Nothing to Hide : The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security by Daniel J. Solove

This research note argues that the “lone wolf” typology should be fundamentally reconsidered. Based on a three-year empirical research project, two key points are made to support this argument. First, the authors found that ties to online and offline radical milieus are critical to lone actors' adoption and maintenance of both the motive and capability to commit acts of terrorism. Second, in terms of pre-attack behaviors, the majority of lone actors are not the stealthy and highly capable terrorists the “lone wolf” moniker alludes to. These findings not only urge a reconsideration of the utility of the lone-wolf concept, they are also particularly relevant for counterterrorism professionals, whose conceptions of this threat may have closed off avenues for detection and interdiction that do, in fact, exist.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1419554

End of the lone wolf: the typology that should not have been

This article provides an in-depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ 
attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to 
different aspects of pre-attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 
lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open-source materials and 
complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are 
not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at
 maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and 
capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years
 before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type 
of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties 
that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and
 capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete 
input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and
 argue for a re-evaluation of the “lone actor” concept.

https://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1556-4029.13676

Lone Actor Terrorist Attack Planning and Preparation: A Data‐Driven Analysis,

The amount of data generated by the current interconnected world is immeasurable, and a large part of such data is publicly available, which means that it is accessible by any user, at any time, from anywhere in the Internet. In this respect, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is a type of intelligence that actually benefits from that open nature by collecting, processing and correlating points of the whole cyberspace to generate knowledge. In fact, recent advances in technology are causing OSINT to currently evolve at a dizzying rate, providing innovative data-driven and AI-powered applications for politics, economy or society, but also offering new lines of action against cyberthreats and cybercrime. The paper at hand describes the current state of OSINT and makes a comprehensive review of the paradigm, focusing on the services and techniques enhancing the cybersecurity field. On the one hand, we analyze the strong points of this methodology and propose numerous ways to apply it to cybersecurity. On the other hand, we cover the limitations when adopting it. Considering there is a lot left to explore in this ample field, we also enumerate some open challenges to be addressed in the future. Additionally, we study the role of OSINT in the public sphere of governments, which constitute an ideal landscape to exploit open data.

/pdf/the-not-yet-exploited-goldmine-of-osint-opportunities-open-54jllpzd7z.pdf

The Not Yet Exploited Goldmine of OSINT: Opportunities, Open Challenges and Future Trends

Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to Al-Qaeda and Beyond

Behaviors or expressions can (inadvertently) communicate the intention or capability to commit a terrorist attack. Such pre-attack “indicators” can be used to improve police services’ ability to detect and interdict terrorist plots before they materialize. This article explores the concept of terrorism indicators by applying it to seven case studies of home-grown jihadist groups and individuals that occurred in three Western countries between 2004 and 2007. Two main findings are presented: a framework that conceptualizes the pre-attack process as consisting of seven distinct phases and, divided over these phases, a multitude of possible indicators of terrorist intent or capability. The run-up to a terrorist attack is found to be multipronged and chaotic rather than a neat linear progression through distinct preparatory stages. This may be characteristic of the loosely organized and relatively amateur nature of the home-grown jihadist groups and individuals studied.

Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment

Despite the Dutch Hofstadgroup's status in the literature as a prime example of a homegrown Salafi-Jihadist terrorist network, the authors, using newly available primary sources, argue that this classification is to a large extent unwarranted. The lack of a rudimentary organizational structure, the existence of divergent views on the legitimacy and desirability of political violence, and the absence of collective action in pursuit of a violent goal rule out labeling the Hofstadgroup as a terrorist organization or network for the largest part of its 2002–2005 existence. A smaller subgroup of extremists did begin developing into a proto-terrorist inner circle from late 2003 onwards. In 2004, this extremist core brought forth the murderer of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. But it was only in 2005, when the remnants of the inner circle tried to resuscitate the Hofstadgroup in the wake of the arrests that had followed Van Gogh's death, that these individual actions were replaced by the communal efforts necessary to w...

The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network

This article argues that the gathering of open source intelligence, such as through messages on social networking sites, weblogs, blogs or apps, demands proper checks and balances. Abstract Open source intelligence (OSINT) is increasingly used for security and safety purposes. Even though security - and intelligence agencies and the police are using messages on social networking sites, weblogs, blogs or apps, state accountability mechanisms found it difficult to adapt to the online culture. Consider for instance the dilemma that open source information (OSINF) is frequently collected, processed, minded and stored by private companies. From a human right perspective, this gathering of OSINT demands proper checks and balances. Even though laws, regulations and policies may recognise this, it is important to review whether the gathering of OSINF online leads to new dilemmas. We conclude that state accountability should at least entail that the actual process and outcome of data collection, processing, mining and sharing is subjected to review and/or sanctions. Furthermore, it should become transparent which entity or who carries responsibility for the use of OSINT.

Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas: Is it time to reassess state accountability?

A range of political and social developments in the Netherlands suggest that ethnic profiling in political and social discourse is no longer seen as a taboo. Increasingly ethnic profiling is perceived as part of the solution to ‘the problem’ of terrorism, radicalisation, integration, violent crime, serious public nuisance or public safety. Although Dutch legislation and regulations do not explicitly prohibit ethnic or racial profiling, for law enforcement officials to use generalisations based on ethnicity, race, national origin or religion is at odds with national and international law. Nonetheless, there is a risk that police, security, immigration and customs officials exercise their general and special powers on the basis of generalisations or stereotypes to tackle pressing social needs.

Has the Genie Been Let Out of the Bottle? Ethnic Profiling in the Netherlands

This article focuses on the special criminal procedures for the use of intelligence in terrorist trials in Canada, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Since 9/11 and the terror attacks in London and Madrid, gathering intelligence as well as the prosecution of suspects of terrorist crimes have become strategic tools in countering terrorism. By reviewing the special procedures for the use of intelligence, their compatibility with human rights standards, including the right to fair trial, is discussed. Concerns include the extent to which disclosure is made possible and to whom. The differences in criminal procedures for the use of intelligence in terrorist trials also raises questions if intelligence origins from a third state, in which different regulations with regard to disclosure of information apply.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1964217_code1267893.pdf?abstractid=1964217&mirid=5&type=2

Quirine Eijkman

Papers

Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment

The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network

Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas: Is it time to reassess state accountability?

Has the Genie Been Let Out of the Bottle? Ethnic Profiling in the Netherlands

Compatible or Incompatible? Intelligence and Human Rights in Terrorist Trials