/pdf/dynamics-of-iranian-saudi-relations-in-the-persian-gulf-1bfslmverb.pdf

Dynamics of Iranian-Saudi Relations in the Persian Gulf Regional Security Complex (1920-1979)

In this dissertation, Borhanedin A. Yassin analyses Kurdish nationalism, particularly in Iran, by examining a variety of factors, some within the Kurdish community itself, others lying outside of it, i.e. in the policy of the states where the Kurds reside, and in the wider international arena. In this study the Kurdish people are linked to major developments in the period 1941-1947, with particular emphasis on the policy of the Great Powers vis-a-vis the Kurds.

Vision or Reality? The Kurds in the Policy of the Great Powers, 1941–1947

The World Development Report 1993 (WDR), on Investing in Health, represents a major contribution to the field of health and development. At a time when the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN agency with the most direct mandate in health, seems to have lost its organizational compass, the World Bank has asserted its discovery of the right compass for health development and the method for using that compass. Moreover, the World Bank is willing to loan money to countries to use its compass. The deal is hard to resist. The 1993 WDR can be read as the user’s manual for the World Bank’s new health compass, and like any user’s manual, the 1993 WDR has its accomplishments and its problems. First, the accomplishments. Simply put, the 1993 WDR has changed the terms of discourse in international health development. While the director general of the WHO has presented a ‘‘new paradigm,’’ which is difficult to comprehend and even more difficult to apply to a specific problem, the World Bank has proposed a universal method to set health policy priorities for all countries. It is hard to think of a recent WHO publication with similar impact on thinking about health policy priorities. Although many of the WHO staff participated in the technical analyses in the WDR, the document is widely perceived as a World Bank statement. But the 1993 WDR is more than a report; it presents a view on health development, a method for assessment, and an agenda for action. The WDR succinctly summarized its position as follows: ‘‘Priority should go to those health problems that cause a large disease burden and for which cost-effective interventions are available’’ (p. 63). The WDR calculates what it calls ‘‘the global burden of disease’’ using a new measure, the disability-adjusted life year (DALY), defined

When Capitalists Collide

: Eisenhower preferred to build consensus for his military and national strategies by using multiple communication techniques to convey his intent If consensus was not achieved, and his intent was not carried out, he would aggressively move to eliminate the source of friction This monograph will analyze four case studies to demonstrate that it is critically important for subordinates and peers to understand the influence of leadership styles on strategic decision makers The first case study is Eisenhower's fight to control Allied strategic bombers to support Operation Overlord in 1944 The second is his fight to develop, implement, and defend his New Look National Security Strategy in 1953 The third is how Eisenhower defended his administration's Middle East foreign policy, and the fourth is his strategy to seek a peaceful solution to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 Three frameworks are used in the construction of each case study The first framework explains the reasons why Eisenhower pursued his strategies, how he communicated his intent, and how he would put together a team to build towards a favorable consensus The second framework shows how some of Eisenhower's key subordinates and peers resisted his intent, and at times would either actively deceive him or attempt to subvert his strategy The final framework demonstrates the actions that Eisenhower took to eliminate those sources of friction The monograph contains four conclusions First, Eisenhower believed strongly in the reasons behind his strategies, which provided the motivation to pursue their implementation Second is his preference for a team and consensus-building approach to strategy development Third is that Eisenhower used multiple methods to communicate his intent and the importance of his strategies Fourth is that if subordinates or peers did not support his strategy, he would try to persuade them to agree, but if they did not see his vision, he would eliminate the threat to his strategy

Eisenhower's Pursuit of Strategy: The Importance of Understanding the Influence of Leadership Styles on Strategic Decision Makers

......................................................................................................................... i CONTENTS......................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................. vi ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................................................... vii

Robert W. Stookey

Papers

The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War Peter L. Hahn

The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919-1945 Phillip J. Baram