/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

Multi-sided platforms coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers who need each other in some way. Dating clubs, for example, enable men and women to meet each other; magazines provide a way for advertisers to find an audience, and computer operating system vendors provide software that applications users and applications developers can use together. When devising pricing and investment strategies, multi-sided platforms must account for interactions among the demands of multiple groups of customers. In theory, the optimal price to customers on one side of the platform is not based on a markup formula such as the Lerner condition, and price does not track marginal cost. Indeed, many actual platform businesses charge one side little or nothing-shopping malls seldom charge shoppers; operating system vendors give developers many services for free; most Internet portals and free television providers do not charge viewers. Competition among platforms takes place in multi-sided markets in which seemingly distinct customer groups are connected through interdependent demand and a platform that, acting as an intermediary, internalizes the resulting indirect network externalities. Multi-sided platforms arise in many economically significant industries from media to payment systems and software; they arise in bricks and mortar industries such as shopping malls as well as information-based industries such as portals. The economics of platform competition has implications for analyzing antitrust and regulatory policies affecting businesses that compete in multi-sided markets. For example, market definition and market power analyses that focus on a single side will lead to analytical errors; since pricing and production decisions are based on coordinating demand among interdependent customer groups, one must consider the multiple market sides in analyzing competitive effects and strategies. To take another example, efficient pricing may result in setting price on a particular market side below measures of average variable or marginal cost incurred for customers on that market side. Economic analysis that

https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=yjreg

The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets

Preface 1. Introduction 2. Four popular misconceptions about franchising 3. Franchise contracts 4. Franchising, vertical integration, and vertical restraints 5. Quality control 6. Franchise tying contracts 7. Vertical price controls in franchising 8. Encroachment 9. Advertising and promotion 10. Termination and non-renewal 11. Concluding remarks.

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/72525/frontmatter/9780521772525_frontmatter.pdf

The Economics of Franchising

We describe a simple initial indicator of whether a proposed merger between rivals in a differentiated product industry is likely to raise prices through unilateral effects. Our diagnostic calibrates upward pricing pressure (UPP) resulting from the merger, based on the price/cost margins of the merging firms’ products and the extent of direct substitution between them. As a screen for likely unilateral effects, this approach is practical, more transparent, and better grounded in economics than are concentration-based methods.

/pdf/antitrust-evaluation-of-horizontal-mergers-an-economic-1o71a1qams.pdf

Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition

The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion.This Article argues that, because there is no support for these empirical assertions, policymakers should reject the policy suggestions that follow. Finally,some policy alternatives are proposed for consideration by the antitrust community.

/pdf/should-predatory-pricing-rules-immunize-exclusionary-2y68xqk949.pdf

Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts

A MYTH IS A STORY, TALE, OR LEGEND that has never been proven. Myths are often related as if they were true and often are assumed to be true—frequently by interested parties. But there is never any solid evidence that they are true. By analogy, there might well be unicorns, dragons, or abominable snowmen somewhere in the world. But until someone produces one, we are justified to call each only a myth. Similarly, neither the Antitrust Modernization Commission (“AMC”) nor anyone else should make judicial or public policy decisions based upon myths, unless of course someone presents solid evidence proving that the myths actually are true. The principal myths of antitrust damages are: Myth #1. Antitrust violations give rise to treble damages. Myth #2. There is “duplication” of antitrust damages because many defendants pay six-fold or more damages. Myth #3. Courts should go easy on defendants when formulating liability rules or calculating overcharges because the awarded damages from a finding of an antitrust violation are so severe. Myth #4. The size of the harms caused by antitrust violations,

/pdf/five-myths-about-antitrust-damages-3jh5bzund1.pdf

Five Myths about Antitrust Damages

This is an introduction to a symposium on Creating Competition for Transition Economies. This article provides an overview of the topic, and also briefly introduces the authors of the articles in the symposium; William Kovacic, Eleanor Fox, Spencer Weber Waller, Malcolm Coate, and Armando Rodriguez.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1447880_code973828.pdf?abstractid=1447880&mirid=1

Creating Competition Policy for Transition Economies

This Paper presents information about forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases. To do this, the paper gathers information about each case, including, inter alia, (1) the amount of money each action recovered for the victims of each alleged antitrust violation, (2) what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, (3) whether government action preceded the private litigation, (4) the attorney's fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel, (5) on whose behalf money was recovered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor), and (6) the kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted (rule of reason, per se, or a combination of the two). A separate Study, forthcoming in the University of San Francisco Law Review (available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090661), aggregates and analyzes this information. That Study also compares the total monetary amounts paid in all forty cases, as well as from the subset of the forty cases that also resulted in criminal penalties, to the total criminal antitrust fines imposed during the same period by the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and also to the deterrence effects of the prison sentences that resulted from DOJ prosecutions during this period. The overall goal of the project is to take a first step toward providing an empirical basis for assessing whether private enforcement of the antitrust laws serves its intended purposes and is in the public interest. The results of the Study show that private antitrust enforcement helps the economy in many ways. It very significantly compensates victims of illegal corporate behavior, and is almost always the only way they can receive redress. Private enforcement often prevents foreign corporations from keeping the many billions of dollars they illegally obtain from individual and corporate purchasers in the United States. The Study also shows that almost half of the underlying violations were first uncovered by private attorneys, not government enforcers, and that litigation in many other cases had a mixed public/private origin. The evidence also shows that private litigation probably does more to deter antitrust violations than all the fines and incarceration imposed as a result of criminal enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice. This is one of the most surprising results from our Study. We do not know of any past study that has documented that private enforcement has such a significant deterrence effect as compared to DOJ criminal enforcement.

/pdf/benefits-from-private-antitrust-enforcement-forty-individual-3fp0cl93i3.pdf

Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies

Antitrust is in one of its periodic states of decline. Historically, it has rebounded from these valleys to rise to even higher peaks of enthusiastic public and political popularity. The first period of substantial antitrust activity began 15 years after the passage of the Sherman Act, and lasted into the 1920s. The Great Depression saw antitrust at its lowest, followed by Thurman Arnold's aggressive tenure, but World War II was hardly a period of great antitrust enthusiasm. The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 began the golden age of antitrust, a period that lasted until the middle 1970s. So far, each rebound has resulted in broader and more vigorous antitrust enforcement efforts.

/pdf/the-end-of-antitrust-or-a-new-beginning-15wkz2hqy1.pdf

Robert H. Lande

Papers

Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts

Five Myths about Antitrust Damages

Creating Competition Policy for Transition Economies

Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies

The End of Antitrust—Or a New Beginning?