Philip D. MacKenzie

TL;DR: A simple technique by which a device that performs private key operations in networked applications and whose local private key is activated with a password or PIN can be immunized to offline dictionary attacks in case the device is captured is presented.

TL;DR: This paper proposes an efficient password-authenticated key exchange system involving a set of servers, in which a certain threshold of servers must participate in the authentication of a user, and in which the compromise of any fewer than that thresholds does not allow an attacker to perform an offline dictionary attack.

TL;DR: This paper proposes an efficient password-authenticated key exchange system involving a set of servers with known public keys, in which a certain threshold of servers must participate in the authentication of a user, and in which the compromise of any fewer than that threshold of server does not allow an attacker to perform an off-line dictionary attack.

TL;DR: This paper examines how to design a secure password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on RSA and presents an augmented protocol that is resilient to server compromise, meaning (informally) that an attacker who compromises a server would not be able to impersonate a client, at least not without running an offline dictionary attack against that client’s password.

TL;DR: It is shown how to modify the OKE protocol to obtain a password-authenticated key exchange protocol that can be proven secure (in the random oracle model), and the resulting protocol is very practical; the basic protocol requires about the same amount of computation as the Diffie-Hellman-based protocols or the well-known ssh protocol.