platform is open source. When a system based on an open source platform with an independent proprietary application competes with a proprietary system, the proprietary system is likely to dominate the open source platform industry both in terms of market share and profitability. This may explain the dominance of Microsoft in the market for PC operating systems.

Nicholas Economides

Papers

The Economics of Networks

The Economics of Networks

Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry

Competition and integration among complements, and network market structure*

Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry