世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

The gravity model has been widely used to infer substantial trade flow effects of institutions such as customs unions and exchange rate mechanisms. McCallum [1995] found that the US-Canada border led to trade between provinces that is a factor 22 (2,200%) times trade between states and provinces, a spectacular puzzle in light of the low formal barriers on this border. We show that the gravity model usually estimated does not correspond to the theory behind it. We solve the 'border puzzle' by applying the theory seriously. We find that national borders reduce trade between the US and Canada by about 44%, while reducing trade among other industrialized countries by about 30%. McCallum's spectacular headline number is the result of a combination of omitted variables bias and the small size of the Canadian economy. Within-Canada trade rises by a factor 6 due to the border. In contrast, within-US trade rises 25%.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=256086

Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle

This article builds a theoretical framework to help explain governance patterns in global value chains It draws on three streams of literature ‐ transaction costs economics, production networks, and technological capability and firm-level learning ‐ to identify three variables that play a large role in determining how global value chains are governed and change These are: (1) the complexity of transactions, (2) the ability to codify transactions, and (3) the capabilities in the supply-base The theory generates five types of global value chain governance ‐ hierarchy, captive, relational, modular, and market ‐ which range from high to low levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry The article highlights the dynamic and overlapping nature of global value chain governance through four brief industry case studies: bicycles, apparel, horticulture and electronics

/pdf/the-governance-of-global-value-chains-3dmchifo7i.pdf

The governance of global value chains

Gravity equations have been widely used to infer trade flow effects of various institutional arrangements. We show that estimated gravity equations do not have a theoretical foundation. This implies both that estimation suffers from omitted variables bias and that comparative statics analysis is unfounded. We develop a method that (i) consistently and efficiently estimates a theoretical gravity equation and (ii) correctly calculates the comparative statics of trade frictions. We apply the method to solve the famous McCallum border puzzle. Applying our method, we find that national borders reduce trade between industrialized countries by moderate amounts of 20-50 percent.

/pdf/gravity-with-gravitas-a-solution-to-the-border-puzzle-4dn7us6msp.pdf

This paper develops techniques for empirically analyzing demand and supply in differentiated products markets and then applies these techniques to analyze equilibrium in the U.S. automobile industry. Our primary goal is to present a framework which enables one to obtain estimates of demand and cost parameters for a class of oligopolistic differentiated products markets. These estimates can be obtained using only widely available product-level and aggregate consumer-level data, and they are consistent with a structural model of equilibrium in an oligopolistic industry. When we apply the tech- niques developed here to the U.S. automobile market, we obtain cost and demand parameters for (essentially) all models marketed over a twenty year period.

/pdf/automobile-prices-in-market-equilibrium-1w0xnf91hi.pdf

Automobile prices in market equilibrium

Dooley et al (2003, 2004a,b,c) argue that China seeks to raise urban employment by 10-12 million persons per year, with about 30% of that coming from export growth. In fact, total employment increased by 7.5-8 million per year over 1997-2005. We estimate that export growth over 1997-2002 contributed at most 2.5 million jobs per year, with most of the employment gains coming from non-traded goods like construction. Exports grew much faster over the 2000-2005 period, which could in principal explain the entire increase in employment. However, the growth in domestic demand led to three-times more employment gains than did exports over 2000-2005, while productivity growth subtracted the same amount again from employment. We conclude that exports have become increasingly important in stimulating employment in China, but that the same gains could be obtained from growth in domestic demand, especially for tradable goods, which has been stagnant until at least 2002.

ChinaAS Exports and Employment

The purpose of the paper is to measure the potential bias in the U.S. import price index due to the appearance of new product varieties, or new foreign suppliers, and determine the effect of this bias on the estimated income elasticity of import demand. Existing import price indexes are based on a sample of products from importing firms. We argue that if the share of import expenditure on the sampled products is falling over time, this will lead to an upward bias in the measured index. Using a correction based on the falling expenditure share on sampled countries, we find that the income elasticity of aggregate U.S. import demand is reduced from 2.5 to 1.7, or about halfway to unity. Our estimates suggest that the aggregate import price index is upward biased by about one and one-half percentage points annually.

/pdf/bias-in-u-s-import-prices-and-demand-29pdnkndnn.pdf

Bias in U.S. Import Prices and Demand

In this paper we develop a monopolistic competition model where firms exercise their market power across multiple products. Even with CES preferences, markups are endogenous. Firms choose their optimal product scope by balancing the net profits from a new variety against the costs of "cannibalizing" their own sales. With identical costs across firms, opening trade leads to fewer firms surviving in each country but more varieties produced by each of those firms. With heterogeneous costs, the number of firms surviving in equilibrium is quite insensitive to the market size. When trade is opened, more firms initially enter, but the larger market size reduces the cannibalization effect and expands the optimal scope of products. As a result, the less efficient firms exit, and the larger market is accommodated by more efficient firms that produce more varieties per firm on average.

Optimal Choice of Product Scope for Multiproduct Firms under Monopolistic Competition

We argue that the incomplete information which the government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect them from import competition. Using a model where agents have private information about their endowments, we solve for the optimal government policy subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive compatibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint. We find that the optimal policy takes the form of nonlinear tariffs. These tariffs are never complete, in the sense of bringing prices back to their initial level, but always allow some individuals to be strictly better off than at the initial prices.

/pdf/distributing-the-gains-from-trade-with-incomplete-4ve1x1snlr.pdf

Distributing the gains from trade with incomplete information

This paper generates persistent effects of a monetary disturbance in the context of staggered price-setters. Previous research has been restricted by the CES functional form to price-setting rules that are constant markups over marginal costs. The present paper considers a translog form for preferences and an input-output structure for production in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of monopolistically competitive staggered price-setters. We derive a price-setting rule that is a function of milrginal cost and also competitors'' prices. This rule better captures the interaction of price-setters envisioned in Tajlor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) in their early work on staggered contracts. The model is able to generate reasonable persistence, and also confirms the conjecture of Taylor and Blanchard that increasing the number of contracting groups increases the degree of persistence.

Robert C. Feenstra

Papers

ChinaAS Exports and Employment

Bias in U.S. Import Prices and Demand

Optimal Choice of Product Scope for Multiproduct Firms under Monopolistic Competition

Distributing the gains from trade with incomplete information

staggered price setting and endogenous persistence