P
Pongsin Poosankam
Researcher at University of California, Berkeley
Publications - 20
Citations - 2974
Pongsin Poosankam is an academic researcher from University of California, Berkeley. The author has contributed to research in topics: Symbolic execution & Malware. The author has an hindex of 20, co-authored 20 publications receiving 2782 citations. Previous affiliations of Pongsin Poosankam include Carnegie Mellon University.
Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
BitBlaze: A New Approach to Computer Security via Binary Analysis
Dawn Song,David Brumley,Heng Yin,Juan Caballero,Ivan Jager,Min Gyung Kang,Zhenkai Liang,James Newsome,Pongsin Poosankam,Prateek Saxena +9 more
TL;DR: An overview of the BitBlaze project, a new approach to computer security via binary analysis that focuses on building a unified binary analysis platform and using it to provide novel solutions to a broad spectrum of different security problems.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Renovo: a hidden code extractor for packed executables
TL;DR: This paper proposes a fully dynamic approach that captures an intrinsic nature of hidden code execution that the original code should be present in memory and executed at some point at run-time.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Automatic Patch-Based Exploit Generation is Possible: Techniques and Implications
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose techniques for automatic patch-based exploit generation, and show that their techniques can automatically generate exploits for 5 Microsoft programs based upon patches provided via Windows Update.
Proceedings Article
DTA++: Dynamic Taint Analysis with Targeted Control-Flow Propagation.
TL;DR: DTA++ is proposed, an enhancement to dynamic taint analysis that additionally propagates taint along a targeted subset of control-flow dependencies and generates rules to add additional taint only for those control dependencies, avoiding the explosion of tainting that can occur when propagating tainted along all control dependencies indiscriminately.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Dispatcher: enabling active botnet infiltration using automatic protocol reverse-engineering
TL;DR: Techniques to extract the format of protocol messages sent by an application that implements a protocol specification, and to infer the field semantics for messages both sent and received by the application are proposed.