Part 1 Empirical evidence on money and output: introduction some basic correlations estimating the effect of money on output summary. Part 2 Money in a general equilibrium framework: introduction the Tobin effect money in the utility function summary appendix - the MIU approximation problems. Part 3 Money and transactions: introduction shopping-time models cash-in-advance models other approaches summary appendix - the CIA approximation problems. Part 4 Money and public finance: introduction bugdet accounting equilibrium seigniorage optimal taxation and seigniorage Friedman's rule revisited nonindexed tax systems problems. Part 5 Money and output in the short run: introduction flexible prices sticky prices and wages a framework for monetary analysis inflation persistence summary appendix problems. Part 6 Money and the open economy: introduction the Obstfeld-Rogoff two-country model policy coordination the small open economy summary appendix problems. Part 7 The credit channel of monetary policy: introduction imperfect information in credit markets macroeconomic implications does credit matter? summary. Part 8 Discretionary policy and time inconsistency: introduction inflation under discretionary policy solutions to the inflation bias is the inflation bias important? do central banking institutions matter? lessons and conclusions problems. Part 9 Monetary-policy operating procedures: introduction from instruments to goals the instrument-choice problem operating procedures and policy measures problems. Part 10 Interest rates and monetary policy: introduction interest-rate rule and the price level interest rate policies in general equilibrium models the term structure of interest rates a model for policy analysis summary problems.

Monetary Theory and Policy

The ability of a two-sector model to quantify the contribution of the housing market to business fluctuations is investigated using U.S. data and Bayesian methods. The estimated model, which contains nominal and real rigidities and collateral constraints, displays the following features: first, a large fraction of the upward trend in real housing prices over the last 40 years can be accounted for by slow technological progress in the housing sector; second, residential investment and housing prices are very sensitive to monetary policy and housing demand shocks; third, the wealth effects from housing on consumption are positive and significant, and have become more important over time. The structural nature of the model allows identifying and quantifying the sources of fluctuations in house prices and residential investment and measuring the contribution of housing booms and busts to business cycles.

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Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model

We consider default by firms that are part of a single clearing mechanism. The obligations of all firms within the system are determined simultaneously in a fashion consistent with the priority of debt claims and the limited liability of equity. We first show, via a fixed-point argument, that there always exists a "clearing payment vector" that clears the obligations of the members of the clearing system; under mild regularity conditions, this clearing vector is unique. Next, we develop an algorithm that both clears the financial system in a computationally efficient fashion and provides information on the systemic risk faced by the individual system firms. Finally, we produce qualitative comparative statics for financial systems. These comparative statics imply that, in contrast to single-firm results, even unsystematic, nondissipative shocks to the system will lower the total value of the system and may lower the value of the equity of some of the individual system firms.

Systemic Risk in Financial Systems

This paper develops an analytical model of contagion in financial networks with arbitrary structure. We explore how the probability and potential impact of contagion is influenced by aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, changes in network structure, and asset market liquidity. Our findings suggest that financial systems exhibit a robust-yet-fragile tendency: while the probability of contagion may be low, the effects can be extremely widespread when problems occur. And we suggest why the resilience of the system in withstanding fairly large shocks prior to 2007 should not have been taken as a reliable guide to its future robustness.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1577043_code459244.pdf?abstractid=1577043&mirid=1

Contagion in Financial Networks

This paper studies the role of credit-supply factors in business cycle fluctuations. For this purpose, we introduce an imperfectly competitive banking sector into a DSGE model with financial frictions. Banks issue collateralized loans to both households and firms, obtain funding via deposits and accumulate capital from retained earnings. Margins charged on loans depend on bank capital-to-assets ratios and on the degree of interest rate stickiness. Bank balance-sheet constraints establish a link between the business cycle, which affects bank profits and thus capital, and the supply and cost of loans. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data for the euro area. The analysis delivers the following results. First, the existence of a banking sector partially attenuates the effects of demand shocks, while it helps propagate supply shocks. Second, shocks originating in the banking sector explain the largest share of the fall of output in 2008 in the euro area, while macroeconomic shocks played a limited role. Third, an unexpected destruction of bank capital has a substantial impact on the real economy and particularly on investment.

Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area

We study the impact of financial constraints on firm size distribution (FSD). We find that financially constrained firms, identified using various proxies, are smaller than the others (their FSD is more skewed to the right). However, among OECD countries, the FSD of nonconstrained firms virtually overlaps that of the entire sample, suggesting that the overall impact of financial constraints on the FSD is modest. The difference is more pronounced in our sample of firms from non-OECD countries. We conclude that financial constraints cannot be considered the main determinant of the FSD evolution in developed economies. (JEL L11, L25)

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On the Evolution of Firm Size Distributions

The paper analyzes the evolution of competitive conditions in the Italian banking industry using firm-level balance sheet data for the period 1984-1997. Regulatory reform, large-scale consolidation, and competitive pressure from other European countries have changed substantially the banking environment, with potentially offsetting effects on the overall degree of competitiveness. We find that competitive conditions, relatively unchanged until 1992, have improved substantially thereafter, as signaled by the decline in estimated markups. Also, we analyze for the first time the long-run impact of the consolidation process on competition and find no evidence that banks involved in mergers and acquisitions gained market power; at the same time, they exhibit lower than average marginal costs. Finally, after controlling for various factors that may have determined the time pattern of banks' estimated markups, we still detect a significant unexplained drop in our competitive conditions indicators after 1992. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the deregulation process, which culminated with the implementation of the Second Banking Directive in 1993, significantly contributed to improving bank competition and that it may also have been an important determinant of the consolidation process recorded by the Italian credit system during the 1990s.

The Effects of Regulatory Reform on Competition in the Banking Industry

The outbreak of the financial crisis coincided with a sharp increase of worldwide interbank interest rates. We analyze the micro and macroeconomic determinants of this phenomenon, finding that before August 2007 interbank rates were insensitive to borrower characteristics, whereas afterwards they became reactive to borrowers’ creditworthiness. At the same time, conditions for large borrowers became relatively more favorable, both before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers. This suggests that banks have become more discerning in their lending, a welcome change, but that moral hazard considerations related to the ”too big to fail” argument should remain a main concern for central banks.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1601845_code606534.pdf?abstractid=1601845&mirid=5

The Interbank Market after August 2007: What Has Changed, and Why?

The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

We assess the long-term economic impact of the new regulatory standards (the Basel III reform), answering the following questions. (1) What is the impact of the reform on long-term economic performance? (2) What is the impact of the reform on economic fluctuations? (3) What is the impact of the adoption of countercyclical capital buffers on economic fluctuations? The main results are the following. (1) Each percentage point increase in the capital ratio causes a median 0.09 percent decline in the level of steady state output, relative to the baseline. The impact of the new liquidity regulation is of a similar order of magnitude, at 0.08 percent. This paper does not estimate the benefits of the new regulation in terms of reduced frequency and severity of financial crisis, analysed in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010b). (2) The reform should dampen output volatility; the magnitude of the effect is heterogeneous across models; the median effect is modest. (3) The adoption of countercyclical capital buffers could have a more sizeable dampening effect on output volatility. These conclusions are fully consistent with those of reports by the Long-term Economic Impact group (BCBS, 2010b) and Macro Assessment Group (MAG, 2010b).

Paolo Angelini

Papers

On the Evolution of Firm Size Distributions

The Effects of Regulatory Reform on Competition in the Banking Industry

The Interbank Market after August 2007: What Has Changed, and Why?

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

Basel III: Long-term impact on economic performance and fluctuations