Showing papers by "Robert J. Thomas published in 1998"

Thermal unit commitment including optimal AC power flow constraints

Abstract: The authors propose a new algorithm for unit commitment that employs a Lagrange relaxation technique with a new augmentation of the Lagrangian. The new augmentation involves a duplication of variables that allows relaxation of the coupling between generator time-spanning constraints and system-wide instantaneous constraints. This framework allows the possibility of committing units that are required for the VArs that they can produce, as well as for their real power. Furthermore, although the algorithm is very CPU-intensive, the separation structure of the Lagrangian allows its implementation in parallel computers. Their work builds upon that of Batut and Renaud (1992), as well as that of Baldick (1995).

An Internet-based platform for testing generation scheduling auctions

Abstract: The paper describes the uses and architecture of a network-centered computing-rich software platform called PowerWeb. PowerWeb was designed and built as a simulation environment for experimentally testing various power exchange auction markets through tournaments. It is designed to host simulations of a competitive "day-ahead" electric energy market in the content of a restructured electric power industry. The PowerWeb environment is meant to be flexible so as to accommodate different "rules of the game". The authors describe its interactive, distributed and Web-based character.

"Markets for Electric Power: Experimental Results for Alternative Auction Institutions"

Abstract: Copyright 1998 IEEE. Published in the Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference On System Sciences,January 6-9, 1997, Kona, Hawaii.Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising orpromotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuseany copyrighted component of this work in other works, must be obtained from the IEEE. Contact: Manager,Copyrights and Permissions/IEEE Service Center/445 Hoes Lane/P.O. Box 1331/Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331,USA. Telephone: + Intl. 908-562-3966.

Experimental results for single period auctions

Abstract: The objective of the paper is to present experimental results for testing the performance of different auction mechanisms related to the introduction of competitive markets for the generation of electricity. The research is based on the concept of smart markets introduced by Vernon Smith (K.A. McCabe et al., 1991) and a simulation model (PowerWeb) of a realistic bulk power system. There are unique physical aspects associated with the supply of electricity (e.g. required instantaneous matching of supply and demand, unintended congestion of parallel transmission routes and maintenance of system stability in response to disturbances). As a result, traditional theories of efficient markets and auction structures developed for other commodities may not be efficient if applied without alteration to markets for electricity. Conversely, current utility rules of operation developed for a centrally planned regime may not be appropriate in a competitive environment. The research does not address the issues of multiperiod operations (unit commitment) and multidimensional markets (ancillary services), and considers only real power in a single time period. The main objective is to test three alternative auction mechanisms when market power is a potential problem. This situation occurs when limits on transmission lines are binding to form a load pocket in which demand is met by a few (in this case two) generators.