Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The measurement scales, consistency index, inconsistency issues, missing judgment estimation and priority derivation methods have been extensively studied in the pairwise comparison matrix (PCM). Various approaches have been proposed to handle these problems, and made great contributions to the decision making. This paper reviews the literature of the main developments of the PCM. There are plenty of literature related to these issues, thus we mainly focus on the literature published in 37 peer reviewed international journals from 2010 to 2015 (searched via ISI Web of science). We attempt to analyze and classify these literatures so as to find the current hot research topics and research techniques in the PCM, and point out the future directions on the PCM. It is hoped that this paper will provide a comprehensive literature review on PCM, and act as informative summary of the main developments of the PCM for the researchers for their future research.
First published online: 02 Sep 2016

/pdf/pairwise-comparison-matrix-in-multiple-criteria-decision-3o11bzmvwo.pdf

Pairwise comparison matrix in multiple criteria decision making

https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/192648/Ho - The state-of-the-art integrations and applications of the analytic hierarchy process.pdf

The state-of-the-art integrations and applications of the analytic hierarchy process

A survey of network interdiction models and algorithms

Multi-criteria decision-making methods are tools that facilitate and help to make better and more responsible decisions Their main objective is usually to establish a ranking of alternatives, where the best solution is in the first place and the worst in the last place However, using different techniques to solve the same decisional problem may result in rankings that are not the same How can we test their similarity? For this purpose, scientists most often use different correlation measures, which unfortunately do not fully meet their objective

/pdf/a-new-coefficient-of-rankings-similarity-in-decision-making-4h2xwq4m2y.pdf

A New Coefficient of Rankings Similarity in Decision-Making Problems.

Despite the extensive application of Monte Carlo analytic hierarchy process (MCAHP) in various fields of decision making, its performance has not been compared with the classic analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Both of these methods are heavily affected by individual or group preferences and thus provide subjective rankings. Since the mere difference between their results does not necessarily warrant the superiority of one against the other, a reliable and robust ranking of alternatives should be available as a comparison basis so that the results of these two methods can be evaluated. In this paper, we use a simulation approach to compare the results of AHP with MCAHP under different levels of uncertainty. We validate our simulation results by comparing the performance of these two alternatives against a real world and reliable ranking of blogs. Our simulation results show that as long as the variation in different pairwise comparisons is less than 0.24, the performance of AHP is not statistically different from the performance of MCAHP. When the uncertainty in terms of variation grows beyond 0.24, MCAHP provides more precise rankings. The findings of this research add to the current body of knowledge in the multicriteria decision analysis as well as Information Systems literature and provide insights for managerial applications of these techniques.

/pdf/comparison-of-ahp-and-monte-carlo-ahp-under-different-levels-30xxgwafqa.pdf

Comparison of AHP and Monte Carlo AHP Under Different Levels of Uncertainty

Though the choices of terrorists’ attack targets are vast, their resources are limited. In this paper, a game-theoretical model is proposed to study both the defender’s (government) and the attacker’s (terrorist) expenditures among multiple targets under budget constraints to guide investment in defense. We study how the defender’s and the attacker’s equilibrium allocations depend on the budget constraints, target valuations, cost effectiveness of their investments, and inherent defense levels of targets in both sequential-move and simultaneous-move games. The equilibrium solutions are provided using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions. At the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, the defender’s total marginal effects are the same among targets. Moreover, the defender’s total marginal effects can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects. We also use the multiple-infrastructure and multiple-urban-area data sets to demonstrate the model results. The regression analysis shows that both the attacker’s and the...

Modeling a Multitarget Attacker–Defender Game with Budget Constraints

This paper develops a simple network approach to American exotic option valuation under Levy processes using the fast Fourier transform (FFT). The forward shooting grid (FSG) technique of the lattice approach is then generalized to expand the FFT-network to accommodate path-dependent variables. This network pricing approach is applicable to all Levy processes for which the characteristic function is readily available. In other words, the log-value of the underlying asset can follow finite-activity or infinite-activity Levy processes. With the powerful computation of FFT, the proposed network has a negligible additional computational burden compared to the binomial tree approach. The early exercise policy and option values in the continuation region are determined in a way very similar to that of the lattice approach. Numerical examples using American-style barrier, lookback, and Asian options demonstrate that the FFT-network is accurate and efficient.

An FFT-network for Lévy option pricing

The objective of this paper is to help both public and private sectors make better decisions in defensive resource allocation through public and private partnerships PPPs. In this paper, efficient PPPs are studied with regard to disaster preparedness using a decentralized model sequential game where the public sector is the first mover and a centralized model. This paper identifies the best public investment policies by evaluating the effectiveness of incentive provisions based on the various private strategic responses. This paper also provides insights into understanding a how to construct optimal public and private partnerships and b whether, when, and to what extent public and private investments in disaster preparedness could form better PPPs. We study the conditions of the private and public sectors' allocation strategies when they are strategic complements or substitutes. We find that the private sector that has a higher target valuation or lives in more risky areas invests more and has higher potential to partner with the public sector. We also compare the decentralized model results with the results of the centralized model to study the efficiency of the PPPs and find that the results are similar when the target valuation or the probability of disasters is small.

/pdf/modeling-public-private-partnerships-in-disaster-management-1eb9adv5lg.pdf

Modeling Public-Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models

Like many other engineering investments, the attacker's and defender's investments may have limited impact without initial capital to "warm up" the systems. This article studies such "warm up" effects on both the attack and defense equilibrium strategies in a sequential-move game model by developing a class of novel and more realistic contest success functions. We first solve a single-target attacker-defender game analytically and provide numerical solutions to a multiple-target case. We compare the results of the models with and without consideration of the investment "warm up" effects, and find that the defender would suffer higher expected damage, and either underestimate the attacker effort or waste defense investment if the defender falsely believes that no investment "warm up" effects exist. We illustrate the model results with real data, and compare the results of the models with and without consideration of the correlation between the "warm up" threshold and the investment effectiveness. Interestingly, we find that the defender is suggested to give up defending all the targets when the attack or the defense "warm up" thresholds are sufficiently high. This article provides new insights and suggestions on policy implications for homeland security resource allocation.

/pdf/modeling-resources-allocation-in-attacker-defender-games-577zakq8yn.pdf

Peiqiu Guan

Papers

Comparison of AHP and Monte Carlo AHP Under Different Levels of Uncertainty

Modeling a Multitarget Attacker–Defender Game with Budget Constraints

An FFT-network for Lévy option pricing

Modeling Public-Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models

Modeling Resources Allocation in Attacker‐Defender Games with “Warm Up” CSF