中枢神経系疾患の治療は正常細胞（ニューロン）の機能維持を目的とするが，脳血管障害のように機能障害の原因が細胞の死滅に基づくことは多い．一方，脳腫瘍の治療においては薬物療法や放射線療法といった腫瘍細胞の死滅を目標とするものが大きな位置を占める．いずれの場合にも，細胞死の機序を理解することは各種病態や治療法の理解のうえで重要である．現在のところ最も研究の進んでいる細胞死の型はアポトーシスである．そのなかで重要な位置を占めるミトコンドリアにおける反応および抗アポトーシス因子について概要を紹介する．

Neuroscience 細胞死：最近の知見

Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature brings to light the deep sense of crisis within the profession of academic philosophy which is similar to the paralyzing pluralism in contemporary theology and the inveterate indeterminacy of literary criticism. Richard Rorty's provocative and profound meditations impel philosophers to examine the problematic status of their discipline— only to discover that modern European philosophy has come to an end. Rorty strikes a deathblow to modern European philosophy by telling a story about the emergence, development and decline of its primary props: the correspondence theory of truth, the notion of privileged representations and the idea of a self-reflective transcendental subject. Rorty's fascinating tale—his-story —is regulated by three fundamental shifts which he delineates in detail and promotes in principle: the move toward anti-realism or conventionalism in ontology, the move toward the demythologizing of the Myth of the Given or anti-foundationalism in epistemology, and the move toward detranscendentalizing the subject or dismissing the mind as a sphere of inquiry. The chief importance of Rorty's book is that it brings together in an original and intelligible narrative the major insights of the patriarchs of postmodern American philosophy—W. V. Quine, Wilfred Sellars, and Nelson Goodman— and persuasively presents the radical consequences of their views for contemporary philosophy. Rorty credits Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey for having "brought us into a period of 'revolutionary' philosophy" by undermining the prevailing Cartesian and Kantian paradigms and advancing new conceptions of philosophy. And these monumental figures surely inspire Rorty. Yet, Rorty's philosophical debts—the actual sources of his particular anti-Cartesian and antiKantian arguments—are Quine's holism, Sellars' anti-foundationalism, and Goodman's pluralism. In short, despite his adamant attack on analytical philosophy—the last stage of modern European philosophy—Rorty feels most comfortable with the analytical form of philosophical argumentation (shunned by Wittgenstein and Heidegger). From the disparate figures of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey, Rorty gets a historicist directive: to eschew the quest for certainty and the search for foundations.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

BRUNO LATOUR, The pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard University Press, 1988, 8vo, pp. 273, £23.95. GEORGES CANGUILHEM, Ideology and rationality in the history of the life sciences, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Mass., and London, The MIT Press, 1988, 8vo, pp. xi, 160, £17.95. Bruno Latour has written a wonderfully funny book about himself. It is difficult, however, to summarize a text committed to the view that \"Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else\", (p. 158). In Latour's opinion, the common view that sociologists of knowledge and scientists are opposed is incorrect. Both groups, according to Latour, are the authors of identical mistakes: reductionism and, relatedly, attempting to conjoin (in the instance of the sociologist) science and society, or (in the instance of the scientist) keeping them apart. For Latour, there are only forces or resistances which different groups encounter and attempt to conquer by forming alliances. These groups, however, are not simply the actors of conventional sociology. They include, for example, microbes, the discovery of the Pasteurians, with which they have populated our world and which we must now take notice of in any encounter or war in which we engage. War is a fundamental metaphor for Latour, since in a war or a battle clashes of armies are later called the \"victory\" of a Napoleon or a Kutuzov. Likewise, he argues, the Pasteurization of France can be viewed as a battle, with its field and its myriad contestants, in which opposing sides attempted to mould and coerce various forces of resistance. Strangely, he points out, the outcome of this huge battle, the labour and struggle of these masses, we attribute to the scientific genius of Pasteur. Pasteur's genius, however, says Latour, lay not in science (for this could be yet another way of making science and society distinct) but as strategist. Pasteur was able to cross disciplinary lines, recruiting allies to laboratory science by persuading them that they were recruiting him. This was possible because, like the armies in battle, they had already done the work of the general. Thus Pasteur's microbiology, which might conventionally be seen as a whole new science, can also be construed as a brilliant reformulation of all that preceded it and made it possible. Hygienists seized on the work of the Pasteurians and the two rapidly became powerful allies because \"The time that they [the hygienists] had made was now working for them\" (p. 52). French physicians, on the other hand, resisted recruitment, since for them it meant enslavement. Finally, however, they recruited the Pasteurians to their enterprise. Pasteurian public health was turned into a triumph of medicine. It is impossible to read this book and not substitute Latour for Pasteur. At the head of his own army, increasingly enlarged by the recruitment of allies, Latour now presents us, in his own language, with something we have made, or at least made possible. The cynic might say, using the old jibe against sociologists, that Latour has explained to us in his own language everything we knew anyway. Retorting thus, however, would be to unselfconsciously make an ally of Latour and miss the point by a narrow margin that might as well be a million miles. Latour says all this much more clearly (and certainly more wittily) than any review. Read it, but beware; in spite of Latour's strictures about irreducibility, the text is not what it seems. This is a recruitment brochure: Bruno needs you. Among the many historians whom Latour convicts by quotation of mistaking the general for the army, Pasteur for all the forces at work in French society, is Georges Canguilhem. Latour uses two quotes from Canguilhem, both taken from the original French version of Ideology and rationality in the life sciences, first published in 1977. Reading Canguilhem after Latour induces a feeling akin to culture shock. Astonishingly, Canguilhem seems almost Anglo-American. Anyone familiar with Canguilhem's epistemological universe would hardly be surprised to discover that Latour finds in it perspectives different from his own. After all, Canguilhem remains committed to the epistemologically distinct entity science or, better still, sciences. Likewise he employs distinctions between science and ideology, as in Spencerian ideology and Darwinian science, which will seem familiar, possibly jaded to English-reading eyes. His text is liberally seeded with unLatourian expressions, including injunctions to distinguish \"between ideology and science\" (p. 39), lamentations that eighteenth-century medicine \"squandered its energy in the erection of systems\" (p. 53), rejoicing that physiology \"liberated itself' from classical anatomy (p. 54), and regret that \"Stahl's influence ... seriously impeded experimental

