/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

Multi-sided platforms coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers who need each other in some way. Dating clubs, for example, enable men and women to meet each other; magazines provide a way for advertisers to find an audience, and computer operating system vendors provide software that applications users and applications developers can use together. When devising pricing and investment strategies, multi-sided platforms must account for interactions among the demands of multiple groups of customers. In theory, the optimal price to customers on one side of the platform is not based on a markup formula such as the Lerner condition, and price does not track marginal cost. Indeed, many actual platform businesses charge one side little or nothing-shopping malls seldom charge shoppers; operating system vendors give developers many services for free; most Internet portals and free television providers do not charge viewers. Competition among platforms takes place in multi-sided markets in which seemingly distinct customer groups are connected through interdependent demand and a platform that, acting as an intermediary, internalizes the resulting indirect network externalities. Multi-sided platforms arise in many economically significant industries from media to payment systems and software; they arise in bricks and mortar industries such as shopping malls as well as information-based industries such as portals. The economics of platform competition has implications for analyzing antitrust and regulatory policies affecting businesses that compete in multi-sided markets. For example, market definition and market power analyses that focus on a single side will lead to analytical errors; since pricing and production decisions are based on coordinating demand among interdependent customer groups, one must consider the multiple market sides in analyzing competitive effects and strategies. To take another example, efficient pricing may result in setting price on a particular market side below measures of average variable or marginal cost incurred for customers on that market side. Economic analysis that

https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=yjreg

The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets

Preface 1. Introduction 2. Four popular misconceptions about franchising 3. Franchise contracts 4. Franchising, vertical integration, and vertical restraints 5. Quality control 6. Franchise tying contracts 7. Vertical price controls in franchising 8. Encroachment 9. Advertising and promotion 10. Termination and non-renewal 11. Concluding remarks.

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/72525/frontmatter/9780521772525_frontmatter.pdf

The Economics of Franchising

We describe a simple initial indicator of whether a proposed merger between rivals in a differentiated product industry is likely to raise prices through unilateral effects. Our diagnostic calibrates upward pricing pressure (UPP) resulting from the merger, based on the price/cost margins of the merging firms’ products and the extent of direct substitution between them. As a screen for likely unilateral effects, this approach is practical, more transparent, and better grounded in economics than are concentration-based methods.

/pdf/antitrust-evaluation-of-horizontal-mergers-an-economic-1o71a1qams.pdf

Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition

Chicago School antitrust policy rests upon the premise that the sole purpose of antitrust is to promote economic efficiency. This article shows that this foundation is flawed. The fundamental purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers. To protect purchasers from paying supracompetitive prices when they buy goods or services. This is the "wealth transfer," "theft", "consumer welfare" or "purchaser protection" explanation for antitrust. The article shows that the efficiency view originated in a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act undertaken by Robert Bork. Bork purported to show that Congress only cared about enhancing economic efficiency.To analyze Bork's arguments, this article first explains the underlying economic concepts, including Bork's misleading definition of the term, "consumer surplus" when he should have used the term "total surplus". This article then analyzes the legislative histories of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Celler-Kefauver Act, and FTC Act. This analysis demonstrates that Congress's overriding concern when it enacted each law was with protecting consumers from paying supracompetitive prices. Congress did this because it believed that illegally acquired supracompetitive pricing constituted an "unfair" transfer of purchasers' property to firms with market power. Economic efficiency was only a secondary concern.The only exception is the law's goal of protecting small sellers from anticompetitive behavior by buyers with illegally gained monopsony power. This limited concern, however, is just the mirror image of Congress' desire to protect purchasers from exploitation. In both buy-side and sell-side cases, the overarching goal is the same - preventing firms that have unfairly acquired power from imposing noncompetitive prices or non-price terms on those they do business with. In both cases these firms "unfairly" acquire wealth. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare of consumers and total welfare (e.g., a merger that raises prices but reduces costs), courts should choose purchaser protection over economic efficiency. This conclusion supports a more aggressive approach to many areas of antitrust.

