Enclosed is a copy of the Board of Governors’ Semiannual Agenda of Regulations for the period August 1, 1980 through February 1, 1981. The Semiannual Agenda provides you with information on those regulatory matters that the Board now has under consideration or anticipates considering over the next six months, and is divided into three parts: (1) regulatory matters that the Board had considered during the previous six months on which final action has been taken; (2) regulatory matters that have been proposed for public comment and that require further Board consideration; and (3) regulatory matters that the Board may consider over the next six months.

Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkの制定せる財務諸表様式について

This paper makes a case that the global imbalances of the 2000s and the recent global financial crisis are intimately connected. Both have their origins in economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s and in distortions that influenced the transmission of these policies through U.S. and ultimately through global financial markets. In the U.S., the interaction among the Fed’s monetary stance, global real interest rates, credit market distortions, and financial innovation created the toxic mix of conditions making the U.S. the epicenter of the global financial crisis. Outside the U.S., exchange rate and other economic policies followed by emerging markets such as China contributed to the United States’ ability to borrow cheaply abroad and thereby finance its unsustainable housing bubble. *University of California, Berkeley, and Harvard University. Paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, October 18-20, 2009. Conference participants and especially discussant Ricardo Caballero offered helpful comments. We thank Alexandra Altman and Matteo Maggiori for outstanding research assistance. Financial support was provided by the Coleman Fung Risk Management Center at UC Berkeley and CEPREMAP.

/pdf/global-imbalances-and-the-financial-crisis-products-of-1g6v3nq6fp.pdf

Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes

We examine the role of monetary policy in the housing bubble. Our review examines the setting of monetary policy in the middle of this decade, the impetus from monetary policy to the housing market, and other factors that may have contributed to the run-up, and subsequent collapse, in house prices.

/pdf/monetary-policy-and-the-housing-bubble-5fbu2bw5rf.pdf

Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble

We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large firms from 1936 to 2005. In sharp contrast to the well-known steep upward trajectory of pay of the past 30 years, the median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s, highlighting a weak relationship between compensation and aggregate firm size. While this correlation has changed considerably over the century, the cross-sectional relationship between pay and firm size has remained stable. Another surprising finding is that the sensitivity of changes in an executive's wealth to firm performance was not inconsequentially small for most of our sample period. Thus, recent years were not the first time when compensation arrangements served to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders. Overall, these trends pose a challenge to several common explanations for the recent surge in executive pay.

Executive compensation: a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936-2005

Leaning Against Boom-Bust Cycles in Credit and Housing Prices

I model global imbalances as arising from changes in preferences for housing relative to tradable goods. The key ingredients in the model are labor reallocation across sectors and consumption smoothing between housing and tradable goods. Countries import goods during periods when more domestic labor is devoted to housing construction. Housing booms are larger in countries that can run trade deficits. This occurs despite the absence of wealth effects, and even if trade is not primarily concentrated in capital goods. I provide several types of evidence to support the theory. First, over the last decade housing variables have decoupled from the business cycle while durable and total consumption expenditures have not. Second, for the same period there has been a strong cross-country correlation between housing variables and current account dynamics. Third, in a parameterized version of the model, housing demand shocks that match the cross-country dynamics of housing quantities generate current account dynamics matching recent global imbalances. Fourth, I use sign restrictions implied by the model to estimate a vector autoregression and identify the effects of housing shocks on the U.S. trade deficit. The results suggest that housing shocks are an important driving force of current account dynamics.

Housing Markets and Current Account Dynamics

This paper makes two contributions. On the theory side, I show that increases in the demand for housing may generate trade deficits without need for the standard ingredients used by others to model housing (wealth effects or trade in capital goods). Housing is a durable good that must be locally produced. If the desire to smooth consumption across goods is sufficiently strong, countries import tradable goods during periods when more domestic labor is devoted to produce nontradables to smooth consumption between tradables and nontradables. Housing booms are larger if the country can run a trade deficit because the deficit lowers the opportunity cost of building, which is the foregone consumption of tradable goods due to reallocation of labor to the construction sector. On the empirical side, I provide two types of evidence to support the theory. First, I show that using the cross-country dynamics of employment in construction as the explanatory variable, the model generates current account dynamics matching recent global imbalances. Second, I use sign restrictions implied by the model to estimate a vector autoregression. The results for a sample of OECD economies suggest that housing demand shocks matter for current account dynamics through the channel explained before.

/pdf/housing-markets-and-current-account-dynamics-3ue42777l7.pdf

https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2014/0193.pdf

What drives housing dynamics in China? A sign restrictions VAR approach

We study housing dynamics in China using vector autoregressions identified with theory-consistent sign restrictions. We study seven potential drivers: 1) Population increases; 2) a relaxation of credit standards, for example, due to the shadow banking system; 3) increasing preferences towards housing, for example, due to a housing bubble, or to housing being a status asset in the marriage market; 4) an increase in the savings rate; 5) expected productivity progress; 6) changes in land supply; and 7) tax policy, a proxy for policy stimulus. Our results show that, even if all shocks play relevant roles, productivity, savings glut, and policy stimulus have been the dominant drivers. When the sample is closer to 2014, housing preferences and credit shocks increase their importance to explain house prices and volume, while population shocks explain a larger share of the dynamics of residential investment. The results show some differences if we use house price indices constructed by the government or by private sources. The official indices show smaller increases in house prices and assign a smaller role to credit and preference shocks.

/pdf/what-drives-housing-dynamics-in-china-a-sign-restrictions-41990xwxpe.pdf

What Drives Housing Dynamics in China? A Sign Restrictions VAR Approach

We show that a contraction of mortgage supply after the Great Recession has increased housing rents. Our empirical strategy exploits heterogeneity in MSAs' exposure to regulatory shocks experienced by lenders over the 2010-2014 period. Tighter lending standards have increased demand for rental housing and have led to higher rents, depressed homeownership rates and an increase in rental supply. Absent the credit supply contraction, annual rent growth would have been 2.1 percentage points lower over 2010-2014 in MSAs where lending standards rose from their 2008 levels.

/pdf/mortgage-supply-and-housing-rents-bgq8g2raqs.pdf

Pedro Gete

Papers

Housing Markets and Current Account Dynamics

Housing Markets and Current Account Dynamics

What drives housing dynamics in China? A sign restrictions VAR approach

What Drives Housing Dynamics in China? A Sign Restrictions VAR Approach

Mortgage Supply and Housing Rents