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Bruno Latour, The pasteurization of France , trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard University Press, 1988, 8vo, pp. 273, £23.95. - Georges Canguilhem, Ideology and rationality in the history of the life sciences , trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Mass., and London, The MIT Press, 1988, 8vo, pp. xi, 160, £17.95.

Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution, quipped Theodosius Dobzhansky. The theory of evolution argues that each biological species was not suddenly and independently created but that all life forms are interrelated by virtue of having descended from common ancestors through the accumulation of modifications. Indeed, nothing we know about living organisms would make any sense if they were not so interrelated. And the theory that biological species are descended from common ancestors provides an indispensable heuristic to understand why living organisms are what they are and do what they do.

Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution

หนงสอ Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction เขยนโดย Colin F. Camerer มวตถประสงคเพอนำเสนอหลกฐานเชงประจกษจากผลการวจยจำนวนมากมายทยนยนอทธพลของปจจยทางจตวทยาทมผลตอการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม หนงสอ เลมนไดนำเสนอแนวคดทฤษฎทเพมความสามารถในการอธบายพฤตกรรมการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม (Game theory) ซง von Neumann; & Morgenstern ไดเสนอไวในป ค.ศ. 1944 โดยชใหเหนวา ปจจยทางจตวทยามอทธพลทำใหการตดสนใจทเกดขนจรงคลาดเคลอนจากการคาดการณของทฤษฎเกม

Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

Responsible research and innovation (RRI) has become an important topic in the academic community and in policy circles, but it has not yet been systematically included in the innovation process of companies. We discuss how companies can integrate RRI into their corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and business strategy. To this end, we developed a conceptual model that links a company’s RRI strategy to its context, and that helps to translate the RRI strategy into activities that result in RRI outcomes. We also propose a process for developing company-specific RRI key performance indicators (KPIs) that can support companies to measure RRI outcomes.

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Company Strategies for Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI): A Conceptual Model

Unraveling Dutch citizens’ perceptions on the bio-based economy: The case of bioplastics, bio-jetfuels and small-scale bio-refineries

There is now almost a decade of experience with RRI (Responsible Research and Innovation), including a growing emphasis on RRI in industry. Based on our experiences in the EU-funded project PRISMA, we find that the companies we engaged could be motivated to do RRI, but often only after we first shifted initial assumptions and strategies. Accordingly, we formulate six lessons we learned in the expectation that they will be relevant both for RRI in industry as well as for the future of RRI more broadly. These lessons are: (1) Strategize for stakeholder engagement; (2) Broaden current assessments; (3) Place values center stage; (4) Experiment for responsiveness; (5) Monitor RRI progress; and (6) Aim for shared value.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23299460.2020.1791506

Learning to do responsible innovation in industry: six lessons

The last decade saw the rise of neuroeconomics. This novel science exemplifies the widespread phenomenon of neuroscientists expanding their work sphere. In neuroeconomics, economists and psychologists join forces with neuroscientists to grapple with the nature of economic and social decision making. Amongst other things, neuroeconomists aim to understand a crucial element of social interaction, namely, trust. This dissertation analyzes how in neuroeconomics trust is stylized and sociality and human nature are conceptualized, and why it is that we are to trust neuroeconomists’ results. Throughout, the philosophy of science developed by Ludwik Fleck guides the analysis. Both Fleck’s views of science as well as his methodology in studying science are defended and developed. The dissertation consists of two parts. Part I delineates the area of problems and questions (chapter 1), and elaborates (chapter 2) and illustrates (chapter 3) the conceptual toolkit for dealing with these. Part II revolves around neuroeconomic research concerning trust. Chapter 4 analyzes different literary forms used to convey the neuroeconomics of trust. Chapter 5 details the state of the art in the neuroeconomics of trust. Subsequently, in chapter 6 the style of neuroeconomics is analyzed by investigating rhetorical devices and the roles played in neuroeconomics by animal models, functional magnetic resonance imaging and game theory. Throughout, historical ties and societal implications are analyzed. Finally, it is argued that neuroeconomics owes its strength more to the intricacy of the network of elements it engages than to the solidity or unavoidability of any of these elements individually (chapter 7).

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In brains we trust: How neuroeconomists stylize trust, the brain, and the social world

In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions from a variety of perspectives complementary to the philosophical/ phenomenological one, including cognitive neuroscience, neurodynamics and psychology. Along such lines we try to make the normative aspect of adequate immediate action better accessible to empirical research. After introducing the idea that “valence” is a forerunner of directed discontent, we propose to make progress on this by first pursuing a more restricted exploratory question, namely, ‘what happens in the first few hundred milliseconds of the development of directed discontent?’

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Pim Klaassen

Papers

Company Strategies for Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI): A Conceptual Model

Unraveling Dutch citizens’ perceptions on the bio-based economy: The case of bioplastics, bio-jetfuels and small-scale bio-refineries

Learning to do responsible innovation in industry: six lessons

In brains we trust: How neuroeconomists stylize trust, the brain, and the social world

Inviting complementary perspectives on situated normativity in everyday life