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Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged

This article is about the relationship between antitrust and consumer protection law. Its purpose is to define each area of law, to delineate the boundary between them, to show how they interact with each other, and to show how they ultimately support one another as the two component parts of an overarching unity: effective consumer choice (also called consumer sovereignty).Consumer choice only is effective when two fundamental conditions are present. There must be a range of consumer options made possible through competition, and consumers must be able to choose effectively among these options. The antitrust laws are intended to ensure that the marketplace remains competitive, unimpaired by practices such as price fixing or anticompetitive mergers. The consumer protection laws are then intended to ensure that consumers can choose effectively from among those options, with their critical faculties unimpaired by such violations as deception or the withholding of material information. Protection at both levels is needed to ensure that a market economy can continue to operate effectively.Legal protection of this sort is required only when the free market is not working properly. This article will demonstrate that antitrust violations stem from market failures in the general marketplace external to consumers, whereas consumer protection violations flow from market failures that take place, in a sense, "inside the consumer's heads."This approach provides a coherent theoretical platform from which antitrust and consumer protection law may be better understood and applied. It also has significant practical consequences, many of which are explored in this article. This article is a companion piece to "Using the Consumer Choice to Antitrust Law," 74 Antitrust Law Journal 175 (2007), which can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121459.

/pdf/consumer-sovereignty-a-unified-theory-of-antitrust-and-3cs2i451ax.pdf

Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law

When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate efficiency gains? The dominant belief has been that the government and courts should evaluate these mergers solely in terms of economic efficiency. Congress, however, wanted the courts to stop any merger significantly likely to raise prices. Substantially likely efficiency gains should therefore affect the legality of mergers to the extent that they are likely to prevent price increases. This standard is more strict than the economic efficiency criterion, because the latter would permit mergers substantially likely to lead to higher prices, if sufficient efficiency gains were substantially likely.The authors analyze the competing price effects of market power increases and efficiency gains in the most relevant context: significant mergers in concentrated markets - oligopoly. They derive four general oligopoly models and evaluate them over all reasonable ranges for their underlying parameters. This methodology avoids biases due to overly restrictive assumptions.By using the Merger Guideline standards and data from mergers that the Federal Trade Commission closely examined, the authors analyze empirically relevant tradeoffs between market power increases and efficiency gains. They find that decreases in marginal costs of 0 to 9% could be necessary to prevent price gains from mergers typical of those the government regularly evaluates. Cost savings in the upper portions of this range are far larger than those that previous authors have suggested would be necessary to compensate for efficiency losses from most mergers. They are also far greater than efficiency gains that one could realistically predict from virtually any merger. Moreover, if a merger significantly increased the probability of collusion, the required cost savings would be even greater.The authors' models and a large number of practical considerations suggest that implicit consideration of efficiency gains, through adjustment of the standards for horizontal mergers, would be better than an explicit case-by-case efficiency defense.

Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers

This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to mergers (a wealth transfer concern). This is the first article to show how to analyze mergers with this goal in mind. Doing so challenges the fundamental underpinnings of Williamsonian merger analysis (which assumes mergers should be evaluated only in terms of net efficiency effects).In this and three related articles we re-do the Williamsonian tradeoff, using price to consumers, instead of net efficiencies, as our focus. We show how a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger. We demonstrate this by calculating how large the necessary efficiency gains would have to be to prevent price increases under different market conditions. We also show that under efficiency analysis even a tiny cost savings would justify almost any merger, so a purely efficiency-based approach effectively would negate the anti-merger laws! Finally, we demonstrate that price analysis is much more predictable and easier to administer than efficiency analysis.

Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement

This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom is that the current level of sanctions is adequate or excessive. The article demonstrates, however, that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Consequently, the average level of United States anti-cartel sanctions should be approximately quintupled. The United States imposes a diverse arsenal of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest and fines for the corporate officials involved. Both direct and indirect victims can sue for mandatory treble damages and attorney's fees. This multiplicity of sanctions has helped give rise to the strongly held - but until now never seriously examined - conventional wisdom in the antitrust field that these sanctions are not just adequate to deter collusion, but that they are excessive. We analyze this issue using the standard optimal deterrence approach. This model is predicated upon the belief that corporations and individuals contemplating illegal collusion will be deterred only if expected rewards are less than expected costs, adjusted by the probability the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned. To undertake this analysis we first calculate the expected rewards from cartelization using a new and unique database containing 75 cartel cases. We survey the literature to ascertain the probability cartels are detected and the probability detected cartels are sanctioned. We calculate the size of the sanctions involved for each case in our sample. These include corporate fines, individual fines, payouts in private damage actions, and the equivalent value (or disvalue) of imprisonment or house arrest for the individuals convicted. Our analysis shows that, overall, United States' cartel sanctions are only 9% to 21% as large as they should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. This means that, despite the existing sanctions, collusion remains a rational business strategy. Cartelization is a crime that on average pays. In fact, it pays very well. Accordingly, our concluding section suggests specific ways cartel sanctions should be increased to become more nearly optimal. This should save consumers many billions of dollars each year.

/pdf/cartels-as-rational-business-strategy-crime-pays-1ot8gdip8p.pdf

Robert H. Lande

Papers

Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged

Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law

Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers

Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement

Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays