Robert H. Lande

TL;DR: This article showed that significant net efficiencies from a merger could cause prices to decrease, even if the merger results in a monopoly, and showed that a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger than would an efficiency focus.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that class actions are virtually the only way for most victims of antitrust violations to receive compensation, and that most successful class actions involve collusion that was anticompetitive.

TL;DR: Werden et al. as mentioned in this paper showed that private enforcement "probably" deters even more antic-competitive conduct than the almost universally admired anti-cartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present evidence showing that private enforcement of the antitrust laws is serving its intended purposes and is in the public interest, and they demonstrate that the amount of money each action recovered, what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, whether the private litigation was preceded by government action, and the attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel, on whose behalf money were recovered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers or a competitor), and the kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted.