Showing papers by "Phoebe C. Ellsworth published in 1984"

The effects of death qualification on jurors' predisposition to convict and on the quality of deliberation

Abstract: This study provides a straightforward test of the proposition that people who are permitted to serve on juries in capital cases (death-qualified jurors) are more likely to convict a defendant than are people who are excluded from serving on capital juries due to their unwillingness to impose the death penalty (excludable jurors). A sample of 288 subjects classified as death-qualified or excludable under theWitherspoon standard watched a 2 1/2-hour videotape of a simulated homicide trial including the judge's instructions, and gave an initial verdict. Death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty, both on the initial ballot and after an hour's deliberation in 12-person juries. Nine juries were composed entirely of death-qualified subjects (death-qualified juries), while 10 contained from 2 to 4 excludable subjects (mixed juries). On postdeliberation measures, with initial death-penalty attitudes controlled, subjects who had served on the mixed juries were generally more critical of the witnesses, less satisfied with their juries, and better able to remember the evidence than subjects from the death-qualified juries, suggesting that diversity may improve the vigor, thoroughness, and accuracy of the jury's deliberations.

Due process vs. crime control: Death qualification and jury attitudes.

Abstract: Juries that exclude people who are unwilling to impose the death penalty (death-qualified juries) may be biased against capital defendants. To evaluate this possibility we compared the demographic characteristics and attitudes toward the criminal justice system of people who would or would not be excluded by theWitherspoon standard. A random sample of 811 eligible jurors in Alameda County, California were interviewed by telephone. Of the 717 respondents who stated that they could be fair and impartial in deciding on the guilt or innocence of a capital defendant, 17.2% said that they could never vote to impose the death penalty, and thus are excludable underWitherspoon. Significantly greater proportions of blacks than whites and of females than males are eliminated by the process of death qualification. On the attitudinal measures, the death-qualified respondents were consistently more prone to favor the point of view of the prosecution, to mistrust criminal defendants and their counsel, to take a punitive approach toward offenders, and to be more concerned with crime control than with due process. Eleven of the 13 items showed statistically significant differences.

Death penalty attitudes and conviction proneness: The translation of attitudes into verdicts.

Abstract: Attitudes toward the death penalty are consistently predictive of jurors' verdicts in criminal trials. Two studies were conducted to find out why. In Study 1, eligible jurors viewed a videotape showing conflicting testimony by a prosecution and defense witness in an assault case. “Death-qualified” subjects (those permitted to serve on capital juries) interpreted testimony in a manner more favorable to the prosecution than “excludable” subjects (those excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty), suggesting that differing interpretations of evidence may mediate the relationship between attitudes toward the death penalty and verdicts. In Study 2, the same jurors indicated their reactions to a number of hypothetical situations in which a jury had convicted an innocent defendant or acquitted a guilty one. “Death qualified” subjects expressed less regret concerning erroneous convictions and more regret concerning erroneous acquittals than “excludable” subjects. Theoretical interpretations of this pattern of results suggest that “death qualified” subjects may have a lower threshold of conviction than “excludable” subjects; thus the relationship between attitudes toward the death penalty and verdicts may also be mediated by differing thresholds of conviction.

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

Abstract: We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who “really are” insane.

The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts

Abstract: Attitudes toward the death penalty are consistently predictive of jurors' verdicts in criminal trials. Two studies were conducted to find out why. In Study 1, eligible jurors viewed a videotape showing conflicting testimony by a prosecution and defense witness in an assault case. "Death-qualified" subjects (those permitted to serve on capital juries) interpreted testimony in a manner more favorable to the prosecution than "excludable" subjects (those excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty), suggesting that differing interpretations of evidence may mediate the relationship between attitudes toward the death penalty and verdicts. In Study 2, the same jurors indicated their reactions to a number of hypothetical situations in which a jury had convicted an innocent defendant or acquitted a guilty one. ~ qualified" subjects expressed tess regret concerning erroneous convictions and more regret concerning erroneous acquittals than "excludable" subjects. Theoretical interpretations of this pattern of results suggest that "death qualified" subjects may have a lower threshold of conviction than "excludable" subjects; thus the relationship between attitudes toward the death penalty and verdicts may also be mediated by differing thresholds of conviction.

The Death-Qualified of Insanity Jury and the Defense

Abstract: We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (deathqualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who "really are" insane.