What will 5G be? What it will not be is an incremental advance on 4G. The previous four generations of cellular technology have each been a major paradigm shift that has broken backward compatibility. Indeed, 5G will need to be a paradigm shift that includes very high carrier frequencies with massive bandwidths, extreme base station and device densities, and unprecedented numbers of antennas. However, unlike the previous four generations, it will also be highly integrative: tying any new 5G air interface and spectrum together with LTE and WiFi to provide universal high-rate coverage and a seamless user experience. To support this, the core network will also have to reach unprecedented levels of flexibility and intelligence, spectrum regulation will need to be rethought and improved, and energy and cost efficiencies will become even more critical considerations. This paper discusses all of these topics, identifying key challenges for future research and preliminary 5G standardization activities, while providing a comprehensive overview of the current literature, and in particular of the papers appearing in this special issue.

What Will 5G Be

https://www.cs.montana.edu/courses/csci566/Ref/CR-Survey.pdf

NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey

/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

We consider a distributed power control scheme for wireless ad hoc networks, in which each user announces a price that reflects compensation paid by other users for their interference. We present an asynchronous distributed algorithm for updating power levels and prices. By relating this algorithm to myopic best response updates in a fictitious game, we are able to characterize convergence using supermodular game theory. Extensions of this algorithm to a multichannel network are also presented, in which users can allocate their power across multiple frequency bands.

/pdf/distributed-interference-compensation-for-wireless-networks-rhr87gv23f.pdf

Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks

We consider a user communicating over a fading channel with perfect channel state information. Data are assumed to arrive from some higher layer application and are stored in a buffer until transmitted. We study adapting the user's transmission rate and power based on the channel state information as well as the buffer occupancy; the objectives are to regulate both the long-term average transmission power and the average buffer delay incurred by the traffic. Two models for this situation are discussed; one corresponding to fixed-length/variable-rate codewords and one corresponding to variable-length codewords. The tradeoff between the average delay and the average transmission power required for reliable communication is analyzed. A dynamic programming formulation is given to find all Pareto optimal power/delay operating points. We then quantify the behavior of this tradeoff in the regime of asymptotically large delay. In this regime, we characterize simple buffer control policies which exhibit optimal characteristics. Connections to the delay-limited capacity and the expected capacity of fading channels are also discussed.

/pdf/communication-over-fading-channels-with-delay-constraints-1fsq2d90hg.pdf

Communication over fading channels with delay constraints

We study auction mechanisms for sharing spectrum among a group of users, subject to a constraint on the interference temperature at a measurement point. The users access the channel using spread spectrum signaling and so interfere with each other. Each user receives a utility that is a function of the received signal-to-interference plus noise ratio. We propose two auction mechanisms for allocating the received power. The first is an auction in which users are charged for received SINR, which, when combined with logarithmic utilities, leads to a weighted max-min fair SINR allocation. The second is an auction in which users are charged for power, which maximizes the total utility when the bandwidth is large enough and the receivers are co-located. Both auction mechanisms are shown to be socially optimal for a limiting "large system" with co-located receivers, where bandwidth, power and the number of users are increased in fixed proportion. We also formulate an iterative and distributed bid updating algorithm, and specify conditions under which this algorithm converges globally to the Nash equilibrium of the auction.

/pdf/auction-based-spectrum-sharing-3303mx1wx6.pdf

Auction-based spectrum sharing

Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) with dynamic scheduling and resource allocation is a key component of most emerging broadband wireless access networks such as WiMAX and LTE (long term evolution) for 3GPP. However, scheduling and resource allocation in an OFDM system is complicated, especially in the uplink due to two reasons: (i) the discrete nature of subchannel assignments, and (ii) the heterogeneity of the users' subchannel conditions, individual resource constraints and application requirements. We approach this problem using a gradient-based scheduling framework. Physical layer resources (bandwidth and power) are allocated to maximize the projection onto the gradient of a total system utility function which models application-layer Quality of Service (QoS). This is formulated as a convex optimization problem and solved using a dual decomposition approach. This optimal solution has prohibitively high computational complexity but reveals guiding principles that we use to generate lower complexity sub-optimal algorithms. We analyze the complexity and compare the performance of these algorithms via extensive simulations.

/pdf/joint-scheduling-and-resource-allocation-in-uplink-ofdm-iqon3un4jf.pdf

Joint scheduling and resource allocation in uplink OFDM systems for broadband wireless access networks

We consider scheduling and resource allocation for the downlink of a cellular OFDM system, with various practical considerations including integer tone allocations, different sub-channelization schemes, maximum SNR constraint per tone, and "self-noise" due to channel estimation errors and phase noise. During each time-slot a subset of users must be scheduled, and the available tones and transmission power must be allocated among them. Employing a gradient-based scheduling scheme presented in earlier papers reduces this to an optimization problem to be solved in each time-slot. Using a dual formulation, we give an optimal algorithm for this problem when multiple users can time-share each tone. We then give several low complexity heuristics that enforce integer tone allocations. Simulations are used to compare the performance of different algorithms.

/pdf/downlink-scheduling-and-resource-allocation-for-ofdm-systems-3522phknst.pdf

Randall A. Berry

Papers

Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks

Communication over fading channels with delay constraints

Auction-based spectrum sharing

Joint scheduling and resource allocation in uplink OFDM systems for broadband wireless access networks

Downlink scheduling and resource allocation for OFDM systems