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Robert H. Lande
Researcher at University of Baltimore
Publications - 103
Citations - 1421
Robert H. Lande is an academic researcher from University of Baltimore. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Damages. The author has an hindex of 22, co-authored 102 publications receiving 1374 citations. Previous affiliations of Robert H. Lande include University of Notre Dame & University of Florida.
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Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged
TL;DR: In this article, a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Celler-Kefauver Act, and FTC Act is presented, showing that Congress's overriding concern when it enacted each law was with protecting consumers from paying supracompetitive prices.
Posted Content
Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law
Neil W. Averitt,Robert H. Lande +1 more
TL;DR: The relationship between consumer choice and consumer protection law is discussed in this paper, where the authors define each area of law, delineate the boundary between them, and show how they interact with each other, and how they ultimately support one another as the two component parts of an overarching unity.
Posted Content
Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the competing price effects of market power increases and efficiency gains in the most relevant context: significant mergers in concentrated markets and derive four general oligopoly models and evaluate them over all reasonable ranges for their underlying parameters.
Posted Content
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement
Robert H. Lande,Alan A. Fisher +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the Williamsonian tradeoff is re-do, using price to consumers, instead of net efficiencies, as the focus, and the authors show how a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger.
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Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal and show that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally.